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In July 1979, Nigeria’s federal military government declared a 100% takeover of 
select operations belonging to the London-based oil company, British Petroleum (BP). 
The takeover of BP marked the takeover of Nigeria’s most lucrative industry that had 
been controlled by foreign investors. Within the secondary literature a more elaborate 
version of this event is offered by scholars, declaring it nationalization with little 
agreement over why this “Giant of West Africa” nationalization BP. Some mention South 
Africa, others Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe); some mention oil, while 
others solely discuss UK diplomacy. Why the discrepancy over the reason for 
nationalization? This project sets out to explain not only why Nigeria nationalized BP in 
1979, but also how the nationalization fits into the broad theoretical discussions on 
nationalism, economic policy, foreign relations, and nationalization. It challenges the 
popular narrative of why Nigeria nationalized BP and substantially revises it. The 
argument is put forward that the nationalization of BP hinged almost entirely on the 
notion of economic nationalism and that the nationalization fit into an established trend 
of takeovers aimed at foreign companies. The federal military government simply used 
 v
southern Africa –discussed as the sole reason for nationalization within the secondary 
literature– as a way to bolster international support. This project also project uses the 
nationalization as a looking-glass into Nigeria and its oil industry during the 1970s. Also, 
this project addresses the impact the nationalization had on Nigerian society. With regard 
to nationalism, Nigeria represents an excellent case for understanding the existence and 
application of economic nationalism, which functions not only as a subject of study much 
like ethnic nationalism or civic nationalism, but also as a new perspective on the 
relationship between the various expressions of nationalism and economic policy. 
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Introduction 
On 30 July 1979, Festus Marinho, the managing director of the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company (NNPC) on behalf of Nigeria’s military leader, General1 Olusegun 
Obasanjo, dispatched a telegram to BP (Nigeria) Ltd. stating that Nigeria intended to 
“increase its participation to 100%” in Shell-BP and BP (Nigeria).2 He went on to say that 
the decision stemmed from the United Kingdom’s proposed change in policy favoring the 
resumption of oil supplies to South Africa.3 Not surprisingly, this same message was 
repeated in Nigeria’s government-monitored newspapers a day or two later. Scholars who 
included this event in their studies of Nigeria, however, produced a simplified and 
dramatized version of the declaration by stating that Nigeria ―one of the world’s largest 
producers and exporters of petroleum― had “nationalized” the London-based British oil 
company, British Petroleum. Within these work we find little agreement over why this 
“Giant of West Africa” nationalized BP. Some mention South Africa, others Southern 
Rhodesia4 (present-day Zimbabwe); some mention oil, while others solely discuss UK 
diplomacy. Why the discrepancy over the reason for nationalization? And, why did 
Marinho use the term participation and not nationalization when addressing BP? The 
terms suggest similar processes of transferring financial ownership and control of a 
                                                 
1 Over the span of several decades, many leading figures in Nigeria’s history underwent several changes in 
military ranking. For the purpose of consistency, only highest ranking is used in this work.  
2 “BP Nigeria,” memo from Shell International Petroleum (London) to BP (London), 30 July 1979, BP 
4823. Hereafter, Shell International Petroleum (London) is cited as simply Shell (London). 
3 “Nationalisation,” memo from Shell (London) to BP (London), 31 July 1979, BP 4823, 1. 
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foreign company into Nigerian hands, but carry very distinct messages pertaining to 
nationalism, economic interests, and global outlook. In looking how the announcement 
has been presented, it is evident that the nationalization of BP was more complicated than 
suggested in public reports with regard to Nigeria’s intended purpose, execution, and 
reasoning.  
Nigeria is one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of oil in the world. 
The success of Nigeria’s industry comes from the high quality of crude oil –low in sulfur 
and light in consistency– that it produces. Also, Nigeria’s proximity to Europe and the 
United States has given Nigeria a competitive edge over the Middle East in terms of 
marketing. The production of commercial quantities of oil in Nigeria was started in 1956 
by Shell-BP Petroleum Company (Shell-BP), but did not really take off until 1970. Much 
of Nigeria’s crude oil and natural gas fields are located in the Niger Delta, an ecologically 
sensitive area of mangrove swamps where its inhabitants depend on fishing and farming. 
In recent decades, the Niger Delta has become a hotbed of dispute between the oil 
companies, Nigerian state, and underrepresented ethnic groups living in the region. While 
the large-scale production of oil has generated a great deal of revenue for Nigeria, it has 
also created strong undercurrents of political and economic instability, particularly in the 
Niger Delta. Within this context, the nationalization of BP represented a major milestone 
for Nigeria’s oil industry. 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Southern Rhodesia became simply referred to as Rhodesia after its counterpart, Northern Rhodesia, 
became independent and changed its name to Zambia in 1964. The name change also reflected the period 
from 1965 to 1979 when it was ruled by a white-minority regime. Throughout this work it is referred to as 
Southern Rhodesia to respect those who did not see post-1965 developments as steps closer to 
independence from European, colonial rule. 
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The nationalization of BP marked a major takeover within Nigeria’s most 
lucrative industry that had been controlled by foreign investors. This put Nigeria’s state-
owned oil company, the NNPC, in a theoretically advantageous position within the 
largest company, Shell-BP, in the most profitable industry in the country. It also 
represented the last major transfer of control from a transnational company to a state-
owned company in Nigeria’s oil industry. Since the nationalization of BP almost thirty 
years ago, Nigeria’s oil industry has undergone only a few minor changes. For many 
Nigerians, it also indicated a high-point in history when Nigeria exercised a leadership 
position within the global struggle for liberation of southern Africa by using its oil as a 
political weapon. To capture the events that led to nationalization properly, the 
proceeding chapters start in the mid-1960s with Nigeria’s first military coup and the 
illegal declaration of independence by Southern Rhodesia and end in the late 1970s with 
the nationalization. Along similar lines, the nationalization also added the flare of 
removing yet another financial remnant of British colonial rule, which lasted from the 
mid-1800s to 1960. The UK-based company, BP (hereafter referred to as BP (London)), 
held a 50 percent share in Shell-BP and was involved in a number of oil companies 
operating in Nigeria. Within BP (London), the UK maintained a 40-60 percent share, 
which, for Nigerian nationalists, made BP the government’s pawn and a vestige of 
colonial rule. For Nigeria, taking over BP was not just about financial advantage, but 
about post-colonial sentiment. 
This project sets out to explain not only why Nigeria nationalized BP in 1979, but 
also how the event fits into the broad theoretical discussions on nationalism, economic 
policy, foreign relations, and nationalization. By engaging in a wide range of material on 
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the subject, I set out to answer several fundamental questions. I started with the simple 
questions of why BP and why 1979? Also, did the nationalization hinge on southern 
Africa and the use of oil as a political weapon as suggested by Marinho and the 
secondary literature or on internal political and economic policy pertaining to oil? What 
was the relationship between the nationalization and Nigeria’s quest for national unity? 
By examining the nationalization of BP, this project contributes to ongoing discussions of 
Nigeria’s oil industry, foreign policy, and quest for a national identity. 
This project deals with Nigeria’s oil history on two levels. The first level 
challenges the popular narrative of why Nigeria nationalized BP and substantially revises 
it. I argue that the nationalization of BP hinged almost entirely on the notion of economic 
nationalism and that the nationalization fit into an established trend of takeovers aimed at 
foreign companies operating within Nigeria. Obasanjo simply used southern Africa –
discussed as the sole reason for nationalization within the secondary literature– as a way 
to bolster international support, especially within the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU). Let us examine further the declaration made in the summer of 1979: Nigeria 
nationalized BP because of the UK’s alleged resumption of oil supplies to South Africa. 
The southern Africa conclusion leaves the question of why BP and why 1979 largely 
unanswered. Certainly, the UK’s and BP’s attitude toward, and activities within, southern 
Africa greatly frustrated Nigeria as the secondary literature suggests; however, the 
internal forces of grandiose economic policy explain why BP and why 1979 more clearly. 
These internal forces also explain the significance of Nigeria using the term participation 
instead of nationalization. 
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The second level of this project uses the nationalization as a looking-glass into 
Nigeria and its oil industry during the 1970s. In the proceeding chapters, I look at what 
insight the nationalization provides into issues of nationalism, oil policy, foreign 
relations, and nationalization. Also, this project addresses the impact the nationalization 
had on Nigerian society. While much of the analysis emphasizes my own perspective on 
the nationalization, I have found it useful to apply the popularly expressed one as a base-
point and as evidence of the power of nationalist language. For the second level of this 
project, I posed a separate series of questions regarding the relationship between oil and 
nationalism. These assisted in drawing conclusions about the roots of corruption and 
crisis in the Niger Delta. The non-profit organization, Transparency International, ranked 
Nigeria the second most corrupt country in the world in 2001.5 I argue that the spirit of 
nationalism through economic measures combined with personal greed greatly 
contributed to the presence of corruption so prevalent in Nigeria today. A look at oil and 
nationalism in Nigeria during the 1970s also offers some perspective on the crisis in the 
Niger Delta. Nationalism through economic policy placed the state in almost full control 
of its oil industry. I argue that the nationalization of BP in 1979 placed the state and the 
minority groups in the Niger Delta in direct contact with one another. Prior to the 
nationalization of BP, these delta citizens saw the military government as a potential ally 
against the transnational companies. The project also addresses questions regarding how 
the nationalization of BP fits into existing discussions on the concepts of nationalism and 
nationalization as they related to oil all over the world. Where does the case of Nigeria 
                                                 
5 Transparency International, “Corruptions Perceptions Index, 2001,” http://www.transparency.org/policy_ 
research/surveys_indices/cpi/2001 (accessed on 31 October 2006). 
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fit? Does it replicate expressions of nationalism and nationalization processes elsewhere 
in the world or is it unique? And, does the nationalization provide evidence for or against 
the popularly understood austere devotion to the liberation of southern Africa?  
With regard to nationalism, Nigeria represents an excellent case for understanding 
the existence and application of economic nationalism. Most works on nationalism focus 
on either organic nationalisms or constructed nationalisms; failing to include economic 
nationalism, which has the proven ability to unify fractured states and forge a unique 
identity that sets them apart from others. Economic nationalism functions not only as a 
subject of study much like ethnic nationalism or civic nationalism, but also as a new 
perspective on the relationship between the various expressions of nationalism and 
economic policy. The latter is concerned with not only the impact economic policy has on 
nationalism, but also the affect nationalism has on economic policy. As an increasingly 
integral part of a state’s application of constructed (or civic) nationalism, economic 
policy becomes equally important. In this sense, scholars often use the phrase nationalist 
economic policy.6  
Economic nationalism moves beyond that interpretation and allows for the 
interaction of economic policy and nationalism in Nigeria to take center stage, providing 
new interpretations of the past and tentative solutions for the future. The idea that 
economic nationalism represented the underlying driving force behind Nigeria’s 
nationalization of BP serves as the primary argument of this work. As a perspective, it 
places Nigeria’s economic policy in the center and allows us to assess the nationalization 
                                                 
6 Harry Johnson, “Economic Nationalism in New States,” in Nationalism, eds. John Hutchinson and 
Anthony D. Smith, 236-240 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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of BP through this lens. In this regard, economic nationalism as a method of study allows 
for a fresh interpretation of Nigeria’s nationalization of BP in 1979.  
 The nationalization of a transnational oil company in Nigeria represented an 
ideological break from other countries. In most cases involving oil-rich developing 
countries, nationalization resulted from disagreements over labor, royalties, or control. 
Grievances were presented to the oil companies, with great publicity, followed by a 
declaration of asset and operation seizure. Nationalization refers to the broad economic 
policies that transfer foreign property (also discussed as assets and operations), partially 
or completely, to either the state or local private owners.  
The case of Nigeria does not fit neatly into the existing definition of 
nationalization or the prevailing characteristics shaped by oil-rich developing countries 
outside Africa. Nigeria’s case indicates two distinct differences. First, unlike other 
countries, Nigeria did not declare nationalization; it called for an increase in participation. 
This is highly unusual, especially if we accept, for a moment, the idea that Nigeria was 
using its oil as a political weapon. Second, the fate of BP actually does fit into the 
definition of participation, as suggested by Marinho, because it marked the increase in 
equity shares within various interests held by BP. Participation, more so than any other 
term, suggests that the takeover of BP’s assets stemmed from a series of decrees aimed at 
increasing the participation in Nigeria’s economy by the state as well as private, Nigerian 
investors. However, the duplicitous nature of Nigeria’s take over of BP prevents 
participation to serve as an entirely sufficient descriptor. It adequately defines the internal 
context, which is sorely missing from the popular narrative, while simultaneously 
ignoring the role Nigeria’s liberation campaign played. I have chosen to identify the 
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peculiar case of Nigeria’s nationalization of BP as deceptive nationalization, to 
emphasize the intentional overlap of economic nationalism and foreign policy and the 
illusory manner in which it was done. Nigeria managed to refashion the reasoning and 
process of nationalization and turn it into something uniquely Nigerian. Like so many 
other aspects of Nigeria’s history, the nationalization reminds us of Nigeria’s 
exceptionalism. 
 
Methodology and Sources 
The nationalization of BP crosses into several geographical and theoretical areas 
of study. To keep this work within manageable terms, I have restricted it to a study on 
Nigeria. That said, however, it inevitably crosses over into the fields of southern African 
studies and corporate history. Notably, this project addresses and contributes to the 
literature on British Petroleum and, its long-time industry partner, Shell. The literature on 
these corporate activities is limited, with none of them non-commissioned.7 This project 
on BP builds on that of James Bamberg’s, which examines the era of nationalism, but 
does not include Nigeria in the analysis.8 It also serves as among the first to discuss in 
detail BP’s activities in Nigeria. In the context of state-corporate relations, the 
nationalization marks a significant shift for Nigeria and BP because represented the end 
of almost all of BP’s activities in Nigeria. Within the past few years, scholars are 
                                                 
7 R.W. Ferrier, The History of the British Petroleum Company, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982); Stephen Howarth, A Century in Oil: The ‘Shell’ Transport and Trading Company, 1897-1997 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997). 
8 James Bamberg, British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975: The Challenge of Nationalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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becoming increasingly interested in the history of foreign firms in Nigeria as the trend of 
nationalization has shifted to privatization. Many of the aspects of Nigeria’s economy 
closed to outside investment have been opened. It has been well documented that China 
and its firms have been investing heavily in Africa, especially in Nigeria’s oil industry, 
with the past few years.9 Are Nigeria’s leaders as concerned about imperialism and 
exploitation with China as they were during the 1970s with the UK? Is Nigeria doomed 
to repeat the same experience of inequality and mutual mistrust that it had in previous 
decades?  
In addition to engaging with works on nationalism and, more specifically, 
economic nationalism as discussed above, this project also addresses the large body of 
works on Nigeria’s oil industry. A keyword search on oil in Nigeria may produce a long 
list of books, but, in general, they treat the same period of time and draw similar 
conclusions. The oil boom of the mid-1970s drew a great deal of attention, particularly 
when development projects showed signs of failure by the end of the decade. During this 
period, oil represented the basis of not only the economy, but also its identity. Indeed, 
most works on this time period can scarcely avoid tying oil into discussions on aspect of 
Nigeria. As a result, most works touching on the 1970s address Nigeria’s political 
economy.10 There is a strong tendency to link oil with underdevelopment and pinpoint the 
economic policies which contributed to Nigeria’s current situation as among the twenty 
                                                 
9 BBC News, “China and Nigeria Agree Oil Deal,” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
business/4946708.stm (accessed on 29 April 2006); BBC News, “China-Africa Trade Jumps by 39%,” 
BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4587374.stm (accessed on 29 April 2006). 
10 See Augustine A. Ikein, The Impact of Oil on a Developing Country (New York: Praeger, 1988); Sarah 
Ahmad Kahn, Nigeria: The Political Economy of Oil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Emmanuel 
U. Nnadozie, Oil and Socioeconomic Crisis in Nigeria (Lewiston, NY: Mellen University Press, 1995); and 
J.K. Onoh, The Nigerian Oil Economy: From Prosperity to Glut (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983). 
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poorest countries in the world.11 Within this area of study, few scholars draw positive 
conclusions about Nigeria during the 1970s. However, in studies looking strictly at 
Nigeria’s foreign policy we see quite a different picture. 
In a separate circle, scholars link oil to Nigeria’s foreign policy, exhibiting more 
positive conclusions about Nigeria in the 1970s.12 Works of this nature suggest that 
Nigeria’s membership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the 
OAU, and its commitment to the liberation of southern Africa during that decade mark 
the highpoint of the country’s national history. Given that the same bodies of decision-
makers (military leaders) were in place, how do we reconcile the two perspectives on 
Nigeria during the 1970s? Most works do not link the two histories and, perhaps for 
nationalistic reasons, keep them separate. The nationalization of BP, for example, rarely 
appears within discussions of economic policy, but almost always receives attention 
within the context of foreign policy. This project seeks to draw Nigeria’s foreign policy 
and economic policy closer together to draw a better, well-rounded perspective on 
Nigeria in the 1970s. It also restores the nationalization to its proper place in discussions 
on economic policy.  
Although it figures more prominently within discussions of Nigeria’s foreign 
policy, there is little agreement among scholars over why, specifically, the nationalization 
occurred. Most works simply mention the nationalization and integrate it into the series 
                                                 
11 Peter O. Olayiwola. Petroleum and Structural Change in a Developing Country: The Case of Nigeria 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1987); Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Country Profile –Nigeria,” 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029
394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1019744984923 (accessed on 12 February 2007). 
12 See Olajide Aluko, Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981); 
Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, eds. Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Perceptions and 
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of “radical” actions taken to transform Nigeria into a major world power. The reasons 
stated address all or some combination of four features: the turbulent elections in 
Southern Rhodesia, apartheid in South Africa, an alleged oil deal involving BP and South 
Africa, or the UK’s general complacency about Southern Rhodesia. Okon Akiba writes 
that Nigeria nationalized Shell-BP in response to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s 
announcement that the UK would be lifting economic sanctions against Southern 
Rhodesia.13 J.K.Onoh writes that Nigeria nationalized BP in response to the Thatcher’s 
“de facto recognition of the minority government in Zimbabwe.” He attributes the short 
timetable for Zimbabwean independence to Nigeria’s political based action.14  
Several incorporate oil into their conclusions about the nationalization. In an 
overview chapter on Nigeria’s growing participation in the oil industry, Cyril Obi and 
Kayode Soremekun mention South Africa and Zimbabwe, stating that the nationalization 
was “a political move against the British Government’s sales of oil to South Africa and its 
support for the minority regime in Zimbabwe.”15 According to the NNPC, however, “this 
action had nothing whatever to do with Rhodesia, and if that [the elections] went wrong it 
would require separate and additional action.”16 While Nigeria had been heavily involved 
in the liberation of southern Africa, a positive conclusion to the situation was clearly 
underway. In their 1981 work, Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer set themselves 
apart by attributing the nationalization (although they themselves did not use the term) to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Projections (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983); and Okon Akiba, Nigerian Foreign Policy towards 
Africa (New York: Peter Lang, 1998). 
13 Akiba, Nigerian Foreign Policy towards Africa, 155. 
14 Onoh, The Nigerian Oil Economy, 123-4. 
15 Cyril Obi and Kayode Soremekun, “Oil and the Nigerian State: An Overview,” in Perspectives on the 
Nigerian Oil Industry, ed. Kayode Soremekun, 20 (Lagos: Amkra Books, 1995). 
16 “Nationalisation,” memo from Shell (London) to BP (London), 31 July 1979, BP 4823, 1. 
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not only BP’s oil deal with South Africa, but also to an economic policy devised to 
remove an “anomaly in the implementation of the [1976] business indigenization 
decree.”17 Although they did not elaborate on the second point, they raised a unique 
conclusion, and evidence introduced in this project supports their idea. Overall, the 
conclusions about why Nigeria nationalized BP vary, which raises questions about the 
methodology of scholars and the historical context surrounding the nationalization. 
As a topic of research and analysis, the nationalization of BP has received little 
attention within the literature because it has fallen into a fissure within the historiography 
and, until now, has remained lodged. The nationalization quickly became an important 
part of nationalist literature on Nigeria’s foreign policy. It represented the highpoint of 
Nigeria’s commitment to southern Africa because it represented, on the surface, an 
extremely bold move. The daily reminders of the nationalization can be easily seen 
driving down almost any major road in Nigeria and passing by African Petroleum service 
stations bearing a sign that closely resembles that of BP (see Chapter 4). According to the 
nationalist literature on Nigeria, the liberation of southern Africa progressed more slowly 
than African leaders desired and the reason for this rested almost solely on the failed 
diplomacy of the UK. To make the African disapproval known, Nigeria nationalized BP 
as a strong punitive measure. Amidst the failings in so many other ways of the Gowon 
and Mohamme/Obasanjo regimes, southern Africa represented a positive government 
initiative. This perspective, in part, explains the delay in subjecting the nationalization to 
close scrutiny. Most scholars include the nationalization in their discussions, but without 
                                                 
17 Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer, Nigeria since 1970: A Political and Economic Outline 
(New York: Africana Publishing, 1981), 88. 
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addressing the specifics of it. This brings up additional points as to why the 
nationalization has never been subjected to close analysis. 
As mentioned previously, scholars never quite agreed on the reasons for the 
nationalization and instead of probing they left it open to speculation. In part, this 
confusion stems from the Nigeria federal military government’s inability to clearly 
articulate its reasoning to the public. Also, the actual impact of the nationalization proved 
minimal for the average Nigerian amidst the flurry of rapid economic change. Indeed, the 
failure of concrete benefits to emerge from the nationalization frustrated those, 
particularly in the Niger Delta. The nationalization of BP illustrates the power of 
unfulfilled promises. These issues are quite telling because they bring into question the 
connection between the nationalization and southern Africa. Another reason can be 
attributed to the historiography and, with it, the accepted methodology.  
Within the historiography of Nigeria, we can easily isolate a major shift in focus 
and, in doing so, can see where the nationalization as a topic of study fell into obscurity. 
In the mid-20th century this shift occurred with the quest for replacing Eurocentric 
perspectives on Nigeria with those based on research within Nigeria using oral sources, 
archaeology, the Nigerian media, and even government publications as evidence. In this 
sense, the “dominant narrative” of the European victors in the conquest of Nigeria was 
replaced with the Nigerian “subordinate narrative”. This approach has proven highly 
useful and has produced influential results that revised Nigeria’s history. Aside from 
subaltern studies, however, the limitations of this trend are starting to show. As we move 
away from the era of colonial rule and well into the fifth decade of independence, this 
approach has become problematic. During the 1970s, the “dominant narrative” is that of 
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the Nigerian state. Nigeria’s policies during that time centered on minimizing outside 
influence and placing Western countries and firms in a subordinate position making their 
narrative the “subordinate” one. Within the literature on Nigeria, however, this shift has 
yet to fully take place. Many scholars writing on Nigeria, and its oil history, continue to 
slight sources from the West in favor of those from Nigeria, believing them to represent 
the “subordinate,” and authentic perspective. Thus, much of the literature on Nigeria 
exhibits the same heavy reliance on Nigerian newspapers and government-released 
information and the dismissal of Western archival sources that have been declassified and 
made available. My work applies a reshuffling of the narrative order to keep pace with 
Nigeria’s continual evolution as an independent state. Indeed, this contemporary 
“subordinate narrative” has pulled the nationalization as a topic of study out of obscurity 
and exposed it to a fresh set of analytical criteria. The result of this methodology has 
proven fruitful in shedding new light onto the nationalization and, consequently, the 
accepted conclusions about it.  
The archival materials consulted for this project were pulled from a variety of 
locations between 2004 and 2006, including Nigeria, England, and to a lesser extent, 
South Africa and the United States.18 In Nigeria, materials gathered included those from 
various universities and research centers, such as the National Archives of Nigeria at 
Ibadan and Enugu, Obafemi Awolowo University’s library, the Nigerian Institute of 
Social and Economic Research (NISER) in Lagos, and the Nigerian Institute of 
International Affairs (NIIA)) in Ibadan. From these places, I gathered a range of 
                                                 
18 Research funded through the Patrice Lumumba Fellowship awarded by the Center of African and 
African-American Studies at the University of Texas at Austin. 
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pamphlets, press statements, and decrees issued by the federal government as well as 
newspaper clippings. Publications by the NNPC were a critical source as well. 
Unfortunately, paperwork of BP (Nigeria)’s prior expropriation are not traceable. 
According to BP’s Archives, those materials were seized by the Nigerian government. 
The papers may have been housed in the office of the NNPC headquarters in Lagos, but 
in 2003 a fire gutted the building, destroying much of the company’s library. My 
fieldwork in Nigeria also included a combination of formal interviews and informal 
conversations with Nigerians from a variety of backgrounds such as petroleum station 
owners, university professors, and small-business women and men in southwestern 
Nigeria.19 The goal of the interviews was to ascertain the public perception on the 
nationalization and gauge how it affected their lives.  
British Petroleum’s Archives in Coventry, England provided materials on its 
corporate operations in Nigeria and southern Africa.20 These materials include annual 
reports, which are integral to understanding the level of involvement of the company at 
any given time, and correspondence between BP in London and in Africa. Imbedded in 
these files are letters and statements by Nigerian officials that, due to problems of 
preservation, are no longer available within Nigeria. For BP, Nigeria was of such 
importance that embedded in files pertaining to southern Africa were memos discussing 
how their actions might affect its relationship with Nigeria. Thus, efforts in piecing 
together Nigeria’s perspective relied on discoveries in unexpected sources. For 
                                                 
19 A sincere thanks to Professor Ademola Babalola of Obafemi Awolowo University in Ile-Ife, Nigeria and 
his family for their assistance in conducting the interviews. 
20 A special thanks to BP’s archivist, Peter Housego, for his assistance during my research trips between 
2005 and 2006. 
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ascertaining Nigeria’s commitment to southern Africa and the suspected activities of oil 
companies in the region, the Anti-Apartheid Movement Collection at Rhodes House in 
Oxford offered a great deal of insight. Materials at the National Archives in Kew were 
extremely valuable in tracing BP and Nigeria’s thoughts in relationship to the British 
government throughout the mid-1960s and 1970s. These sources provided the greatest 
amount of evidence for my conclusions on the nationalization of BP.  
Within the United States and South Africa, I conducted a limited search of 
newspaper clippings and government statistics. From the University of the Free State in 
Bloemfontein in South Africa, I collected newspaper clippings in English and Afrikaans 
to ascertain the regional public opinion within the “heartland” of Afrikaan culture. A 
similar review of materials available on Nigeria was done within the United States using 
the ExxonMobil Archives housed at the Center for American History. The integration of 
all of these sources from Nigeria, England, South Africa, and the United States provided 
not only evidence supporting the thesis of the dissertation, but also numerous 




This project is organized into six chapters, with the first two providing the 
theoretical and historical background. The middle two chapters focus on presenting the 
popular narrative on the nationalization of BP, deconstructing it, and rebuilding it within 
the context of economic nationalism. The last two chapters explore why the federal 
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military government hitched the nationalization of BP on the liberation of southern Africa 
and how this, and other factors, make this nationalization exceptional. The conclusion 
addresses the impact economic nationalism and, more specifically, the nationalization had 
on Nigeria’s economy and society. The goal of this work is to lace together the 
perspective of economic nationalism with the peculiar fate of BP in Nigeria.  
Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical framework for this project. Nation and 
nationalism are common words used in discussing postcolonial Africa, but lack 
satisfactory definitions. The characteristics that make a nation and an expression of 
nationalism have been largely borrowed from European studies and do not transfer well 
into African studies. Assumptions developed for the presence of civic nationalism and 
ethnic nationalism lack the dexterity necessary when looking at African countries such as 
Nigeria. To remedy the problem, this chapter introduces economic nationalism.  
Chapter 2 explores the history of Nigeria, with an emphasis on the 1970s. This 
chapter also introduces the basic features of Nigeria’s oil industry at the time, including 
trading ports, refineries, and production fields. Most of the major transnational oil 
companies operated in some capacity in Nigeria during the 1970s. Here we also examine 
the origins and global network of BP and, more specifically, its operations in Nigeria 
since the discovery of commercial quantities in the late 1950s. Because Nigeria viewed 
BP as a proxy for British political and financial interests, Nigeria handled the company in 
a manner separate from the other major transnational oil companies. Nigeria and BP 
experienced moments of tension having as much to do with general oil negotiations as 
post-colonial frustrations. These subtle tensions propelled Nigeria’s oil industry into 
greater production levels and broader distribution networks in the 1970s than previously 
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existed. Issues surrounding Nigeria’s economy and the role of oil revenue within it are 
introduced here and revisited in later chapters. 
Chapter 3 recounts the events leading to Nigeria’s nationalization of BP in 1979. 
Here, the narrative is presented as popularly understood. We look at Nigeria’s 
involvement in the liberation of southern Africa (namely South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia), and allegations that surfaced regarding BP’s continual supply of petroleum 
products to that region despite international sanctions. Through the incorporation of 
archival evidence, this chapter fleshes out aspects of this fascinating narrative and clarify 
suspicious pieces of information. Of particular interest in this chapter is the full story on 
Nigeria’s scheme just prior to the democratic elections and the nationalization of BP, 
which involved the revival of a prohibition law on any trade with South Africa and the 
catching of trading companies, such as BP, in violation of it. The prohibition served as a 
way of emphasizing BP’s dishonest behavior just before the announcement of 
nationalization.  
Chapter 4 picks up the narrative from the previous chapter and deconstructs it. 
After highlighting areas of misinformation and offering new conclusions regarding the 
popular narrative, this chapter moves toward rebuilding the narrative. This includes 
placing the nationalization of BP within the context of policies that highlight Nigeria’s 
commitment to economic nationalism during the 1970s. Economic nationalism served as 
a way to forge a unified identity with some distinction. In this chapter we trace a series of 
development plans and indigenization decrees as well as independently initiated take 
overs and nationalizations within the upstream and downstream sectors of Nigeria’s oil 
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industry.21 But, these steps toward a major economic transformation do not belong solely 
to the federal military government. Influential businessmen, organizations, and local-
level governments lobbied for many of these changes, especially within the oil industry. 
In this regard, we see the influence nationalism has on economic policy. The 
nationalization of BP, nestled amongst many similar economic endeavors, appears less 
exceptional than popularly presented.  
Chapter 5 describes the process of nationalization and the formation of African 
Petroleum, the successor of BP (Nigeria). Within the literature on oil, the subject of 
nationalization receives a great deal of attention as part of individual country studies. In 
placing Nigeria into comparison with other countries, we find that Nigeria represents an 
unusual case within the trend of nationalizations because of the tremendous disconnect 
between rhetoric and reality. This chapter also highlights the fine print of the 
nationalization, which reveals that BP lost some, not all, of its assets and operations. The 
discussion of BP’s nationalization ends with an ironic twist –African Petroleum has 
maintained a working relationship with BP (South Africa) for the past twenty years. This 
situation brings into question BP and Nigeria’s relationship during the nationalization as 
well as Nigeria’s connection with South Africa. 
Chapter 6 returns to Nigeria’s interest in southern Africa and analyzes how it 
became a national cause and why it was an effective strategy. We explore the language 
and symbolism used by the Nigerian government through the Nigerian media. Analyzing 
speeches given by Nigerian leaders, we can identify Nigeria’s attempt to bond with 
                                                 
21 Upstream refers to the exploration, drilling, and production of petroleum. Downstream relates to the 
transport, refining, and petrochemical processes that get petroleum products to the consumer. 
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African-Americans in the United States and Africans in southern Africa through 
references to labor exploitation and racism. This chapter highlights the connection 
between economic policy and foreign policy, which in most analytical studies is treated 
separately. 
Finally, a brief concluding chapter brings us back to Nigeria and its economy to 
assess the affects of economic nationalism and deceptive nationalization. In it, Nigeria’s 
situation as a rentier state plagued by corruption and a deteriorating economy is 
discussed. A section on areas of future research highlights understudied topics that have 
come out this project on nationalization. This conclusion serves as a way to draw together 
the different components of the project as well as take a step toward moving beyond the 





Illustration 1: Map of Nigeria22 
  
                                                 
22 Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook Online –Nigeria (2006), http://www.cia.gov/ 
cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni (accessed on 3 April 2007).  
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Chapter 1:  Oil and Economic Nationalism 
 Scholars of contemporary Nigerian history largely agree that a fundamental 
problem that holds Nigeria’s development back is its lack of national identity. But what 
does it mean to be a nation? And, how does Nigeria attain that goal? Generally, scholars 
start by defining a nation in broad terms, highlighting features of nationalism, and 
proposing strategies for nation-building. While there is consensus on the first step, there 
is little on the second and third. This is especially true when crossing over from European 
cases to African ones. Definitions of a nation and guidelines for nation-building are based 
on studies of Western Europe. Are these applicable to Africa, or more specifically, 
Nigeria? In looking at the fragile British colonial construction that is Nigeria, a new set of 
challenges to the studying of nationalism. In this chapter I argue that the general 
categories of nationalism fail to adequately address the situation that unfolded in Nigeria 
during the 1970s. With regard to nation-building Nigeria’s oil industry has, as the popular 
saying goes, represented a “blessing and a curse.” It is also what complicates our 
understanding of nationalism in Nigeria. To resolve this dilemma, I propose economic 
nationalism as lens through which to view Nigeria’s situation. This perspective not only 
addresses the role of oil in Nigeria during the 1970s, but also the influence nationalism 
has on economic policy. This chapter provides an overview of the issues complicating the 




While Nigeria exists territorially and functions, to some extent, as a modern state, 
it lacks the components to make it a true nation-state.23 But, what does it mean to be a 
nation versus and nation-state? Since ancient times, scholars have debated the definitions 
of these terms. Simply stated, Anthony D. Smith defines a nation as,  
a named human population occupying a historic territory or homeland and 
sharing common myths and memories; a mass, popular culture; a single 
economy; and common rights and duties for all members.24 
 
Horace B. Davis adds that a nation is a specific territory with a certain minimum size and 
is conscious of itself as a nation.25 Smith’s definition encapsulates unity through culture 
and territory, but makes no reference to time. With this omission, he has indicated that a 
nation has existed since time immemorial. In light of this perspective, nation and 
ethnicity can be used interchangeably. This interpretation marks a departure from an 
assumption commonly used in studies restricted to Europe, which identifies nations as 
modern phenomena.26  
For centuries, scholars restricted their studies to Europe in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Without being explicit, they assumed that all nations turned into nation-states, 
with ethnic claims disappearing. In the mid-20th century ethnic nationalism and separatist 
movements challenged this romantic view of nations, exposing the limitations of their 
                                                 
23 See Abubakar Momoh and Said Adejumobi, eds., The National Question in Nigeria (Hampshire: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2002) and Arthur A. Nwankwo, National Consciousness for Nigeria (Enugu: Fourth 
Dimension Publishing, 1985). 
24 Anthony D. Smith, The Nation in History (Hanover, NJ: University Press of New England, 2000), 3. 
25 Horace B. Davis, Toward a Marxist Theory of Nationalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 8. 
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assumptions.27 What people failed to recognize is the existence of nations in Africa 
before colonial rule. Since time immemorial, the area we identify as Nigeria today has 
included a multitude of nations, incorporating most, if not all, the components described 
above by Smith. The real debate lies in whether these early African societies can be 
defined as states.  
To become a nation-state means that all of the attributes of a nation are 
recognized, maintained, and protected within a globally recognized political structure. 
Early scholars on nationalism argued that the formation of a nation-state occurred 
organically. Montserrat Guibernau categorized this perspective as “romantic nationalism” 
because it was based on the zeitgeist of Romanticism. This group of intellectuals assumed 
that each nation emphasized the “natural divisions” within the “human race,” which had 
been “endorsed by God….”28 The end of European imperialism and the cobbling together 
of states in the southern hemisphere challenged this notion of naturally occurring nation-
state. In practice, the culture and values of one nation, or ethnic group, dominates the 
state. And, any level of political autonomy with a state without total independence will 
never fully reflect their views on foreign and economic policy.29 Within discussions on 
nation-building, it has been generally believed that a world comprised of nation-states 
offered the greatest opportunities for peaceful diplomacy, protection of individuals, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
26 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 3. 
27 Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2001), 29-31. 
28 Montserrat Guibernau, Nations without States: Political Communities in a Global Age (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1999), 22. 
29 Guibernau, Nations without States, 17. 
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economic progress. The colonial creation that is Nigeria included many nations and this 
factor has complicated its transition into a nation-state. 
More and more scholars are questioning this idea. In their essay on nationalism in 
Australia, Steven Castles et al raise the possibility that nation-states may become 
irrelevant in the new millennium. They argue that there is little value in having an 
economically weak nation-state with only the shell of political authority.30 While this 
many certainly raise some interesting possibilities for Nigeria, these ideas have only 
emerged recently. During the 1970s, the quest for the nation-state was the primary goal 
for most developing countries. How does it become a nation-state without becoming 
culturally homogenous or politically exclusionary? 
 In the mid-1960s Nigeria’s leaders tried to reach a compromise between 
becoming a nation-state and maintaining cultural distinctions by establishing the country 
as a federation. This represented one of Nigeria’s first attempts as an independent state to 
become a nation. Nigeria, like so many other African countries, had to work toward 
becoming a nation-state. Robert I. Rotberg emphasizes that because of colonialism, 
ethnic groups within Africa highly conscious of themselves as politically disrupted 
nations.31 For the most part, forging a nation-state out of culturally distinct nations was an 
exercise in unexplored territory. While the idea of creating a nation from a state is not 
knew, African countries such as Nigeria tested the feasibility of the concept. Jean-Jacques 
                                                 
30 Steven Castles and others, “Australia: Multi-Ethnic Community without Nationalism?,” in Ethnicity, eds. 
John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 360 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
31 Robert I. Rotberg, “African Nationalism: Concept or Confusion?,”  Journal of Modern African Studies 4, 
no. 1 (May 1966), 37. 
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Rousseau in the 18th century discusses the importance of forging nationalism in Europe 
within a state. He writes:  
The first rule that we must follow is that of national character. Every 
people has, or must have, a character; if it lacks one, we must begin by 
endowing it with one.32  
 
His seminal work marked an initial divergence toward the “organic” formation of a 
nation and the acknowledgement that in some cases, a nation has to be created after the 
establishment of a state. While Nigeria did not represent a nation without states, it did 
resemble a state with multiple nations. Roussau was among the first intellectuals to 
consider the construction of a nation and national identity. Scholars after him turned this 
notion into a category of nationalism called civic nationalism. Within the literature it 
became a counterpoint to ethnic nationalism. 
 
Ethnic Nationalism 
While British colonial rule reconfigured most aspects of life for people in Nigeria, 
it did not destroy the bonds of a multitude of nations. Indeed, in the absence of a strong 
central government and economy since independence in 1960, these nations have thrived. 
To speak about Nigeria’s history is to speak of overlapping nationalisms that intersect 
with economics and politics. All over the world nationalism is a powerful, yet ambiguous 
term. Rotberg describes nationalism as a “morass of misapplication” because it 
                                                 
32 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ed. C.E. Vaughan, 2: 319 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1915). 
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“describes much in general and little in particular.”33 Generally speaking, nationalism is 
the expression of belonging to a community, within which members recognize a “set of 
symbols, beliefs, and way of life” and the need to establish a “common political 
destiny.”34 Some scholars do not consider ethnic expressions prior to the emergence of 
nation-states in the late 18th century as ethnic nationalism; instead, they see them simply 
as confirmations of ethnic affiliation.35 This notion is becoming increasingly outdates as 
scholars move away from Europe and into the developing world. The community, 
however, can represent many different social groupings.  
One can speak of Islamic nationalism, women’s nationalism, ethnic nationalism, 
and civic nationalism. These are not to be confused with nationalist movements after 
World War II based on anti-colonial sentiment which hastened the arrival of 
independence within African countries. With reference to Nigeria during the 1970s, 
ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism figure prominently. Ethnic nationalism, also 
referred to in the literature as primordial nationalism and ethno-cultural nationalism, is 
the expression of national identity based on select cultural attributes such as religion, 
customs, language, kinship that contribute to the maintenance of an ethnic community.36 
For most Nigerians, ethnic nationalism is not a holiday novelty, but a way of life. With 
over an estimated 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria, nation-building has been a challenge. 
                                                 
33 Rotberg, “African Nationalism,” 33. 
34 Guibernau, Nations without States, 14. 
35 See Thomas Hylland Erikson, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives, 2nd ed. 
(London: Pluto Press). 
36 Smith refers to ethnic nationalism as primordial nationalism; see Smith, Nationalism, 51-56. David 
Brown refers to it as ethnocultural nationalism; see David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, 
Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics (London: Routledge, 2000), 35-38. 
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As with many other developing countries, ethnic nationalism has been blamed for 
political instability and associated with state-wide afflictions of underdevelopment and 
corruption in Nigeria. Many scholars contend that ethnic nationalism shadowed civic due 
to a vacuum created by uneven development and a dismal transfer of power from colonial 
authorities in 1960. Nigerians argue that the country began its independence with 
ethnicity as the basis of politics, which set the country on the collision course. Using the 
only political tools at their disposal, aspiring Nigerian politicians relied on ethnic 
linkages to rally votes in the late 1950s. As a result, the country voted along ethnic lines 
and continues. Nigeria’s post-colonial history continues to reflect this ethnic-based 
competition for power and resources.  
But, if ethnic nationalism offered no positive benefits to an individual’s life, why 
would it exist? This form of nationalism has distinctive features that on the one hand 
encourage voluntary membership, but on the other is based on organic, assigned 
expressions. Scholars have highlighted several pervasive the characteristics of ethnic 
nationalism. Ethnicity is based on what are considered “primary attributes,” which 
include place of birth, biological features, ancestral homeland, language, and all aspects 
that are culturally distinct.37 Much of what defines an ethnic group is derived from 
looking back to past claims and origin myths; this explains why ethnic nationalism has 
often been designated as “backwards” and hindering to social development.38  
Within a modern context, ethnic nationalism is often viewed negatively. It has 
been described as organic, exclusionary, and radical. Davis prefers to refer to ethnic 
                                                 
37 Brown, Contemporary Nationalism, 21. 
38 Brown, Contemporary Nationalism, 52. 
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nationalism as “atavistic” nationalism to underscore these features.39 Ethnic nationalism 
is considered intrinsically authoritarian and, at the same time, collectivist in nature.40 
Many of these features are not wholly without foundation. Within Marxist doctrine, 
ethnic nationalism was also viewed negatively. According to Brown, Marx saw ethnic 
nationalism as a “romantic myth coming from insecure middle classes.”41 This idea 
spread among leadership circles beyond only Marxist adherents. Ethnic nationalism is 
perceived by many observers as including many negative characteristics.  
While many of these descriptions hold true, they are complicated by two issues. 
First, ethnicity can be characterized as both voluntary and involuntary. One the one hand, 
birthright qualifies an individual as a member and proscribes a set of cultural norms to 
that ethnic affiliation. Regardless of level of personal detachment, a person still carries 
these ethnic attributes with them. On the other hand, ethnic identity ultimately belongs to 
the individual, making this association voluntary.42 Societal complications such as racism 
can also complicate ethnicity because an identity may be imposed on a person.  
Second, ethnicity is not automatically the antithesis of development and social 
progression. Boundaries complicate notions of ethnicity and reassign ethnic allegiance. In 
this regard, ethnic nationalism can be a forward looking phenomenon. What ethnic 
nationalism indicates is that nationalist ideologies differ and that nationalism can change 
in one direction or another.43 If it is all these things, why does it survive? In the absence 
                                                 
39 Davis, Toward a Marxist Theory, 28. 
40 Brown, Contemporary Nationalism, 50. 
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of an effective government, ethnic communities organize to create a support network. For 
example, within Nigeria there are numerous hometown associations, which perform 
many functions in the absence of a satisfactory state government.  
The hometown associations are voluntary, non-profits and membership is based 
on common ancestry and place of origin. These organizations mobilize resources to 
provide local communities with education, facilities, medical centers, and basic amenities 
such as roads.44 In the Niger Delta, the hometown association called Odimodi Ebidou 
Bene acted as an arbiter in a dispute between Odimodi and Ogulagba villages regarding 
the ownership of the land on which an oil terminal was situated. Odimodi Ebidou Bene 
assisted these two villages to collect rent in arrears for three years.45 David Brown writes 
that ethnic associations provide security, moral authority, and psychological support.46 
The hometown associations in Nigeria operate on the consensus of ethnic affiliation, but 
carry with them a commitment to development and democracy (although men and 
women do tend to have separate organizations). The discourse on ethnic nationalism has 
created a sort of buffer, keeping it confined with its broad features by juxtaposing it with 
civic nationalism. 
 
                                                 
44 Rex Honey and Stanley I. Okofor, eds. Hometown Associations: Indigenous Knowledge and 
Development in Nigeria (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1998). 
45 Chris Ikporukpo, “Development and Territoriality of a Hometown Association: The Odimodi Ebidou 
Bene,” in Hometown Associations: Indigenous Knowledge and Development in Nigeria, ed. Rex Honey 
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46 Brown, Contemporary Nationalism, 22. 
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Civic Nationalism 
Civic nationalism is identified as a state-sponsored initiative to promote civic 
consciousness and national unity. Benedict Anderson refers to this as official nationalism 
because the emphasis is on public connections generated by the state.47 In reference to 
Europe in the mid-18th century, Josep R. Llobera directs our attention to the presence of 
political nationalism.48 In terms of state vs. nation, leaders use civic nationalism to merge 
the two terms into one effective nation-state. In practice, it is used as a measure to 
dampen ethnic and religious bonds that clash or override with state initiatives. In Nigeria, 
this has been the main appeal to civic nationalism. The spread of civic consciousness 
includes the setting up and maintenance of state institutions for people. It also includes 
the intention of replacing symbols of allegiance and power from an ethnic level to a state 
one. Visible features of civic nationalism include national anthems, state flags, 
aesthetically pleasing architecture for government buildings and state-funded education 
facilities. In Libya, for example, images of Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi remind people 
of the power of government. Obasanjo, in 1978, introduced a new national anthem, which 
omitted references to specific ethnic groups and stressed the historical bond of Nigeria.49 
Bruce Kapferer writes that nationalist projects within a state create a kind of religion, 
                                                 
47 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1994), 155-162. 
48 Josep R. Llobera, The God of Modernity: The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe (Oxford: 
Berg Publishers, 1994), 103. 
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whereby the political is “shrouded in the symbolism of a ‘higher’ purpose.”50 Civic 
nationalism has been heralded as the guaranteed solution to creating a nation-state. 
Perceived as the polar opposite from ethnic nationalism, civic nationalism 
embodies an array of positive attributes. Brown writes that civic nationalism is seen as 
potentially democratic and liberating for individuals because it instills a public culture 
shared by all. It attaches people to a public culture, which celebrates the shared residence 
in a specified territory. It is often described as being inclusive, democratic, and 
voluntary.51 In opposition to ethnic nationalism, civic nationalism is assumed to be 
progressive and forward-looking. But, as Brown argues, it can be based on public 
institutions of the past and, thus, not progressive in nature.52 A good example is the 
prevalence of laws drafted by former colonial powers in Africa that are still in place, 
which may identify women as the legal property of her husband. Nigeria’s leaders used 
civic nationalism to create unity through shared residence as opposed to ancestry.53 
Fighting for freedom in southern Africa, symbols of independence from the British 
imperialism, and federal perseverance during civil war contributed to civic nationalism in 
Nigeria. 
Civic nationalism, for many scholars, also includes the notions of liberalism and 
ethical norms. Liberalism holds that individuals should express concern with the welfare 
of others within his/her community.54 Its emergence within the discourse on nationalism 
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relates to the formation of nation-states. Liberalism contends that a group identity is 
“crucial for all human beings” and necessary to sustain a “law-abiding and caring 
community.”55 Along with this idea is that the nation is also responsible for defining 
ethnical behavior, representing universally accepted ethics, and maintaining ethical 
standards within a state. Thus, civic nationalism does not only represent symbols directed 
toward public consciousness, but also can embrace ethical and liberal ideals.  
The anti-colonial struggle in Nigeria also exemplifies a form of nationalism 
related to civic. African nationalism, as described within the non-socialist secondary 
literature, represents a revolutionary movement to overthrow European colonial rule in 
favor of independence. The movement called for sovereignty and individual freedom, but 
lacked consensus on governance and economic institutions after independence was 
achieved. African nationalism, unlike ethnic or civic nationalism, is tied to a specific 
period of time. For many in Nigeria, it represented the “golden age” of unity, which 
quickly disappeared within a few short years. It is most associated with civic nationalism, 
because the loudest rallying cry downplayed ethnicity and religion and emphasized civil 
consciousness. When it came time for elections, however, the story was quite different. 
One of the flaws of African nationalism is that if situated in a rigorous comparison 
project with former colonies outside of Africa such as India, it holds no major concrete 
distinctions from other anti-colonial movements.56 Within a non-socialist context, African 
nationalism mirrors many of the positive attributes most associated with civic 
nationalism.  
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Like ethnic nationalism, the assumptions about civic nationalism carry a set of 
problems. First, civic nationalism does not always pair with democracy. Nigeria, as a 
strong advocate of civic nationalism, was under the leadership of a federal military 
government. Second, it would be incorrect, especially in the case of Nigeria, to assume 
that civic nationalism includes culturally and religiously neutral properties. B. Yack 
argues that civic nationalism is simply a disguised form of ethnic nationalism utilized by 
a dominant ethnic group to fashion their own culture into the state-wide institutions.57 
The establishment of civic nationalism included, according to Nnoli, a process of 
continual negotiation among ethnic groups.58 Looking at the standard assumptions about 
ethnic and civic nationalism reveals the fallacy of this dichotomy. Scholars within recent 
years have recognized the shortcomings of the “two forms approach.” Smith, for 
example, recognizes the problems, but finds value as a starting point for analysis within 
his works.59 In looking at issues of development within Nigeria, scholars ask the 
compelling question of what forms did figure prominently and why? 
 
Economic Nationalism 
It was not long after independence that Nigeria’s leaders realized that national 
anthems, sporting events, and shared historical experiences were not enough. This 
prompted the experimentation with nuanced adaptations of nationalism. Scholars looking 
at Nigeria for a long time restricted their discussions to the two major forms of 
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nationalism, leaving peculiarities unsettled. This section introduces economic nationalism 
as a form of nationalism. It serves as a point of departure to shed light on the intersection 
between nationalism, politics, and the economy in Nigeria. For this project economic 
nationalism is defined as the implementation of economic policy with the express 
purpose of constructing a national identity on the economy as opposed to ethnicity or 
religion.  
The phrase economic nationalism is not new. Coinciding with the rise of 
socialism as a response to the failure of modernization theory, emerged discussions about 
economic nationalism. Between the 1960s and 1990s, most scholars defined economic 
nationalism as linked to an economic revolution, with the intention of severing all ties 
with the West and implementing socialism. Its characteristics include irrational, emotion-
driven, exclusionary, and maintaining the seemingly contradictory qualities of both 
tending to be authoritarian and collective.60 Stephen J. Kobrin confirms this in his article 
on nationalization, which he refers to as “forced divestment.” He sees economic 
nationalism as the application of irrational ideology embodied in cultural nationalism and 
injecting it into a state’s economy.61 In general, many scholars were uncomfortable 
placing economic policy with nationalism. Are the concepts compatible or mutually 
exclusive?  
Many works published during the height of the Cold War (1960s to 1980s) also 
link economic nationalism with socialism. Scholars familiar with Marxism (and 
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Leninism), however, recognize the flaw in this linkage. Marxists respond by stating that 
social elites can not successfully impose the components of socialism; it has to emerge as 
a naturally-occurring revolution that eliminates class distinctions. To a large extent, 
forcing the expansion of public government effectively places the state within the hands 
of a few, within a privileged class.62 To the British perspective, economic nationalism 
meant the transfer of foreign investment to only public investment as well as an era of 
history spanning the 1960s and ‘70s:  
The growth of economic nationalism inevitably means that countries want 
to run their own industries and that foreign investment of the kind which 
has helped us prosper for so long will become increasingly exposed and in 
many cases will be taken from us with inadequate compensation.63 
 
The concept of economic nationalism is not a recent creation. However, scholars lacked 
agreement on what it actually meant and in what was to be used. Was it purely socialist? 
Did it only refer to the 1970s? In Looking at Nigeria, we can see how these assumptions 
can be challenged. Economic nationalism did not mean foreign operations automatically 
became public ones. Nor did it mean the entrenchment of socialism. Thomas J. 
Biersteker’s work on transnational firms in Nigeria clearly supports this point. Through 
his examination of Nigeria’s economic plans and Nigerian Enterprise Promotions 
decrees, he illustrates the intended transfer of jobs, equity, and ownership from (with the 
exception of some aspects of oil) foreign firms to private, Nigerian business men and 
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women.64 A large body of literature highlights the expansion of capitalism in Nigeria as a 
method of creating a nation-state from a state.65 What is clear is the strong emphasis of 
using economic transformations as a way to build-up a nation and unite a country. 
 An underlying motivation for implementing economic nationalism has been a 
response to the shared concern over neocolonialism. The concept of neocolonialism 
within Africa emerged in the early 1960s, coinciding with decolonization. 
Neocolonialism is defined as a continued relationship between a newly independent state 
and its former colonizer, which is based on economic exploitation and political 
subservience of the former by the latter. It highlights the formal ending of colonialism, 
but the continuation of a new form of imperialism based on previous colonial stricture.66 
The assumptions that go along with neocolonialism include the desire to move away from 
cash crop economies and reduce the reliance on foreign investment. O.E. Udofia 
highlights in his article the connection Africans have made between imperialism and the 
activities of transnational companies, especially foreign oil firms.67 Neocolonialist 
doctrine also assumes that economic turbulence within the country stems from this 
relationship and needs to be corrected. African countries became the most vocal about 
neocolonialism and many aggressively sought to indigenize and industrialize their 
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industries as well as diversify its trade arrangements.68 It was popularized by Kwame 
Nkrumah, Ghana’s first president and advocate of socialism. In his 1962 book entitled 
Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, Nkrumah places neocolonialism into 
the stages of development laid out in Marxist doctrine and concludes that it is the last 
stage of imperialism.69 Nkrumah defined neocolonialism as a “more insidious, complex 
and dangerous than the old colonialism.”70 For many African countries, cutting the chord 
on a neocolonial relationship was of utmost importance; it became a high priority within 
the project of economic nationalism. 
Contemporary studies on economic nationalism emphasize the creation and 
cultivation of all forms of economic systems and the underlying agendas. Economic 
nationalism functions not only as a subject of study much like ethnic nationalism or civic 
nationalism, but also as a new perspective on the relationship between the various 
expressions of nationalism and economic policy. The latter is concerned with not only the 
impact economic policy has on nationalism, but also the affect nationalism has on 
economic policy. Until recently, economic nationalism received little attention by 
scholars favoring ethnic nationalism as an area of study. As an increasingly integral part 
of a state’s application of civic nationalism, economic policy becomes equally important. 
In this sense, scholars often use the phrase nationalist economic policy.71 But, economic 
nationalism moves beyond that interpretation and allows for the interaction of economic 
                                                 
68 John Smith Ikpuk, Militarisation of Politics and Neo-Colonialism: The Nigerian Experience 1966-90 
(London: Janus Publishing, 1995). 
 
69 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (New York: International 
Publishers, 1965). 
70 Kwame Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path (New York: International Publishers, 1973), 312. 
71 Johnson, “Economic Nationalism in New States,” 236-240. 
 39
policy and nationalism in Nigeria to take center stage, providing new interpretations of 
the past and tentative solutions for the future. 
Within discussions on ethnic and civic nationalism, few scholars include 
discussions pertaining to economics, economic policy, or the impact these have had on 
nationalism. It has only been within the past few years that this aspect of nationalism has 
received serious attention. For the most part, the heavily cited theoretical works on 
nationalism discuss festivals, language, religion, and sporting contests, but not financial 
activities. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger discuss the invention of tradition, 
whereby cultural attributes or national activities had been deliberately created for the 
purpose of nationalism.72 When looking at Nigeria, we see the invention of an economic 
tradition of strong state sponsorship and control, especially with regard to its oil industry. 
It grew out of a desire to unify the country’s economic system largely under state 
administration and control, instead of allowing informal, differing systems to continue. 
With regard to the nationalization, we see the fate of BP resembling so many other 
foreign firms within the country as part of the invented tradition of a nationalist economic 
policy. Indeed, the attention given to the subject in Nigeria within this project is part of a 
newly emerging trend of examining economic nationalism. 
The study of economic nationalism, like civic and ethnic nationalism emerged out 
of a need to identify and conceptualize the processes of nationalism witnessed within this 
increasingly globalized economy. It has entered into discussion because the process of 
globalization, for better or worse, has altered the existence of nation-states. Thus far, 
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works on this perspective, such as the edited volume Economic Change and the National 
Question in Twentieth-Century Europe, deal with the former Soviet Union and Western 
Europe; however, most of the ideas are relevant to African countries.73 Two exceptions 
are a published lecture by Adeoye A. Akinsanya, in which he emphasizes the value in 
implementing nationalist economic policy and Terisa Turner who mentions in passing 
that economic nationalism as a policy began at the end of the civil war in 1970. 74 
In Eric Helleiner and Andreas Pickel’s recently published work, Economic 
Nationalism in a Globalizing World, they highlight assumptions regarding economic 
nationalism, which shaped the term’s usage within this project. They emphasize that the 
study of economic nationalism “should focus on how nationalism and national identity 
shape economic policy and processes…” and how it acts as a “potent force in the 
contemporary world.”75 Economic nationalism as used in this project was also fashioned 
with the definition created by Harry Johnson in the mid-1960s: an economic program 
designed “to extend property owned by nationals to gratify the taste of nationalism.”76 He 
also emphasizes economic nationalism as an ideology to rally a population around a 
state-sponsored economic vision.77 The phrase economic nationalism within this project 
serves both as a perspective as well as a form of nationalism. 
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Economic Nationalism and Nationalization 
The federal military leaders in Nigeria during the 1970s brought with them 
vibrant aspirations, which included unprecedented, aggressive approaches to economic 
development. They combined the symbols of civic nationalism with the nuanced doctrine 
of economic nationalism. Until recently, economic nationalism was associated with 
socialism and the negative characteristics assigned to ethnic nationalism.  Contemporary 
works on nationalism have called for a new definition, with a broadened set of 
applications. It also addresses the relationship between economy and nationalism more 
than the forms of nationalism. The policies laid out by Gowon and the combined regime 
of Muhammed and Obasanjo reveal a great deal not only about their economic visions for 
Nigeria, but also their views on the oil industry.  
Nationalization for most oil-rich developing countries, represented an integral 
component to the program of economic nationalism. Nationalization in this project refers 
to the take over of foreign, private operations by state-owned companies or private, 
indigenous individuals. It is a particularly important area of study because it displays the 
power of economic policy on the national psyche and represents the largest, most 
expensive endeavors within the scope of economic nationalism. For this reason, studying 
nationalizations shows the inner workings of this nationalist program. Indeed, the federal 
military government in Nigeria faced pressure by indigenous businessmen and members 
of the civil service for nationalization. While it is a relatively easy task to list the many 
acts of nationalization in Nigeria that are widely recognized, this project seeks to address 
on specific case which is part of economic nationalism, but is not recognized as such 
within the secondary literature. 
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Within the confines of this project on Nigeria’s nationalization of BP in 1979, 
economic nationalism has provided an informative, clear linkage between economic 
policy and the fate of BP. By placing economic initiatives at the center, the sweeping 
trend of nationalization and increasing participation is hard to miss. Further, economic 
nationalism explains previously unanswered questions about the nationalization of BP. It 
provides better answers pertaining to why 1979 and why BP than looking at the event 
within the context of foreign policy ever did. What emerges from this study is the 
observation that the takeover of BP’s operations was part of an established trend within 
Nigeria of replacing foreign investment and manpower with Nigerian ones. 
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Chapter 2:  Nigeria and British Petroleum 
Nigeria maintained a more complicated relationship with British Petroleum than 
with any other transnational oil company during the 1970s. Their relationship revolved 
around competing national visions that clashed on some issues and merged on others. 
But, few would describe the relationship as “tense” because it by no means replicated the 
situation in other oil-rich developing countries. To Nigeria, BP represented both a friend 
and an enemy as a company that understood, but at the same time, often resisted 
Nigeria’s visions of political and economic independence. During the 1970s, their 
relationship became increasingly uneasy. Accusations from both sides included taking 
one another for granted and disrespecting legal authority. As a result of this tension, 
Nigeria’s oil industry not only changed, but also progressed. Indeed, Nigeria joined the 
top ranking oil-producers in the world during the 1970s. Through the examination of 
Nigeria’s history and oil industry as well as BP’s role in both, this chapter serves as a 
point of departure for the discussing of Nigeria’s nationalization of BP in 1979.  
 
Regime Change 
Since its forced formation into a British colony in the late 1800s, Nigeria has 
grappled with economic and political instability. The amalgamation of separate colonies 
and protectorates into one Nigeria in 1914 represented the unification of hundreds of 
ethnic groups and sub-groups and the linking of two distinct landscapes. The northern 
half of Nigeria includes a dry climate and savannah and desert terrain with a spread-out, 
but relatively small population in comparison to the south. In the southern half, Nigeria’s 
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landscape includes a humid climate with tropical, dense vegetation. It also contains the 
majority of Nigeria’s major cities and a booming population. Typically, scholars highlight 
the dominant ethnic groups of Nigeria and the areas of the country in which they 
dominate as a way of understanding tension within the country. Thus, the predominantly 
Muslim Hausa reside in the North, or the region between the Republic of Niger and the 
Niger and Benue Rivers; the Christian/Muslim Yoruba reside in southwestern Nigeria 
between the south of the Niger River and west of the Niger Delta; and, the predominantly 
Christian Igbo live primarily in the southeastern region of the country west of the Niger 
Delta and south of the Benue River (refer to Illustration 1). Much of Nigeria’s political 
instability has been linked to ethnic fracturing and competing ethnic nationalisms all for 
access to the central government. 
After receiving its independence in 1960, Nigeria’s First Republic proceeded on 
shaky ground until the country’s first military coup took place in 1966. One year later, 
Nigeria split apart as the Igbo dominated Eastern Region78 declared independence as the 
Republic of Biafra and launched the country into a three-year civil war. The period under 
discussion in this project deals with a reunited Nigeria under military leadership, a 
rapidly expanding oil industry of which Nigeria maintained little control, and the 
emergence of super-nationalist policies. During the 1970s, Nigeria was ruled by two 
different military regimes –the first under General Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975) and the 
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second under General Murtala Muhammed (1975-6) and General Olusegun Obasanjo 
(1976-1978).  
After the war, Gowon launched a program to reintegrate eastern Nigeria and 
rehabilitate the area, focusing on the three Rs –Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, and 
Reconciliation.79 This was seen as a largely successful operation by Gowon. Emerging 
from a civil war in 1970, Gowon transformed Nigeria’s foreign policy from one of non-
alignment to one of activism. He expanded Nigeria’s membership in the OAU into a 
leadership role, formally and informally. Nigeria’s geographic size and large population 
of an estimated 51.6 million in 1960 (with an estimated 2.5 percent increase annually) 
made Nigeria, in Nigerian eyes, a natural choice to act as the powerhouse behind African 
politics. The UK hailed Gowon as “not only not corrupt but virtually incorruptible.”80 
With Nigeria’s economy benefiting from the oil boom of the mid-1970s and the initial 
success of the Second Development Plan (1970-74), Gowon felt it was the wrong time to 
transfer Nigeria back to civilian rule. He had promised to return Nigeria to civilian rule 
by 1972 but continued to delay it. In 1971, he laid out a nine-point program, which listed 
the major functions required for open elections, which delayed an election until 1976. 
They included carrying out a census; creating a system for revenue allocation; forming 
new states; drafting a new constitution; creating national political parties; holding 
elections at state and federal levels; eradicating corruption; and demobilizing soldiers.81 
In 1974, rumors circulated, and were later confirmed, that Gowon’s intention of returning 
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Nigeria to civilian rule would be extended beyond 1976, possibly to 1980. The transfer to 
a democratically elected government would coincide with the total completion of the 
Second Development Plan. 
Disappointed by Gowon’s performance, officers in the military barracks drafted 
plans for his removal. Nigeria’s second military coup in 1975 was carried out by middle 
ranking northern military officers dissatisfied with Gowon and eager to forge their own 
political path and take their share of the power and wealth. Many considered the overlap 
of this coup with the anniversary of the one in 1966 as intentional. British observers 
remarked that the coup was carried out by military personnel, such as Major General 
Joseph Garba, without a clear plan on to whom national leadership would be bestowed.82 
On 29 July 1975, Garba announced over the radio the removal of Gowon:  
Fellow countrymen and women, I Colonel Joseph Nauven Garba, in 
consultation with my colleagues, do hereby declare that in view of what 
has been happening in our country in the past few months the Nigerian 
armed forces have decided to effect a change of the leadership of the 
federal military government. As from now General Yakubu Gowon ceases 
to be the head of the federal military government and commander in chief 
of the armed forces in Nigeria.83 
 
Speculation spread that Gowon had prior knowledge of the coup because when it 
happened he was in Kampala, Uganda at an OAU Summit, his family was in England, 
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and several of his senior officials were out of the country. Gowon publicly announced his 
acceptance of the new regime and commitment to assisting the new leadership.84  
To take Gowon’s place as supreme military commander was not Garba, but 
Murtala Muhammed, a former federal commissioner of communications. The Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office of the UK described Muhammed as, 
a tough Hausa from the north who played a leading role in the coup, which 
brought Gowon to power in 1966, but disagreed with his policy of 
minimising bloodshed during the civil war and had not enjoyed good 
relations with him since.85  
 
They also described Muhammed as “erratic, intemperate, and not well disposed. He also 
has the reputation of being one of the most corrupt army officers.”86 An appraisal of his 
policies within the secondary literature supports this description; however, in Nigerian 
popular culture he is remembered fondly.87 Muhammed’s economic plans in many ways 
marked a radical departure from Gowon’s.  
Muhammed’s regime lasted from July 1975 to February 1976. All of the military 
governors and administrators were dismissed from their posts and returned to the 
barracks, to be replaced by those chosen by Muhammed. In addition to reshuffling the 
Supreme Military Council, Muhammed also created the new, separate National Council 
of States. Among others, Major General Muhammed Buhari became military governor of 
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the North Eastern State.88 The new supreme military council under Muhammed created 
advisory panels to discuss the formation of new states and a federal capital territory, 
Abuja, in the middle of the country to replace Lagos. Their first order of business also 
included the canceling of the 1973 proposed census and the postponement of the planned 
arts festival, FESTAC.89 Further, Muhammed implemented Nigeria’s Third Development 
Plan from 1976 to 1980, which focused on improving upon the previous plan for 
indigenization and greater participation in the oil industry. This regime also went on an 
anti-corruption quest. From the moment of Muhammed’s arrival, plans had been set in 
place for the country’s return to civilian rule in five years. In February of 1976, 
Muhammed was assassinated in an abortive coup, leaving the regime to Obasanjo, the 
former chief of staff and deputy to Muhammed. 
Obasanjo took control of the supreme military council during the remainder of the 
same regime from February 1976 to October 1979. He maintained the same development 
path, government administration, and commitment to transitioning Nigeria to civilian 
rule. Despite this continuity, the UK viewed him differently than Muhammed. The 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office described Obasanjo as having a “good reputation as 
an efficient officer with a non-tribal approach. His attitudes have been generally pro-
British.”90 It also described his as an honest person, disciplinarian, non-smoker, and 
teetotaler.91 Starting on 24 July, all nineteen military governors were sent back to their 
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military posts and replaced by other military men labeled as ‘administrators.’ 
Additionally, four federal commissioners were also integrated into the army or assigned 
to other posts. This group included Buhari, who served as the petroleum commissioner 
since March 1976 and became the chairman of the state-owned oil company in 1978.92 
For the marketing company, BP (Nigeria), Buhari’s dismissal was a major disappointment 
because it felt he understood the oil industry the best. They went on to describe him as 
“an excellent man, straightforward and honest, who could hold his own….”93 However, it 
was Obasanjo that took the most aggressive economic measures during the last year of 
the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime. Under Obasanjo, Nigeria’s national oil company 
increased its participation to 60 percent within each foreign oil producer and BP was 
nationalized.  
Obasanjo, however, earned a great deal of international respect for executing the 
promise of civilian rule in four years that had been announced by Muhammed on 1 
October 1975. On 21 September 1978, Obasanjo signed Decree No. 25, placing a new 
constitution into effect starting 1 October 1979. In early October 1978, the federal 
military government introduced the Constitution Drafting Committee. The membership 
included lawyers, professors, businessmen from the private sector, and local government 
officials.94 Obasanjo maintained a ban on politics during the writing of the constitution. 
In October 1979 national elections took place, installing Alhaji Shehu Usman Aliyu 
Shagari as president of the Second Republic. Prior to this position, Shagari served as the 
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minister of economic affairs. Overall, the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime received praise 
for moving Nigeria forward economically, attempting to shelf ethnic-based nationalism, 
and for its commitment to returning Nigeria to civilian rule.  
The history of Nigeria during the 1970s is one of political and economic 
uncertainty. A failed democracy and two military coups tested the faith of those hoping 
for a smooth transition from colonial rule. This political upheaval did not go unnoticed 
within the international community. Nigeria’s burgeoning oil industry played a major 
role. Much of Nigeria’s history –particularly regarding foreign and economic policy- 
hinged on the oil industry. Not only did oil become the cornerstone of Nigeria’s economy, 
but also an obstinate linkage between Nigeria and its former colonizer.  
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Illustration 2: Map of Oil Production in Nigeria, 1970s95  
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The Oil Industry 
Nigeria’s oil industry developed rather slowly over a span of some fifty years, but 
once established it expanded into the country’s largest source of revenue. What began as 
a series of failed exploration ventures along the southern coast of Nigeria, turned into a 
profitable oil production and marketing business. Much of Nigeria’s oil history overlaps 
with its colonial history and, similarly, with its struggle to break away from its former 
colonizer after receiving independence. 
As a British territory from the mid-1800s to 1960, only British oil companies 
received exploration concessions in Nigeria. And, petroleum consumption among 
Nigerians, for reasons of financial constraints and as a method of colonial social control, 
remained limited. Thus, it was understood since the early 1900s that any oil found in the 
colony was destined for British consumption and trade. Oil exploration in Nigeria started 
as early as 1901 by two London-based companies (the British Colonial Petroleum 
Company and the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation) operating in conjunction with British 
colonial expansion.96 Both companies surveyed southern Nigeria in search of crude oil 
and only came across small pockets of bitumen, which local communities used since pre-
colonial times.97 Local communities collected bitumen that seeped to the surface and 
used it to waterproof their fishing boats.98 In fact, one village in the bitumen-rich region 
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near the town of Ondo, was named Gbeleju Loda, meaning “the town of tar.”99 Bitumen, 
particularly in the early 1900s, was not a desirable type of crude oil for export because it 
was difficult to extract and refine into marketable petroleum products. By 1916, both 
exploration companies folded and exploration efforts in Nigeria ceased for several 
decades. While not a major producer of oil yet, the British colony of Nigeria proved itself 
to be an important consumer of petroleum products. 
The consumption of petroleum products in Nigeria was limited largely to the 
colonial administration and the relevant components of colonial infrastructure, such as 
railroads, automobiles, public transport buses, railroads. Many of the major transnational 
companies operating in Nigeria today began their activities by setting up petrol stations 
and distributions networks throughout Nigeria in the mid-1900s. For example, the US-
based marketing company, Mobil, appears to have arrived to Nigeria in 1907 as Sacony-
Vacuum and BP’s marketing subsidiary BP (West Africa) began its sales activities in the 
early 1900s. Texaco, another US-based company, began marketing its petroleum products 
through the Companie Francaise de L’Afrique Occidentale in Nigeria in 1913. In 1964, 
Texaco took over the distribution of its own products through Texaco (Africa).100 The 
Netherlands/UK-based Royal Dutch/Shell (hereafter referred to as Shell) began selling its 
petroleum products in 1927. Several other major oil companies followed BP, Mobil, and 
Texaco ―the Italian company Agip (1962), US-based Esso (1956), and the French 
company Elf (1983) also distributed and sold petroleum products in Nigeria.101 Prior to 
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1965, when the first refinery was built, the marketing companies imported petroleum 
products into the country.  
These companies established extensive marketing networks totaling over one 
hundred petrol stations spread throughout the country. The sale and consumption of 
petroleum products in Nigeria largely resembled the geographic layout of the colonial 
infrastructure, with most petrol stations and kerosene depots restricted to southern 
Nigeria. Large areas of Nigeria such as the northern region did not have many petrol 
stations because the major oil companies did not see those markets as profitable given the 
small population, distance from coastal refineries, and the difficulties of transportation. 
The discovery of commercial quantities in Nigeria coupled with Nigerian independence 
significantly changed petroleum consumption patterns. 
Since the initial “discoveries”102 in the early 1900s, several other attempts had 
been made and, ultimately, resulted in the establishment of a major oil industry. Royal 
Dutch/Shell and BP’s predecessor, D’Arcy Exploration, formed a joint-venture company, 
Shell-D’Arcy Exploration Company in 1937. One year later, the company received the 
first concession in Nigeria. Shell-D’Arcy struck oil in the delta of the Niger River 
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(referred to as the Niger Delta) in the southeast in 1956.103 The company shipped the 
colony’s first commercial quantity of crude oil on 17 February 1958. Coinciding with the 
first major strike and the launching of Nigeria’s oil industry, Shell-D’Arcy changed its 
name to Shell-BP Petroleum Company. For several years, Shell-BP held the distinction of 
being the sole oil producer in Nigeria. Shell-BP produced the largest percentage of 
Nigeria’s oil, producing roughly 443,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) from its 18 fields located 
in the Eastern Region and Mid-West Region, north of Port Harcourt (refer to Illustration 
2).104 Between 1958 and 1961, Shell-BP expanded Nigeria’s yearly crude oil output from 
about 1.9 million bbl to 16.6 million bbl.105 With the end of British colonial rule, Shell-
BP’s privileged position came to an end. 
After Nigeria became independent, it invited several other major oil companies 
from the United States and Europe to conduct exploration parties. Between 1960 and 
1967, oil companies branched out from the Niger Delta in search of oil, sending survey 
expeditions northeast of the Niger Delta all the way to Lake Chad. They also expanded 
their search efforts westward across the Niger River along the Nigerian coast. The 
wholly-owned French state company, SAFRAP established a subsidiary in Nigeria and 
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struck oil north of Shell-BP’s concessions and began small-scale production in 1966.106 
However, SAFRAP’s yearly production mirrored only a small fraction of Shell-BP’s. For 
France, SAFRAP’s production in Nigeria provided roughly 3 percent of its crude oil 
between 1966 and 1970.107 The US-based oil company, Gulf Oil, began exploration in 
Nigeria in December 1963 in the Eastern and Mid-West Regions. The company is 
credited with being the first company to begin production offshore.108 Its production level 
reached 57,000 bbl/d by June 1967, primarily from the Mid-Western Region.109 Nearly all 
production in Nigeria was confined to onshore locations and all crude oil produced 
moved through pipelines to Nigeria’s only refinery in Port Harcourt or the Bonny 
terminal for export.110 Oil from the Eastern Region accounted for 65 percent of total 
production in the 1960s.111 Several other companies held prospecting licenses, but had 
yet to strike oil and begin production before Nigeria was engulfed in civil war from 1967 
to 1970. 
During the civil war, Nigeria’s crude oil production slowed to a virtual standstill. 
As the war escalated in Biafra, Shell-BP ceased production from its wells in the Mid-
West in November 1969 because of the air attacks.112 The Port Harcourt refinery closed 
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on 4 August 1967 and did not resume operations until May 1970 due to damages.113 In 
July of 1968, Gulf was the only producer able to remain in operation.114 After the fall of 
Port Harcourt to the federal military in May 1968, Biafra began to use make-shift 
refineries to provide fuel for their vehicles.115 SAFRAP attempted to keep production in 
the Eastern Region open, but found the situation nearly impossible forcing them to 
abandon their operations during the war as well. During the war, production dropped to 
as low as 51.9 million barrels in 1968.116 Oil facilities, intentionally or not, were severely 
damaged during the war. The damages included portions of the Port Harcourt refinery. 
Shell-BP also reported that a storage tanker caught on fire and a couple oilfields were 
burning.117 In total, estimated damages by 1968 to Shell-BP’s facilities were estimated to 
be ₤20 million.118 The refinery at Port Harcourt took nearly one year to repair and 
resumed operations in the summer of 1970.119 With the Eastern Region under siege, oil 
companies explored new production options. Scholars attribute the war to the expansion 
of oil production and transport within the Mid-West Region. 
With the close of the civil war and up-dated oil technology, Nigeria’s industry 
expanded. Several transnational oil companies joined Shell-BP, SAFRAP, and Gulf in the 
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production of crude oil. For example, Mobil Producing (Nigeria) began offshore 
prospecting in 1961 and made its first discovery in 1964. Mobil began production 
offshore in February 1970.120 Agip received a prospecting license in 1962, but did not 
strike oil until 1 March 1965 or start production until October 1970.121 Gulf oil made its 
first discovery and began production from its onshore fields in 1972.122 Texaco began 
exploration in Nigeria in 1963, but did not start its offshore production until the early 
1970s.123 Illustration 2 shows the location of these concessions. After recovery from the 
civil war, production levels soared. Shell-BP produced 752,000 bbl/d, Gulf 225,000 
bbl/d, Mobil 52,000 bbl/d, and Texaco 8,600 bbl/d.124 Together, these companies 
launched Nigeria into the ranking of tenth largest producer in the world in 1970 (see 
Table 1).125 During the 1970s, Nigeria’s crude oil supplied between 7 and 12 percent of 
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Year   Production (bbl/yr)  Export (bbl/yr) 
1966   152,428,168   139,549,000 
1967   116,553,292   109,274,902 
1968   51,907,304   52,129,855 
1969   197,204,486   197,245,641 
1970   395,835,689   383,455,353 
1971   558,678,882   542,545,131 
1972   643,206,685   650,979,689 
1973   750,593,415   723,313,837 
1974   823,317,838   795,710,044 
1975   651,506,761   627,638,983 
1976   758,058,380   736,822,998 
1978   692,269,121   667,387,067 
1979   842,474,109   813,726,843 
Table 1: Nigeria’s Oil Production and Exports127 
 
Year    Estimated Reserves (in bbl) 
1965   3 million 
1970   9.3 million 
1975   20 million 
1980   16.7 million 
Table 2: Nigeria’s Oil Reserves 
 
With several companies operating in Nigeria at one time, the pressure to watch 
over and protect of Nigeria’s upstream interests became a major challenge to successive 
Nigerian governments. Nigeria wrangled with the importance of not only developing a 
diverse economy, but also meeting the rising levels of consumption associated with 
industrial development. To facilitate these needs, Nigeria passed several decrees that 
dramatically altered Nigeria’s oil industry, notably the Petroleum Decree (Act) No. 51 
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(1969), Decree No. 18 (1971), and Decree No. 33 (1977). These decrees were integral for 
clearing out-dated colonial laws regarding land rights, taxation, and concessions. Also, 
they reflected Nigeria’s interest in following the principles laid out by the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which called for the establishment of a state-
owned oil company to oversee and participate in each member country’s oil industry.  
The first, the Petroleum Decree (Act) No. 51, was written on 27 November of 
1969 for the express purpose of amending the Colonial Mineral Ordinance of 1914. It 
was the outcome of the Federal Executive Council’s report on oil taxation, revenue, and 
other various matters related to Nigeria’s oil interests drafted for Gowon. It placed 
ownership and control over all oil found in Nigerian subsoil and within its territorial 
waters. And, the decree separated exploration licenses granted to oil companies from 
prospecting licenses and mining licenses. For existing licenses and leases, the decree 
applied with several exceptions –duration, rent, and royalties in contracts would 
remain.128 It ensured that if oil was discovered by a company in Nigeria, it could no 
longer automatically claim the rights to extract and sell it. Obtaining a license required 
approval by the commissioner for mines and power, who, in turn, would only grant them 
to companies registered in Nigeria. Under this rule, the major oil companies were forced 
to reconfigure their relationship to their parent companies.129 Through these provisions, 
the federal military government was able to increase its control for present and future 
endeavors. 
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The second and third decrees mark the formations of Nigeria’s national oil 
companies, which focused not only on regulating its industry, but also, with regard to the 
state-owned oil company, working with major oil companies through joint ventures. The 
idea of creating a state company emerged when Nigeria aspired to comply with OPEC 
Resolution XVI Article 90 of June 1968, which called for all members to hold a 51 
percent equity share of all foreign oil companies operating in Nigeria.130 Although 
Nigeria did not join OPEC until the summer of 1971, it gravitated toward the 
organization’s membership criteria. The first step included the second decree under 
discussion, Decree No. 18, which created the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) 
as a holding company (not operating company) in 1971. Its role included recruiting and 
training Nigerian workers for the industry; managing oil leases and the refineries; 
overseeing the construction and maintenance of oil and gas pipelines; and facilitating 
more effective and expansive distribution networks for Nigeria’s domestic consumption 
of petroleum products.131 Most importantly, the NNOC oversaw several subsidiaries to 
cover every stage of the industry process.  
One of the NNOC’s notable actions included taking shares in the production 
activities of the foreign oil companies. In April 1971, Nigeria acquired a 33.3 percent 
share in Agip’s upstream operations in Nigeria and 35 percent of SAFRAP’s upstream 
operations in Nigeria.132 These moves marked the first attempt by Nigeria at equity 
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participation, meaning that Nigeria owned shares, or equity, in a company, but did not 
directly involve itself in the everyday activities. While OPEC inspired Nigeria to increase 
its participation, Nigeria chose the middle-road approach as its starting point between 
Libya’s call for 51 percent and the Persian Gulf states’ 20 percent.133 As the 1970s 
progressed, Nigeria pressed beyond merely equity participation and owning a holding 
company toward direct involvement, which is referred to in the literature as direct 
participation.  
The formation of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) occurred 
on 1 April 1977 through the provisions of the final decree under review ―Decree No. 33. 
Essentially the NNOC and the Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR) merged into one 
company, taking all of the subsidiary companies under NNPC control. Scholars view the 
shift to the NNPC as an attempt to move “beyond the collection of oil rents by operating 
in the industry directly” and promoting the role of indigenous participation. 134  The 
NNPC was an operating company and as such exercised the power to conduct research on 
oil and invest in new oil-related activities. Instead of taking equity participation in a 
foreign company’s operations, it became a full, but silent partner through joint-ventures. 
But, like many other government institutions, it suffered from a lack of support and basic 
infrastructure to make the company truly effective. In a memo, BP (Nigeria) complained 
of the NNPC’s shortcomings: 
More than 4 months after its formation, and more than a month after all 
former employees of NNOC/MPR had to indicate whether or not they 
wished to stay with the new corporation, there are no signs yet that the 
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corporation is settling down to seriously and comprehensively tackling the 
many problems…. There are no indications yet that the massive 
recruitment drive for Nigerian and expatriate staff is being actively 
pursued. There is very little effort visible in actually restructuring the 
organisation in line with the original decree. The same person in the same 
scrappy old office with the same problems in the same completely 
inefficient manner.135 
 
Both the formation of the NNOC and its reconfiguration into the NNPC represented 
pieces of large-scale economic development plans to jumpstart Nigeria’s economy. 
Together these decrees bolstered nationalist support for its leadership and took advantage 
of the oil revenues during the oil boom years. As implied in the quote above, the 
formation of the NNPC proved no exception, however, to the reoccurring flaws of 
Nigeria’s economic plans. In addition to taking part in the upstream activities, the 
Nigerian government also became interested in the downstream. 
Nigeria sought to expand the existing downstream sector into a more extensive 
network of pipelines, trading ports, refineries, and distribution depots than before held. 
Of these efforts, Nigeria devoted the most energy to increasing its refining and export 
capabilities. In the 1970s, Nigeria strove to increase its refining capacity and by the early 
1980s, Nigeria had four refineries in operation. The first refinery was built at Alesa-
Eleme near Port Harcourt by Shell-BP in October of 1965.136 The refinery was operated 
by the Nigerian Petroleum Refinery Corporation (NPRC), which was comprised of 
Nigeria held 50 percent equity in the refinery since 1965, with Shell and BP (London) 
holding 25 percent each and acted as a consortium in the NPRC until 1972. Its primary 
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function was to reduce the amount of petroleum imports into Nigeria and, instead, refine 
light crude oil produced from nearby oil fields in the Niger Delta.137 After the civil war, it 
refined at full capacity (38,000 bbl/d) in May 1970.138 In 1972, Nigeria increased its stake 
in the company to 60 percent in compliance with the Nigerian Enterprise Promotions 
Decree (see Chapter 3). The refinery employed approximately 400 people, of which 30 
were expatriates.139 Despite this change, BP (London) remained the primary manager of 
the refinery.140 In 1978, a second refinery in Warri was commissioned.141 In the 1980s, 
Nigeria added two refineries with one located in Kaduna in northern Nigeria and a second 
one in Port Harcourt. Nigeria used these refineries as a way to involve itself in Nigeria’s 
industry and ensure that a sizable quantity of petroleum products refined remained within 
the country for domestic consumption.  
Nigeria also expanded its trading capabilities by encouraging the major oil 
companies to increase the number of export terminals and ports available. As each major 
oil company struck oil and began commercial production, a new port was established to 
handle the outflow of trade. Most ports were constructed in the 1960s. Bonny was 
commissioned in April 1961 and Escravos, Forcados, Pennington, and Qua Iboe were 
commissioned in 1968. In the case of Forcados, the civil war delayed construction until 
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March 1970.142 The Brass terminal, located 17 miles off shore was constructed as part of 
an oil development project undertaken by the NNOC and Agip/Phillips, through a 
consortium in 1974.143 Each of the major companies operating in Nigeria used designated 
ports from which they loaded their tankers based on proximity. As evident in Illustration 
2, Agip used Brass, Agip/Phillips used Bonny, Gulf used Escravos, Shell-BP used Bonny 
and Forcados, Mobil used Qua Iboe, and Texaco used Pennington. Loading and 
discharging of crude oil was a slow process, which necessitated multiple ports along 
Nigeria’s southern coast.  
Ship congestion at the ports and infrastructural weaknesses made loading and 
unloading a slow and often disorganized process. This situation became a major issue 
leading up to the nationalization of BP in 1979, meriting it some discussion. The majority 
of Nigeria’s oil trading was done by Shell and BP because Nigeria lacked the shipping 
capabilities to transport its own oil, especially long distances. Only in 1976, did Nigeria 
launch its own small-scale tanker business through the purchase of the Oloibiri tanker 
from Yugoslavia. The primary route of the tanker included shuttling Nigeria’s crude oil 
from Forcados to Curaçao, in the West Indies, for refining.144 Thus, Nigeria heavily 
depended on transnational oil companies to construct and operate its overseas oil trade. 
For efficiency, these companies simply plugged Nigeria into their global trading networks 
and shipping routes. Nigeria, then, represented one stop in an oil tanker’s typically 
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clockwise journey around the continent of Africa en route from the Middle East or Asia 
to Europe or the Americas. Chapter 2 looks at one such tanker, Kulu, which loaded crude 
oil in Iran and traveled down the east coast of Africa to Durban, South Africa. The tanker 
then traveled northward to Nigeria before heading to various points in Europe. The entire 
trip took roughly one year, depending on congestion at the ports and maintenance 
requirements. An oil company designed a port’s capacity to suit its own needs, which 
meant that only a few oil tankers at one time could call at one of Nigeria’s ports. Overall, 
it took an estimated forty hours for the arrival, loading, and clearance.145 The movement 
of oil tankers such as Kulu is important to the nationalization of BP since some of 
Nigeria’s dealings with BP leading up to the takeover involved disputes over tankers 
leaving or destined for South Africa on their way to or from Nigeria. 
In looking at Nigeria’s oil history from the start of production through the 1970s, 
the role of BP is hard to miss. The company played a tremendous role in building up 
Nigeria’s industry from small-scale, domestic use within the Niger Delta. Even today, BP 
participates in several aspects of Nigeria’s oil and natural gas industry. Nigeria and BP’s 
relationship has been a complicated one, with characteristics bearing little resemblance to 
others of its kind. In large part, this stems from not only BP’s partnership with Nigeria 
over the years, but also the company’s relatiosnhip Royal Dutch/Shell and the UK. 
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British Petroleum 
The history of this London-based oil company began like many others with a bold 
individual seeking fortune and adventure through oil. Within a twenty-year span, a 
personal quest became that of one of the world’s largest transnational oil companies. In 
1901 William D’Arcy, a British entrepreneur and adventurer, went to Persia (present-day 
Iran) in search of oil fields. Upon discovery of large commercial quantities of oil, D’Arcy 
formed the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909. These oil fields represented D’Arcy’s 
primary production center.146 
The famous Winston Churchill, a member of the War Council of Great Britain at 
the time, set his sights on D’Arcy’s activities in the Middle East with hopes of securing 
oil supplies for the British Royal Navy.147 In this way, BP’s history differs from other oil 
companies in the development of its relationship with the UK. In 1914, Churchill bought 
half of the company on behalf of the British government, making BP no longer a 
privately owned, independently operated company. The British government held a 40 to 
60 percent share in BP throughout the second half of the 20th century. For this reason, 
Nigeria saw BP as a “mere creature” of the British government.148 As a shareholder, the 
British government had a right to nominate two people to the BP Board and held the 
authority to veto some company decisions. Through a letter written by John Bradbury 
(referred to as the Bradbury Letter) in 1914, the British government highlighted that 
while it had the right to veto decisions made by the company, it would not exercise that 
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right unless absolutely necessary.149 In this letter, the government outlined the 
circumstances in which it would use its veto power: activities that may affect foreign 
naval or military policy; the proposed sale of the company’s activities or change company 
status; any new exploration/exploitation endeavors; and, “the sale of crude or fuel oil to 
foreigners… as might endanger the due fulfillment of current Admiralty contracts.”150 
The government, however, gave the company a great deal of autonomy and rarely 
interfered.  
With government backing financially and politically, D’Arcy felt free to expand 
his oil interests beyond Persia. During the first half of the 20th century, D’Arcy 
participated in a series of oil expeditions to other parts of the Middle East, Asia, and 
Africa alone or through a joint venture with rival oil companies such as Royal 
Dutch/Shell. In 1935, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company changed its name to Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company to reflect the name change of the country. What D’Arcy failed to realize 
was that the name change represented only the start of major political change in Iran. In 
the 1950s, Anglo-Iranian lost its stronghold over the oil fields in Iran through a hostile 
conflict with the Iranian government.151 The Iranian government took a bold move and 
nationalized Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. To improve the company’s public image after 
the debacle with Iran, the company changed its name in 1954 to British Petroleum 
Company Ltd. One year later, BP reorganized its corporate structure to become a holding 
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company, creating BP Trading Company Ltd. as a subsidiary that managed the company’s 
global trade. From that point forward, BP continued its vigorous exploration and 
production, while expanding its marketing and transport into its operations. Between 
1950 and 1980, BP diversified its activities to reduce reliance on any one country or 
region for production or sales. BP hired geologists to explore possible new sources in 
Africa, including Nigeria and Libya, and the Americas.152  
In addition to BP’s independent operations, it also engaged in activities with 
Shell. The London-based transnational oil company, Shell Trading Company, operated 
since the 1880s trading crude oil and finished petroleum products such as kerosene and 
gasoline. Shell Trading boasted that it was the first oil marketing company in southern 
Africa, through British Imperial Oil’s activities starting in 1901.153 Around the same time 
oil production began in the Dutch colony of Sumatra (part of present-day Malaysia) by 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company based out of the Hague. In 1903 Shell and Royal Dutch 
joined operations to compete with Standard Oil (the origins of today’s ExxonMobil), 
forming the Asiatic Petroleum Company. In 1907 the two companies formally merged 
into one powerful company under the name Royal Dutch/Shell. The company expanded 
its operations throughout Asia and South America.154  
Through the process of an “imperial carve-up,”155 Shell and BP wound up in a 
restrictive agreement that required the sharing of operations starting in 1928. The 
arrangement demarcated the Consolidated Area, expanding across the Indian Ocean to 
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include important areas of the British empire such as India, eastern Africa, and southern 
Africa. Shell and BP Shell and BP worked together through a 50-50 joint venture called 
the Consolidated Petroleum Company. The arrangement reduced competition and 
allowed for greater coverage of operations based on each company’s strengths ―Shell’s 
in production and BP’s marketing.156 Consolidated Petroleum maintained various 
branches with Shell acting as the manager of the company and its subsidiaries per 
agreement in 1931. All subsidiaries were registered in the UK and decided and executed 
from offices in London. 
Southern Africa provides an excellent example of the relationship between Shell 
and BP and their joint activities in Consolidated Petroleum. Both companies operated in 
South Africa, Mozambique, and South West Africa (present-day Namibia). Only a 
handful of British representatives of those companies actually visited or worked in 
southern Africa. With Shell acting as the primary manager for Consolidated Petroleum, 
BP (London) kept very few executives in the region.157 During the 1970s, the operations 
of Shell and BP within and independent of Consolidated Petroleum became important to 
Nigeria when it tried to determine whether UN sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were 
committed by these companies. Many Nigerians were convinced that these violations 
involved the trading of Nigeria’s oil to southern Africa against its declared prohibitions. 
Over time, BP (London) began to feel restricted by the Consolidated Area and looked for 
ways to expand its operations independently. From BP’s (London) perspective the 50-50 
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agreement never really worked in its favor. BP (London), with great resistance from 
Shell, hoped for dissolution of Consolidated Petroleum and a split of operations allowing 
both companies their independence. To facilitate an equal split in southern Africa, the two 
companies underwent “Operation Voortrekker” starting in January 1969, which served as 
a way of equalizing shares. The process of separation was completed by June 1975, 
bringing a formal end to Consolidated Petroleum in southern Africa. 158 
Unlike countries in eastern and southern Africa, Nigeria was not part of the 
Consolidated Area. Shell and BP (London), however, continued to act as close partners in 
the upstream sector of Nigeria’s oil industry. As previously mentioned, Shell and BP 
(London) went in together on the exploration and production of oil in the Niger Delta. 
Within Shell-BP, BP (London) held a 50 percent share in production and a 20 percent 
interest in exploration concessions. This arrangement provided BP with roughly 250,000 
bbl/d of crude oil to trade.159 Shell-BP maintained an office in Port Harcourt, with an 
employee from Shell’s office in London acting as the company’s manager. As the most 
successful oil company in Nigeria, Shell-BP produced two-thirds of Nigeria’s available 
crude oil in the 1970s. In 1973, Shell-BP exported 25.4 percent, followed by Gulf at 18.2 
and Mobil at 10.1 percent.160 In the marketing of petroleum products, however, Shell and 
BP (London) operated separately. 
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Within Nigeria, BP (London) operated in several different areas of the oil 
industry. For decades, BP (London) operated marketing subsidiaries in many parts of 
Africa, including West Africa. BP (West Africa), managed from London, focused on its 
biggest markets in Ghana and Nigeria. By the 1950s, the demand for petroleum products 
required the creation of a separate subsidiary, BP (Nigeria), devoted solely to Nigeria.161 
Until nationalization, BP (Nigeria) was Nigeria’s largest marketing companies. It had the 
largest distribution and sales record of petroleum products in the country.162 In December 
1964, BP (Nigeria) was incorporated as a subsidiary, registered in Lagos with a locally-
based board of directors. Within BP (Nigeria), BP (London) held the majority (60 
percent) shares and the remaining was held by Kenilworth Oil Company and Melrose 
Trading Company.163 In addition to production and marketing, BP’s (London) 
involvement in Nigeria’s oil industry also included a stake in refining as a member of the 
NPRC and participation in the, then, new liquefied natural gas scheme.164 BP’s (London) 
portfolio of operations in Nigeria exhibited a wide range of activities, in many cases, on a 
larger scale than its competitors.  
Within Nigeria, BP (London) established itself as a major oil company involved in 
many aspects of the country’s oil industry. Over a twenty year period, Nigeria modified 
its relationship with BP, and the other major oil companies. This transformation hinged 
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almost entirely on Nigeria’s quest for industrial development and the revenue required for 
that vision. Nigeria targeted its oil industry as the solution, transferring piece by piece 
nearly all foreign operations into public or private Nigerian ones.  
 
Oil and the Economy 
Although crude oil production began in Nigeria in the late 1950s, the industry did 
not factor into Nigeria’s economy in a significant way until the early 1970s. Public 
discussions after the civil war centered on the role of oil in Nigeria’s future and how best 
to manage this increasingly valuable commodity. The general consensus in Nigeria at the 
time was that the major oil companies controlled their oil industries and, without pointing 
fingers, attributed this situation to the chronic shortages of petroleum products.165 After a 
series of nationalizations, newspaper reporters felt more at ease about blaming the foreign 
oil companies for these shortages. In one particular article, the author argues that of all 
companies, BP (London) as the manager of NPRC should have recognized these 
shortages and addressed them.166 Many Nigerians also saw the lack of control over their 
oil industry as a glaring vestige of colonial rule that required effective and immediate 
eradication. Taking over the oil industry marked a crucial and decisive move away from a 
neocolonial situation. Also, it became evident that its oil production generated high 
                                                                                                                                                 
164 “BP’s Strategy for Nigeria,” 22 August 1979, BP 4823, 1. 
165 See “Gov’t Role in Oil Industry,” New Nigerian [Kaduna] (31 August 1972), 5; “Oil: Dominant 
Element in the Upsurge of Nigerian Economy,” Daily Times [Lagos] (31 August 1972), 7; “Role of 
Petroleum in National Development,” Nigerian Observer [Benin] (23 December 1972), 7. 
166 “BP Had It Coming Long Ago,” Daily Times [Lagos] (6 August 1979), 3. 
 74
amounts of revenue coming into the country. Any plans for development and financial 
independence from the UK factored in oil wealth.  
Until the mid-1970s, intense development based on oil revenues appeared 
successful. This was particularly true during the oil boom years between roughly 1973 
and 1978 when the price of crude oil per barrel reached unprecedented levels. As a 
member of OPEC since 1971, Nigeria enjoyed the influx of oil revenues, but without any 
of the political repercussions of taking part in the Arab oil embargo between 1973 to 
1974. The price of oil per barrel in Nigeria rose from around $4.30 in October 1973 to 
$14.70 in January of 1974, which effectively tripled Nigeria’s oil revenues.167 This gave 
Nigeria the rare experience of having a major surplus of 11 percent in its budget.168 The 
high oil prices during the embargo had a two-pronged effect on Nigeria’s plans for 
economic growth. It made the expansion of Nigeria’s oil industry and the execution of 
ambitious national development plans much more economically feasible.  
In his essay, “The Shock of Modernity,” Michael Watts aptly describes the 1970s 
for Nigeria as a “decade of oil and bristling petrolic nationalism.”169 His poignant 
description highlights how Nigeria reveled in its financial freedom by engaging in two 
related oil-funded projects ―nation-building and its own brand of civic nationalism. 
Gowon operated on the correct assumption that government spending in development 
projects would bring the country together under a strong, centralized government. 
Without economic progress, nationalist projects would ultimately fail as people sought 
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means for survival through ethnic, familial, and religious affiliations. Economic 
development projects became not only about improving the economy, but also getting 
people to believe in the government and the merits of being part of a nation-state.  
Under pressure to produce immediate results and share the oil wealth, the 
Nigerian government cut taxes, sponsored free education, distributed substantial salary 
awards, began subsidizing petroleum products in October 1973, and heavily invested in 
development projects on roads and telecommunications.170 These investments were 
coupled with efforts to create new financial alliances. Contracts to design and build 
petroleum distribution depots and pipelines often went to Japanese and Soviet firms.171 
They also invested in neighboring countries, including the granting of loans and 
donations. According to Julius Ihonvbere, Nigeria loaned the Republic of Benin N2 
million and to Guinea N50,000.172 All of these efforts encouraged the fractured societies 
in Nigeria to feel invested in and rewarded by the national government.  
In addition to the myriad of investment projects outlined above, Nigeria also 
engaged in two directly related to Nigeria’s oil industry. The first is the government’s 
attempt at revenue allocation, whereby oil revenues centrally collected would be evenly 
distributed among the twelve states. The first major revision to the revue allocation 
schema took place in 1967, calling for 50 percent to go to the states, 35 percent into the 
Distributable Pool Account, and 15 percent to the federal military government out of the 
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mining rents and royalties collected. Export duties would be distributed exclusively 
among the states. Starting in 1970 the central government reserved the most lucrative 
revenue derived from petroleum taxes for itself. The Distributable Pool Account served as 
intra-structural distribution system, allocating 50 percent shared equally among states and 
50 percent parceled out on the basis of population. In theory, this revenue allocation 
system would place the central government in total control of funds and individual states 
in charge of local development schemes as opposed to distribution based on ethnic or 
religious preferences. Since its inception, the revenue allocation program underwent at 
least five changes between 1967 and 1980, each resulting in the tinkering of percentages 
allocated to states versus the Distributable Pool Account and the loss of revenue for many 
states.173 While losing revenue, however, each state became increasingly dependent on 
the federal funding. Tom Forrest writes that prior to the federal military government 
states received 55 percent and by 1975 states received 80 percent.174 Ultimately, the 
revenue allocation schema failed to turn the economy around, but it did tie states and 
their citizens, albeit temporarily, to the central government through a sharing of Nigeria’s 
new found oil wealth.  
The second project centered on taking over several companies engaged in various 
aspects of Nigeria’s oil industry. Through a combination of gradual and forceful decrees, 
Nigeria’s oil industry by 1979 looked radically different that it did in 1970. By the close 
of the decade, Nigeria had not only established its own oil company to participate in 
every aspect of the industry, but also managed to replace many of the managerial 
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positions held by foreigners with Nigerians. It also engaged in a series of take overs that 
replaced foreign shareholders with Nigerians ones and foreign oil companies with state-
run ones. But, the motivations for these take overs depended on the context. Prior to the 
oil bust of 1978, the federal military government under two successive regimes had 
planned these transformations. They were seen as long-term solutions to problems of 
shortages and uneven distribution, oil reserve protection, and profit security. The major 
foreign oil companies received warning several years in advance. After 1978, the 
motivations were complicated and the time-tables shortened. The previous ones had not 
been entirely compromised, but the desperation in which take-overs occurred 
overshadowed them. The notion of oil reserve protection was replaced with a frantic 
desire to extract large quantities and secure profits. By 1978, the government became 
complacent about the problem of chronic shortages because all attempts to remedy the 
problem had thus far failed. This latter period is the one in which the nationalization of 
BP falls. While a great deal more is said about this topic in proceeding chapters, it is 
necessary to highlight how nationalizations fit into Nigeria’s economic plans.  
Like the revenue allocation scheme, sharing the oil wealth and securing a path for 
nation-building and civic nationalism was paramount. The oil industry and the 
nationalizations that shaped it became uniquely Nigerian in composition and outlook. 
Nationalizing the oil industry offered visible changes during the 1970s as the signage 
attached to petrol stations changed from foreign logos to national ones. Oil became a 
commodity that went from theirs’ to ours’ and contributed a great deal toward national 
consciousness. However, the vision of nation-building and civic nationalism took an 
unexpected turn when the oil boom turned into an oil bust. Prices of crude oil on the 
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global market plummeted, with a slight recovery, in 1979. Forrest describes this period as 
the “crisis of 1978” because it not only the moment the oil boom ended, but also the 
moment of realization that the development projects and grand vision for national control 
could no longer be sustained.175 Having not planned sufficiently for the future, the 
Nigerian government found the oil bust as impending doom. Dramatic headlines were 
spread across the front pages of newspapers in Nigeria making statements such as “Oil 
Boom is Over: Gloomy Economic Future Predicted.”176 A series of articles explaining the 
oil industry and Nigeria’s position in the global market also emerged within the public 
forum to ponder the future of Nigeria’s oil industry.177 Ambitious projects that required 
substantial federal funding were abandoned or shifted onto the desks of the state 
governments. For example, the burden of highly subsidized education schemes went to 
the states who could not shoulder the weight. Students and faculty responded with a 
series of strikes and protests. During the brief moment when oil prices picked up again in 
1978 the federal military government resumed its massive spending to compensate for 
prior losses. 
The “moment of realization” in 1978 came with some corrective measures, but in 
many ways the decade of financial mismanagement, escalating inflation, and rampant 
corruption facilitated by a collapsed federal revenue allocation structure could not be 
easily repaired. Nowhere was this more acutely true than the disappearing agricultural 
sector. In the mid-1970s attempts had been made to revitalize its agriculture through 
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state-funded planting and irrigation projects using oil money. Peter Evans writes about 
Nigeria’s aspirations for economic progress during the 1970s in terms of global ranking. 
Nigeria saw itself as moving from a peripheral country within the global economy to 
semi-peripheral, joining the ranks of countries such as Brazil.178  But, Nigeria lacked a 
burgeoning manufacturing industry like Brazil and relied on its “influence and affluence” 
to move beyond the peripheral rank of its African neighbors.179 For this reason, Nigeria’s 
leaders enacted numerous decrees to channel oil revenue into state coffers. These decrees 
also became an exercise in currying public favor to legitimize the continuance of 
authoritarian rule. Ultimately, this stripped funds and planning for the agricultural sector 
toward the more lucrative arena of oil production (see Conclusion). 
 
Nigeria and British Petroleum 
In stark contrast to most oil-rich countries, Nigeria did not have an overtly tense 
relationship with the major transnational companies running Nigeria’s oil industry. 
Nigeria and BP rarely came into heated debate over the future of oil production, prices, 
and distribution. Behind closed doors, however, BP officials in London and Lagos 
certainly expressed displeasure with what they perceived as ill-conceived and politically 
charged economic policies. Within Nigeria’s oil industry, BP did not hold all the cards, so 
to speak, that would have placed it in a highly vulnerable position. Whereas, in Libya BP 
was the country’s largest oil producer and exporter. Leading up to nationalization in 
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December 1971, BP and Libya’s relationship deteriorated into an openly tense one, 
especially as negotiations over compensation took over two years to settle.180 Nigeria, for 
the most part, maintained a cordial relationship with BP, while pressing forward with its 
economic development initiatives.  
From Nigeria’s perspective, one of the most frustrating things about BP was that it 
had several claims within Nigeria’s oil industry. BP was ensconced in such a way that 
excising it from Nigeria’s oil industry was an extremely messy prospect. Yet, for that 
same reason, BP appeared to be one of the most expendable oil companies operating in 
the country because taking over a portion of its activities would not dramatically 
destabilize the oil industry. By the early 1970s, Nigeria supplied BP with 15 percent of its 
oil for trade and 10 percent of Shell’s crude oil supplies.181 The remainder of the oil 
produced by Shell-BP in Nigeria went into the global oil market. Since the establishment 
of Nigeria’s industry, a relationship of dependence had emerged between Nigeria and BP. 
BP and Nigeria differed largely in their views on the value of oil, making for a 
dialectic industry embodying contradictory ideas from different sides that help to shape it. 
They also disagreed over the future direction of Nigeria’s oil industry. As a major oil 
trading company, BP (London) saw oil as a commodity for export and distribution in 
profitable regions. The company held tight to its neoclassical economic view that global 
markets should determine prices for oil and frowned upon host government interference. 
Within Nigeria, this meant that BP expressed little interest in expanding its distribution of 
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petroleum products and aspects of its industries into remote areas in the country with 
sparse populations. The bulk of oil facilities and service stations in Nigeria existed in the 
southern half of the country to the neglect of the northern half. Also, like most production 
companies, Shell-BP focused on producing crude oil almost exclusively for export, 
leaving little for domestic processing and consumption. As the 1970s approached, Nigeria 
began to formulate a differing view regarding its oil, seeing oil as the key to its 
development and national progress.  
The relationship between Nigeria and BP did not follow the common path of 
escalating tension over employment practices, royalties, and profit flight of which some 
many other oil-exporting countries did. For many years, Nigeria saw the value of 
pressuring BP into getting what it wanted as opposed to nationalizing it. This way, 
Nigeria wrangled out of BP micro-development projects related to improving 
infrastructure and social services. BP only expressed a concern over being nationalized 
when Nigeria became heavily involved with southern Africa and a major criticizer of 
British diplomacy. By and large, however, the UK viewed Nigeria throughout the 1970s 
as a flamboyant but faithful trading partner and considered only in passing the possibility 
of BP facing ejection from the country for political dealings. In the following chapter, the 
popular idea of Nigeria nationalizing BP over southern Africa is explored to expose the 
problematic aspects of that conclusion. 
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Chapter 3:  Background to Nationalization 
During the 1970s, Nigeria became heavily involved in the liberation of southern 
Africa from both colonial rule, in the case of Portuguese Mozambique and Angola, and 
white-supremacist regimes in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. With the exception of 
those countries, African countries underwent the process of decolonization and enjoyed 
independence by 1965. Portugal, however, ignored the “wind of change” that led to 
decolonization in Africa and tightened control over its colonies.182 Africans in those 
colonies launched liberation wars, which the OAU and Nigeria supported financially and 
militarily. Southern Africa during the 1970s was a hotbed, with pressure from all sides 
threatening to completely reconfigure the political landscape. From the African 
perspective, the white regimes maintained power because of European political, financial, 
and military assistance. The UK defended its position by declaring that the racial 
problems in these countries required “internal solutions,” requiring it to provide gentle 
guidance from time to time on how to prepare gradually political equality. The OAU, 
with Nigeria serving as a vocal and influential member, repeatedly criticized this 
approach. Military clashes, failed negotiations, declining economy, suppression of 
liberation movements, and Western indifference: this is the context in which scholars 
have situated Nigeria’s nationalization of BP. 
This chapter examines the popular narrative, which starts in the mid-1960s and 
moves through to the end of the 1970s. We begin with an overview of Nigeria’s activist 
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role in the African-led liberation movement focused on southern Africa. After 
establishing the political scene with an emphasis on Nigeria’s position in it, we turn to 
exploring the popular narrative that highlights the escalating deterioration of Nigeria’s 
relationship with the UK and BP. This chapter also introduces aspects rarely subjected to 
historical analysis such as the UK’s Beira Patrol in the Mozambique Channel, how 
petroleum reached Southern Rhodesia despite UN sanctions, and Nigeria’s attempt to 
enforce sanctions at its own ports. These additions validate many of the accusations 
leveled at the UK and BP, while fleshing them out in greater detail based on archival 
sources. After presenting the narrative, the chapter shifts to focus on deconstructing and 
raising questions such as why BP? Why 1979? And, why do the reasons put forward by 
scholars in the secondary literature vary significantly?  
The goal of this chapter is to show why the popular narrative put forward largely 
by scholars writing on Nigeria’s foreign policy, with all of the tantalizing drama, heroes, 
and deceit, and reveal why it does not accurately present the reasons that Nigeria 
nationalized BP. The narrative runs like a Nigerian melodrama with new developments 
unfolding incrementally, to keep the story moving forward. The villains are clearly 
recognizable and lack admirable or relatable qualities. South Africa’s actions are viewed 
as “pure evil,” and devoid of logic. The narrative also includes catch phrases and rally 
cries. It is easy to see how this it has become, for all its misgivings, an important part of 
historical memory in Nigeria. The nationalization does not fit into this narrative perfectly, 
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but this fact does not render the narrative worthless. The preservation of this narrative 
within secondary works holds a distinction all its own regardless of the nationalization. 
 
 
Illustration 3: Map of Southern Africa, 1970s183 
 
Nigeria and the Liberation of Southern Africa 
The height of Nigeria’s active foreign policy spanned across the military regimes 
of Gowon (1966 to 1975) and Muhammad/Obasanjo (1975-1979). Gowon took on a 
duplicitous position, in which he espoused radical ideas and stern threats toward the UK 
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through the megaphone of the OAU. At the same time, he also harbored a solid economic 
relationship with the UK in Nigeria. Scholars contend that whatever action generated 
public attention warranted a decisive political response. To a lesser extent, Obasanjo 
befriended the UK, but also took a hard-line approach on southern Africa. And, with 
transition to a civilian government slated for 1979, Obasanjo had no scruples about 
setting Nigeria’s foreign policy ablaze before exiting. Starting as early as 1977, Obasanjo 
was poised to pounce, announcing that “action would be taken against firms involved in 
South Africa.”184 The effort to prohibit the destination of vessels that called at its ports 
best illustrates this. Nigeria essentially set a snare in which to catch the oil companies in a 
public show. Observers contended that Gowon and Obasanjo’s posturing overshadowed 
sincere activism.  
Nigeria established itself as a prominent member of the OAU and the United 
Nations (UN). During the 1970s, Nigeria continued with its efforts to provide vocal 
support and financial assistance to the OAU. In 1974, Gowon became chairman of the 
OAU for one year. Nigeria also played an important role bringing the OAU and UN 
together. In November 1973, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 3066 
concerning the cooperation between the UN and the OAU.185 Regardless of the objection 
put forward by countries accusing OAU members of violating sanctions, the resolution 
went forward. Nigeria also served on the UN Security Council (UNSC) for two years 
starting in January 1978, with its role as president. Several OAU members objected to 
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Nigeria as the representative of Africa. Most backed Niger and Gabon, not Nigeria. But, 
according to the London-based research wing of the Economist, Nigeria finished third in 
the elections, but refused to withdraw from the race, forcing its way into the position.186 
Within its first year, Nigeria assisted in the formation of a committee to review the 
possibility of an oil embargo against South Africa and another committee to oversee the 
arms embargo.187 To the UNSC, Nigeria made a bold declaration: that Nigeria “would 
take stern measures against foreign firms which retained investments in South Africa 
operating in Nigeria” despite its economic weakness to take these measures 
unilaterally.188 Nigeria’s two years on the UNSC placed it into a prime position for 
carrying out its vision of liberation in southern Africa, although progress overall was 
slow.  
Nigeria found itself in a dilemma. As much as Nigeria wanted to align itself with 
other African countries and movements to eradicate European dominance, it still 
remained fettered to European, primarily British, financial and military assistance. 
During Nigeria’s civil war, the UK provided the majority of Nigeria’s military supplies 
and training. In Nigeria’s oil trade network, the UK represented the primary trading 
partner. In pursuance of befriending African countries and maintaining a strong financial 
relationship with the UK, Nigeria developed a split personality between the mid-1960s 
and 1980. The acuteness of this duality varied over the years. Throughout the 1970s, 
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Nigeria presented itself as a leader of an African liberation movement as well as a great 
criticizer of British policy to the outside world; at the same time, it acted as a cooperative 
and agreeable host to British firms operating in the country.  
Critical reviews of Nigeria’s foreign policy indicate moments where it public 
adoration superseded action. Aside from the general notions of liberation and its 
involvement in it, Nigeria maintained no cohesive plan for action. As a result, its 
behavior confused onlookers. It appeared to pick and chose its moments of activism. A. 
Bolaji Akinyemi writes that it was difficult to ascertain how central southern Africa was 
to Nigeria’s policy. According to him, Gowon was “uncompromising if the issue directly 
involved” southern Africa, but otherwise action was based on “their merits.” 189 He cited 
circumstances where Gowon sought foreign investment from countries considered soft on 
southern Africa, such as the US and France. The latter had a reputation as a sanction 
violator for Southern Rhodesia and a major arms supplier to South Africa. 
 
Anti-Apartheid Campaigns against South Africa 
Since 1948, South Africa had been under a strict policy of apartheid, which had 
come under a great deal of criticism from the African leaders. However, it was not until 
the late 1970s and 1980s that international pressure developed and became part of a 
systematic attempt to end apartheid. Action partly happened because the history of 
southern Africa became a matter of South Africa’s apartheid state launching military 
campaigns within neighboring countries. South Africa’s population was estimated at 26 
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million (based on the census taken in 1970), with 70 percent African, 17 percent people 
of European descent, and 13 percent falling into the category of “Coloureds” and Asians. 
Since the election of the National Party into South Africa’s government in 1948, South 
Africa’s citizens were forced into a complicated arrangement of apartheid, of which the 
ultimate goal was the total separation of races in South Africa and the continued 
exploitation of non-white labor. In South Africa, Africans lived under strict and violent 
control that restricted their movements, quality of life, and location of settlement. A series 
of laws implemented total segregation in South Africa, dividing public spaces both urban 
and rural. 
Within South Africa, the political scene underwent few changes during the 1970s. 
A change in prime ministers from B.J. Vorster to Pieter W. Botha took place in 1978, 
ushering in a strengthened commitment to reshaping South Africa’s relationship to 
Southern Rhodesia and making the system of apartheid workable within South Africa. 
With Southern Rhodesia’s white-minority regime, South Africa maintained what 
outsiders viewed as a peculiar relationship. While generally supportive of its ideas, 
instability within the country threatened the “peace” and security of South Africa. During 
the 1970s, Southern Rhodesia’s conflict spilled into neighboring countries and 
international intolerance of such activities complicated South Africa’s own operations in 
places such as South West Africa (present-day Namibia). By default, Southern Rhodesia 
became South Africa’s wild and untamable counterpart. The British discussed South 
Africa’s willingness to hang Southern Rhodesia out to dry, so to speak, in an effort to 
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preserve its own reputation and economic interests. By August 1975, Vorster withdrew 
remaining South African troops from Southern Rhodesia and impressed upon Smith the 
value of negotiating with African leaders such as Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa. In fact, 
South Africa provided financial assistance to the bishop’s election campaign in the late 
1970s. While restricting its political relationship with Southern Rhodesia, the flow of 
goods to the country remained steady.  
Within South Africa, Botha established himself as a ruthless proponent of the 
apartheid system. Unprecedented levels of violence erupted in the country. It was under 
his leadership that notable African activists were imprisoned and murdered. Resistance to 
apartheid within South Africa broadened into an international movement during the 
1970s, with neighboring African countries playing an important role. Nigeria and the UN 
jointly organized a five day world conference, World Conference for Action against 
Apartheid, in 1977. The goal of the conference was to prepare an anti-apartheid agenda 
for the UN General Assembly. The declaration from the conference called for tougher 
economic sanctions because the existing arms embargo was “grossly inadequate.”190 At 
this conference Obasanjo extended a warning to companies that were violating Nigeria’s 
ban on trade with South Africa.191 Nigeria also engaged in selective boycotts of events 
which included South African participants.192 Citizens of Nigeria also became members 
of the London-based Anti-Apartheid Movement; although, Ghana and Zambia claimed 
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more members than Nigeria.193 While adding South Africa to its agenda of African 
liberation, Nigeria also maintained pressure on Southern Rhodesia both through the OAU 
and UN, as well as through its own initiatives. The problems of Southern Rhodesia that 
began in 1965, however, saw remarkable steps toward closure by the end of the 1970s, 
with Nigeria interjecting its opinion and placing pressure on the UK to make the right 
decisions. 
 
Continued Pressure on Southern Rhodesia 
Southern Rhodesia underwent a dramatic shift in 1965. It went from being under 
the rule of the UK, as part of the Central African Federation, to an independent state 
under the leadership of a white-minority party that rejected African participation in 
national politics. The population of Southern Rhodesia stood in 1970 over 5 million, with 
an estimated 4.9 million Africans and 230,000 people of European descent. Since 1953, 
Southern Rhodesia had been part of the Central African Federation with Northern 
Rhodesia (present-day Zambia) and Nyasaland (present-day Malawi). On November 5, 
1964, people of European descent voted in a referendum for immediate independence. 
Zambia and Malawi both met the conditions laid out by the British for independence, but 
Southern Rhodesia did not, making their declaration of independence on November 11, 
1964 illegal. This action is referred to as a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). 
In order to pressure the new leadership of Southern Rhodesia, Ian Smith and his 
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Rhodesian Front, the UN passed Resolution 232 calling for mandatory sanctions against 
the country on 16 December 1966. Items specifically mentioned in the resolution 
included asbestos, chrome, tobacco, copper, petroleum products, military supplies, and 
automobiles to name a few.194 Within the first year of the sanctions, it became apparent 
that Southern Rhodesia’s economy was not buckling and trade had not ceased. 
Politics in Southern Rhodesia since UDI remained largely the same in the first 
half of the 1970s. Ian Smith continued to act as prime minister to serve the interest of the 
Rhodesian Front until a forced transfer of power took place in 1979. By 1970, Southern 
Rhodesia became a republic, marking the abandonment of its promise of African majority 
rule in the future and the rejection of British authority in the country. The UK and 
Southern Rhodesia entered into their third round of talks in 1971 (the first two taking 
place in the 1960s aboard naval ships). The British continued to put forward their Five 
Principles as essential conditions for a legal independence drafted in October 1964, 
which included: 
1. unimpeded progress toward majority rule; 
2. guaranteed against retrogressive constitutional changes; 
3. immediate improvements in the political status of Africans; 
4. progress towards ending racial discrimination; 
5. acceptance of any Anglo-Rhodesian settlement terms by the people of 
Rhodesia as a whole.195 
 
More specifically, the UK called for the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act (1930),196 
universal adult suffrage, and steps toward “reasonable aspirations of the majority of the 
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country’s inhabitants….”197 A tentative agreement was made at the third round of talks 
and the British formed the Pearce Commission to gather public opinion within Southern 
Rhodesia on the proposal. In the meantime, African resistance within southern Africa 
escalated and was met with a decisive military response, launching the country into civil 
war. Several liberation groups based within and outside the country attacked Southern 
Rhodesia.  
After a series of secret meetings between the British Prime Minister Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home and Ian Smith, a tentative settlement was reached in Salisbury (present-
day Harare) in November 1971. The UK reported with enthusiasm that an acceptable 
resolution had been made through “substantial concessions on Mr. Smith’s part.”198 The 
terms included:  
…unimpeded progress toward majority rule by means of greatly 
improving arrangements for African representation in Parliament: will 
contain constitutional guarantees…and will bring about an immediate 
improvement in the political status of the African population and progress 
towards the end of racial discrimination.199  
 
People in Southern Rhodesia viewed the settlement with a mixture of joy and caution and 
the UN General Assembly flatly rejected it, complaining that the British had dismally 
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failed at bringing down the Smith regime.200 In point of fact, the agreement had 
essentially dismissed the Five Principles that the British required for independence. 
Nigerian students from Amadu Bello University demonstrated in Zaria, Kano, and 
Kaduna storming the streets and throwing stones at the High Commissions’ office in 
Kaduna in response to the agreement.201 And, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization 
called for Nigeria to leave the Commonwealth and nationalize all British and American 
firms.202 Despite the flurry of activism, Gowon remained unchanged in his promise to the 
UK that no action would be taken on the issue of Southern Rhodesia.203  
After the tentative agreement was made, the next step was to test its acceptability 
among the African population, which was ascertained through the British-appointed 
Pearce Commission.204 The Pearce Commission was sent to Southern Rhodesia to test the 
acceptability and feasibility of the settlement proposal between January and March 1972. 
While in progress, Nigeria remained skeptical with regard to the level of British 
manipulation involved in the process.205 Nigeria wanted UN intervention to remove 
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Smith instead of the UK’s drawn-out negotiation tactics.206 While the Pearce Commission 
was in progress, Gowon shifted positions and threatened “reprisals against British 
commercial interests in Nigeria if the Rhodesian deal goes through.”207 True to form, 
Gowon seized public opportunities to denounce British activity, while privately assuring 
that British investment in Nigeria was secure. This was based on pragmatic economic 
policy. Nigeria generated neither the capital, nor the skills to take such a step. With every 
threat, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office checked with their local agents for 
advice. The High Commissioner in Lagos saw action on political grounds as unlikely:  
the Nigerians would have to think very hard before taking action along 
Libyan lines and would have to feel seriously threatened by HM 
Government’s policy in southern Africa before taking such a drastic 
step.208  
 
In response to the same inquiry, Shell (London) stated that, 
the Nigerian government is not very likely to take real action, and the 
specific judgment that if nevertheless they do, they will be more likely to 
go for British interests other than oil.209 
 
When asked, however, the trajectory of Nigeria’s economic policy, Shell and BP 
discussed the extreme likelihood that Nigeria intended, 
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to achieve substantial ownership of the existing oil business and to cut out 
a figure on the international stage to reflect Nigeria’s growing political 
importance within Africa.210 
 
What is emphasized in the passages above is an important distinction between Nigeria’s 
foreign policy and its economic one. In the case of dealing with the UK regarding the 
Pearce Commission, Nigeria used its oil industry as the threat, but it was quite evident 
that real action was unlikely.  
At the conclusion of its research, the Pearce Commission presented a report 
stating that the white population approved, while the Asian and “Coloured” communities 
gave mixed reaction. The settlement proposal was abandoned, proving the British 
negotiation strategy to be ineffective. According to Aluko, Nigeria allegedly persuaded 
the UK to accept the commission’s report and abandon the settlement plan.211 
African observers, while praising the UK’s initial efforts, saw the agreement as 
largely toothless because every compelling demand had been softened with the phrasing 
“progress toward” without a clear timeframe.212 Instead of forcing the Smith regime to 
accept a constitution forbidding racial discrimination, the UK left the means by which 
any retroactive changes would be prevented up for negotiation. Throughout the process, 
the UK appeared passive and weak. What the British saw as significant progress, African 
leaders viewed as unacceptable. Nigeria argued that the UK maintained an unreasonably 
aloof stance on the denial of African rights and liberties in the region. In part, this 
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criticism was a reflection of the UK’s behavior within Nigeria.213 Nigerian media referred 
to the UK as “selling out” for white Southern Rhodesians. While Nigeria criticized the 
UK for its failure to effectively complete the decolonization process, it also held firmly 
the belief in African activism to bring about change. 
Between 1972 and 1976, the landscape of southern Africa became a war zone. In 
addition to fighting within Mozambique and Angola against the Portuguese and its allies, 
Southern Rhodesia also became embroiled in a civil war. By 1972, several African 
liberation groups had formed and launched guerilla attacks against the Southern 
Rhodesian police and military. For the most part, the details of the civil war move beyond 
the scope of this project, but some points warrant attention. In January 1973, the Smith 
regime accused the Zambian government of allowing guerilla groups, particularly the 
Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU), to camp in Southern Rhodesia and launch 
attacks periodically. Zambia denied such charges. Southern Rhodesia closed its 400 mile 
border with Zambia, preventing all traffic, except copper exports, to cross. One month 
later Southern Rhodesia opened its border, but Zambia continued to keep its side closed. 
Zambia rerouted all its exports, including copper, to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Lobito, 
Angola.214 Also, ZAPU, the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU), and the Front 
for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) announced in December 1974 the acceptance 
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of the African National Congress (ANC) as the umbrella organization of their liberation 
movement with Bishop Muzorewa as its chairman. To prevent the effective mobilization 
of these African liberation groups, the Smith regime used a range of underhanded tactics 
such as detaining and killing suspected Africans, banning their publications, and 
obstructing their collection of outside funds.215 Weary from war, Smith called for a cease-
fire and reconfigured his political strategy toward a settlement. Ultimately, international 
pressure turned the tide in 1975 and forced the Rhodesian Front to engage in a process of 
turbulent change. 
With the independence of Mozambique in 1975 and South Africa’s troop 
withdrawal, the civil war in Southern Rhodesia swung in favor of the African liberation 
groups. The US and South Africa also pressured Smith to surrender his power and 
suggested Bishop Muzorewa as a good presidential candidate. In 1972, Gowon had met 
with Bishop Muzorewa and expressed his satisfaction that Muzorewa had a “pragmatic 
and realistic attitude” for a multi-racial society.216 Gowon’s successors, Muhammed and 
Obasanjo, set their sights on the Patriotic Front, which formed in October 1976. The 
Patriotic Front was formed by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe’s current 
president) and became the favored group of the OAU and the Frontline of States.217 
Smith convened a series of meetings with Bishop Muzorewa, President Kennth Kaunda 
of Zambia, and the Patriotic Front among others to negotiate a settlement. Exhausted 
from war and pressured by South Africa, Smith altered his position and announced his 
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willingness to discuss a transition to African majority rule within two years on 24 
September 1976. One year later, he began dismantling laws regarding racial segregation 
and allowed for universal adult suffrage. Despite these changes, Smith refused to hand 
over power entirely and the fighting continued.  
Southern Rhodesia’s civil was spilled over into neighboring countries. In April 
1977, South Africa threatened to cut oil supplies to Southern Rhodesia if a settlement was 
not reached soon. Smith withdrew his troops from neighboring countries and promised a 
new constitution and multi-racial government elections for January 1979. Discussions 
began regarding the lifting of UN sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. The lifting of 
sanctions, however, was largely symbolic since a wave of allegations and reports 
indicated that they were largely ineffective. 
 
Sanctions and Violations 
The mandatory economic sanctions established on 16 December 1966 by the 
UNSC against Southern Rhodesia continued until 21 December of 1979, although global 
attitude toward them changed.218 The political and economic climate in Southern 
Rhodesia remained largely unaltered by the sanctions. Reports from a range of sources 
confirmed suspicions that trade with Southern Rhodesia continued, especially in 
petroleum products, despite the ongoing Beira Patrol in the Mozambique Channel.  
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Starting in February of 1966, the UK deployed several ships of the Royal Navy 
and a handful of Shackleton aircrafts of the Royal Air Force to patrol the Mozambique 
Channel (the waterway between Mozambique and Madagascar in the Indian Ocean). The 
purpose of the patrol was to intercept ships attempting to call at the port of Beira with 
intentions of trading goods destined for Southern Rhodesia (see Illustration 3). At the 
start of the patrol, UN mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia had not yet been 
put into place and only a strong recommendation was made to member countries to sever 
economic ties. The patrol cost the British government an estimated ₤500,000 per year and 
included the maintenance of a naval base at Mombasa, Kenya and an air base at Majanga, 
Madagascar.219 By May 1967, the operation included 4 aircraft carriers and about 2-3 
frigates, patrolling for stretches of 14 to 19 days at sea. The aircraft missions during the 
first couple of months patrolled every 12 hours, but by June 1966 they were cut to three 
times per week.220  In total, the patrol operated for nearly ten years, with its shortcomings 
becoming apparent within the first few years. It ceased completely in 1975, coinciding 
with the independence of Mozambique. Overall, the international community, including 
the UN, considered the patrol a complete failure primarily because oil supplies continued 
to reach Southern Rhodesia not only by ship calling at other ports (including one down 
the coast from Beira, still in Mozambique) in plain view, but also by land from South 
Africa. 
Before sanctions, oil supplies (as crude oil or finished petroleum products) 
reached southern Africa through several major ports –Durban and Cape Town in South 
Africa and Beira (present-day Matare) and Lourenço Marques (present-day Maputo) in 
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Mozambique (see Illustration 3). Because Southern Rhodesia was a land-locked country, 
it relied on the ports of Mozambique, particularly Beira.221 Since 1899, a railroad 
connected Beira to the cities of Umtali and Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia. In Umtali 
stood Southern Rhodesia’s only refinery. Petroleum products also arrived at Beira 
destined for Malawi and Zambia, totaling around up to 1 million bbl/yr.222 The eastern 
portion of South Africa –the Transvaal –relied on Lourenço Marques for its petroleum 
products. Shell (South Africa) and BP (Southern Africa) used Lourenço Marques as a port 
to supply its customers in South Africa. For the most part, these major ports received 
crude oil shipments from Middle Eastern countries such as Iran and Iraq, through the 
crude oil supply subsidiaries of the major oil companies –Shell, CFP, BP, Caltex, and 
Mobil.223 
Demand for oil in Southern Rhodesia was relatively low as it applied to limited 
transport and industry. Southern Rhodesia lacked crude oil of its own, but mined large 
amounts of coal and utilized hydroelectric power. For this reason, Southern Rhodesia 
heavily depended on the transnational marketing companies. South Africa represented the 
largest market in southern Africa with demand reaching 89 million bbl/yr.224 Shell and BP 
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together controlled most of the marketing operations within Southern Rhodesia.225 Within 
southern Africa, each major oil company oversaw the operations of its subsidiaries. BP, 
for example, had a subsidiary operating in almost every country in addition to its 
participation in Consolidated Petroleum, a joint-venture with Shell. 
After the implementation of sanctions, the oil marketing network in Southern 
Africa underwent substantial changes to maintain their interests while respecting UN 
policy. The subsidiaries of the major oil companies were forbidden from supplying and 
operating within the country. The Umtali refinery, without crude oil supplies, closed 
down in mid-January 1966.226 The solution for the marketing companies was to reshuffle 
its board of directors replacing, in the case of BP, British citizens with Southern 
Rhodesians within each of the shareholding companies.227 Similar corporate changes and 
reconfiguring of trade patterns also occurred in South Africa and Mozambique. In theory, 
each company operating in Southern Rhodesia became a Southern Rhodesian company. 
BP’s Southern Rhodesian subsidiaries continued to operate as “directed companies under 
Rhodesian legislation.”228 Steps such as these indicated a need to distance the parent 
company in London from Southern Rhodesia as much as possible. By reorganizing their 
administration, the major oil companies such as BP remained quietly active in the region, 
with the plan of weathering the crisis in hopes of returning to full capacity in the near 
future. Arrangements such as these raised serious questions over whether these 
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companies adhered to UN sanctions. It did not take long before evidence to this problem 
surfaced. 
One of the first discussions of sanction violations being conducted by land from 
South Africa involved the movement of petroleum products across the Beit Bridge (see 
Illustration 3). In February 1966, the South African press, more specifically the Rand 
Daily Mail, unveiled the transport of petroleum products from South Africa to Southern 
Rhodesia by way of the Beit Bridge.229 At the time of its publication, it only reached 
southern African readers and mandatory UN sanctions against Southern Rhodesia had not 
been implemented. At most, the issue indicated established supply routes from South 
Africa and got British oil companies not holding supply licenses into trouble. For non-
British companies, the transport of oil across Beit Bridge may have tarnished their 
reputation. The topic emerged again ten years later in exposés regarding sanction 
violations by the major oil companies. The Beit Bridge connects South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia over the Limpopo River, a couple hundred miles north of South 
Africa’s Transvaal. On the South African side, a railroad operated, but it did not extend 
across the border until September 1974 (see Illustration 3).230 To measure the extent of 
the leakage, the British Embassy in South Africa set up a surveillance team at the bridge 
over a 24-hour period on 16-17 February 1966. Within one hour, they recorded several 
trucks and oil tanker trucks carrying gasoline, diesel, and kerosene (see Table 3). 
After some investigation, UK officials in southern Africa in collaboration with the 
local affiliates of the major oil companies, determined the extent to which oil supplies 
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reached Southern Rhodesia. Across Beit Bridge, they estimated that roughly “thirty 
thousand gallons per day” went across by road in “painted out Shell and BP lorries.”231 
The oil supplies marked “Total” were believed to be CFP, or Total, origin, sold to 
agricultural cooperatives.232 Shell estimated using South Africa’s custom’s reports that 
roughly 106,000 gallons crossed Beit Bridge per week in 1966, making the daily total 
around 8,000.233 By May 1966, the amount was suspected to have increased to 200,000 
gallons per day.234 Beit Bridge serves as just one example out of many of oil supplies 
reaching Southern Rhodesia. Increasingly, by the mid-1970s, most recognized UN 
sanctions as completely ineffective. As a result, commitment by the world’s major 
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Early Morning, 16 February 1966 
Time  Activity         
2:45am Lorry TDK 7136, 100 drums going north 
6:00am Tanker RV 1372, going north 
6:00am Tanker TAR 1589, going north 
6:10am Tanker trailer RBP 8353, going north 
6:20am Lorry TAR 1978 with trailer, 80 drums going north 
6:20am Lorry TAL 10695, 80 drums going north 
6:35am Lorry V2704 with trailer, 50 drums going south 
7:25am Lorry TCE 4844, 150 drums going north, drums stenciled “Total” 
7:30am Roadmaster RS8 4673, one tank, going north 
7:30am Lorry TCE 1913, 150 drums going north, stenciled “Total” 
8:05am Roadmaster, drums going south 
Table 3: Petroleum Supplies across Beit Bridge235  
 
African opinion criticized the UN for not expanding sanctions to include South 
Africa, the largest supplier of goods to Southern Rhodesia. The UN would only entertain 
discussions related to the supplying of arms, especially by the UK, to South Africa. The 
issue became complicated when allegations surfaced in 1971 that South Africa 
approached the UK for weapons and had not been flatly refused. According to the UK, 
Botha asked about supplying three Hawker Siddeley HS 125 civil aircrafts and four 
Buccaneer aircrafts.236 Nigeria knew about the possible arrangement and expressed its 
concern that any weapons supplied by the UK could be easily used by the South African 
government to oppress its African subjects or against other African countries.237 Behind 
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closed doors in Nigeria, ideas circulated around the federal military government that if 
the UK decided to sell arms it might take actions that would have “maximum public 
impact but minimum harm to Nigeria,” such as closing British High Commission offices 
in Kaduna and Ibadan as opposed to seizing assets of British firms.238 Gowon faced 
substantial pressure to take decisive action, going against his moderate inclination and 
was reminded of the fallibility of his leadership. The federal commissioner of external 
affairs, Okoi Arikpo, issued an empty threat that Nigeria would take the lead in “quitting 
the [British] Commonwealth.”239 To African leaders, the UK’s consideration of arms to 
South Africa unveiled its support for apartheid.240 In the end, the UK treaded lightly 
around the issue and distanced itself from direct involvement in the supplying of arms. 
This did not, however, prevent UK-based firms, or other European countries, from 
meeting South African requests. From the UN’s perspective, the issue really concerned 
the resale of weapons to Southern Rhodesia.  
 
Inquiries and Allegations 
During the sanction period, numerous reports suggested not only that violations 
had been committed, but also in what manner. Reports from Southern Rhodesia during 
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the 1970s indicated that sanctions against it had not crippled the economy, but did create 
some level of inconvenience and sense of political isolation.  
Newspaper articles with limited circulation in southern Africa became of interest 
to the international community at large. The more apparent it became that the sanctions 
accomplished little, the more people became interested in establishing why. More 
specifically, interested parties wanted to know what role Western governments and firms 
played. By the mid-1970s, reports with wider distribution and more rigorous research 
than ever before surfaced. In June of 1976, the Center for Social Action of the United 
Church of Christ (UCC) published a report claiming that “Mobil had, for many years, 
been evading US sanctions against Rhodesia.”241 The report was based on just a handful 
of documents, 18 to be exact, retrieved from Mobil Oil (Rhodesia) and Mobil (South 
Africa). The beauty of the piece is that included are copies of the documents themselves, 
allowing the reader to see the exact wording of each memorandum from the two 
companies. The documents were collected and submitted to the UCC by an anti-apartheid 
group comprised of white South Africans.242 The London-based Anti-Apartheid 
Movement (AAM) organization built upon the work of the UCC in its 1977 reports.243 
The reports claimed that “BP was the first to breach [sanctions], followed by Shell and 
                                                 
241 Bernard Rivers for Center for Social Action of the United Church of Christ (UCC), Oil Conspiracy: An 
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242 Haslemere Group and Anti-Apartheid Movement. “Submission to British Government,” 15. 
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the others.”244 These works retraced the supply chain of petroleum products of which BP 
and Shell took part and contended that the British government knew of these illegal 
activities.245 Both documents accused the major oil companies of knowingly engaging in 
the supplying of petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia through intermediaries in 
South Africa, using the port of Lourenço Marques. 
The second outcome stemming from the swath of allegations regarding sanction 
violations was the launch of official, government investigations. The reports prepared by 
the AAM and UCC held a tremendous sway in structuring the cases because they 
provided original documents from the oil companies and concrete information that had 
yet to be effectively disproved. Through the Security Council Committee on Sanctions 
against Southern Rhodesia, the UN launched an inquiry on 2 July 1976. The committee 
listened to testimonies by both groups.246 A perfunctory examination by the US Treasury 
took place in 1977 over sanction violations by Mobil and Caltex, but the parent 
companies’ claims held sway over an already biased review board.247 Similarly, the 
British government launched the Bingham Inquiry to establish whether British oil 
companies, namely Shell and BP, violated sanctions. 
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The Report on the Supply of Petroleum Products to Rhodesia, 248 or more 
commonly called the Bingham Report, was published in October of 1978. The published 
work reported the finding of Thomas H. Bingham and Samuel M. Gray, which 
investigated in October of 1977 numerous allegations regarding sanctions violations by 
British oil companies, namely Shell and BP.249 It is a document of some 500 pages that 
deals with the oil sanctions against Southern Rhodesia with regard to British oil 
companies and their subsidiaries. The commission’s job also included determining 
whether branches of the British government were misled intentionally or otherwise. The 
companies agreed to comply, partially because of verbal promises made by the British 
government that the emphasis laid on corporate activities and not individual ones.250 The 
report was organized into fourteen chapters and an introduction, which set out the legal 
background and commercial oil activities regarding the UK, South Africa, and Southern 
Rhodesia spanning from just before UDI in 1965 to 1978.  
The Bingham Inquiry focused on establishing the relationship between the parent 
company BP based in London and its “affiliates” in southern Africa. The Bingham Report 
concluded that BP neither conspired with other companies or governments to make 
Southern Rhodesia’s UDI possible, nor worked to maintain it. It highlighted the basic 
problem that there was no way of preventing oil from reaching Southern Rhodesia 
entirely, particularly without applying an oil embargo on South Africa as well.  
The majority of oil supplies to southern Africa originated from the ports of South 
Africa. Oil arriving at Mozambique supplemented the South African movement of 
                                                 
248 T.H. Bingham and S.M. Gray, Report on the Supply of Petroleum Products to Rhodesia (London: Her 
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petroleum products.  Thus, two countries who openly opposed the implementation of 
sanctions were the two sources of Southern Rhodesia’s oil. This made the sanctions 
virtually ineffective. Patrolling only one of Mozambique’s ports did little to improve the 
success rate. Also, the marketing arrangements in the region among the major oil 
companies was quite complex involving multiple handlers in many different countries. 
Added to which, Shell and BP remained in a long-standing arrangement requiring 
agreement by two of the world’s largest oil companies on any decisions made. As a 
result, few people at the top of these companies held complete information of any depth 
about the established trade networks and any change in policy required a long chain of 
communication and compliance.  
What became clear during an investigation of BP and Shell’s operations in 1977 
was that the British government had little understanding of the company’s overseas 
activities despite holding a 50 percent share. Evidence indicates that at times the parent 
companies knew, and in some cases, controlled major activities by the companies in 
southern Africa; other times, however, they appeared to be completely in the dark about 
daily marketing operations. Also, the UK imposed sanctions on British companies, but 
not South African companies. With that in mind, BP (South Africa) as a South African 
company was not responsible for upholding UK legislation. Further, the report 
highlighted several gray areas in which a linkage existed, although this was regularly 
disputed and allegedly clarified by the oil companies.  
Members of the UN such as Nigeria saw the UK as not only failing to prevent oil 
from reaching Southern Rhodesia, but also actively engaging in the trade. With the Beira 
Patrol, Nigeria posed the question: “who is policing the police?” Nigeria took it upon 
itself to actively enforce sanctions within its own capabilities. Nigeria also appeared to 
assume a linkage of its own oil industry to the petroleum products reaching Southern 
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Rhodesia. Whether the federal military government truly believed this and held evidence 
was never revealed, leaving only speculation that it was a conclusion used to stir up 
national support. Newspaper stories translated the outcome of the Bingham Report into a 
more dramatic treatment than the international press with rumors of Nigeria’s oil reaching 
South Africa, and then Southern Rhodesia. For example, a front-page article in Sunday 
Punch attempted to outline how Nigeria’s oil reached Southern Rhodesia. The article 
states that “crude oil from Nigeria oil fields is sometimes carried surreptitiously to be 
refined in South Africa and sent to oil the murderous war machine of rebel Ian Smith.”251 
The publishing of the report also coincided with the usage of oil as a political tool within 
and outside Nigeria. Under the leadership of Obasanjo, Nigeria engaged in a rigorous 
campaign regarding the trade of its oil to southern Africa.  
 
Nigeria’s Oil Restrictions 
Starting in 1977, Nigeria took a keen interest in the trade of its crude oil. 
Obasanjo made a compelling speech at the opening of the World Conference for Action 
against Anti-Apartheid on 23 August 1977.252 He stressed that Nigeria would not tolerate 
foreign companies operating in Nigeria having links to South Africa. He remarked that 
transnational companies contributed to the “evil machinery” of apartheid and welcomed 
the UN’s plans to regulate their activities. Nigeria would no longer deal with businesses 
that “are party to the system that holds our brothers and sisters in southern Africa in 
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bondage.”253 With this new ambition, Nigeria’s government officials began probing into 
the comings and goings of ships calling at its ports. In the late 1960s, Nigeria had added 
into oil contracts a clause prohibiting the shipping of its crude oil to South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia. On 1 December 1971, Nigeria placed several countries on a list of 
prohibited destinations including Southern Rhodesia, Portugal, and South Africa among 
others.254 But, Nigeria’s crude oil typically did not travel southward and Nigeria lacked 
the capabilities to enforce the prohibition. As a consequence, the clause was nearly 
forgotten by the companies and the government.  
In 1979 Nigeria became highly concerned with where ships had been prior to their 
arrival at Nigeria and where they traveled to after departing. It resurrected the list of 
prohibited countries and started making inquiries with the major oil trading companies –
namely BP and Shell. Aside from following through with its commitment to block 
companies dealing with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, Nigeria also appeared 
interested in simply whipping the companies into a panic. The direct linkages between 
Nigeria and southern Africa hinged primarily on mutual ties to Britain and British firms. 
Nonetheless, details such as these did not stifle Nigeria’s determination. The move to 
monitor the ports of call and the destinations of the oil tankers lacked clear planning and 
policy cohesion, making the entire endeavor confusing for all involved. At the same time, 
the process proved highly effective in pursuing Nigeria’s objective of receiving praise for 
its ability to roust out “evil” companies. 
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The narrative of events presented within the secondary literature tends to remain 
focused on events in southern Africa and Nigeria’s public reaction to them, which results 
in a leap in time from late 1978 to the nationalization of BP in July 1979. Aluko’s work, 
however, brings into focus the Nigeria’s attempt to monitor and restrict its oil trade and 
highlights the events taking place within that time frame. His work is the only published 
one of its kind in its description of the debacle involving the oil vessel Kulu.255 Building 
on the early work of Aluko, this section tells the little-known story of how Nigeria tried 
to enforce UN sanctions from its ports.  
 
Ports of Call and Crude Oil Destinations 
During the 1970s, Nigeria desperately tried to gain control over its industry, but 
faced a myriad of obstructions including weak infrastructure, lack of its own trading 
networks and vessels, and a shortage of skilled workers. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
Nigeria was in a period of major transition and was just starting to correct problems of 
this nature. Participation decrees, the formation of a state-owned oil company, and 
negotiations to bridle oil revenues had all been in the works during this period. In the area 
of shipping and trade, however, Nigeria had not significantly progressed. Nigeria did not 
have the shipping capabilities to shuttle its own oil around the world. In 1976 it bought 
tanker from a Yugoslavian firm. The Oloibiri’s operations included taking Nigeria’s crude 
                                                                                                                                                 
254 While South Africa and Southern Rhodesia remained on the lists, the addition of Israel and the removal 
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oil from Forcados to a refinery located in Curaçao, in the West Indies.256 For the large-
hauls and major foreign contracts, Shell and BP remained the primary conductors for 
Nigeria.  
Nigeria’s newspapers published reports in 1978 that linked its oil industry to the 
petroleum being supplied to Southern Rhodesia. Regardless of their level of accuracy, it 
set in motion Nigeria’s quest for rousting out bad oil companies from its industry. 
Nigeria, of all countries, wanted to ensure that no connection to South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia existed. The largest producer and trade of Nigeria’s crude oil, Shell-
BP, attempted to disprove the news reports in May 1978 by producing destination lists 
and quantities loaded and discharged.257 Perhaps this response gave the NNPC the idea of 
checking the ports of call and destinations of all ships entering Nigeria’s territorial 
waters. 258 Taking no further action, the matter seemed closed for several months. 
An extremely damaging and provocative article by Platts dated 31 January 1979, 
forced the issue of ports of call and destinations open again. The article, titled “South 
African Reported in Secret Supply Arrangement with Nigeria,” claimed that Nigeria had 
entered into a secret agreement with South Africa to supply crude oil.259 Unlike Gowon, 
who tended to give Shell-BP the benefit of the doubt, Obasanjo became outraged at the 
potential embarrassment it could cause. To add salt into the wound, so to speak, the oil 
companies seemed disaffected and heeded no caution. Within the next two months, 
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Nigeria caught BP-charted ships violating Nigeria’s prohibition list. At the port of 
Forcados, Esso Portland flying a Liberian flag called at Cape Town to collect postal mail 
via helicopter before calling at Nigeria en route to New York. Another vessel, Erviken 
bore a Norwegian flag and called at Durban en route to Trieste, France. Both vessels were 
BP nominated, one for NNPC cargo, and were released without much hassle.260 Another 
ship, the SS Jumbo Pioneer, arrived at the port of Brass and was an Israeli tanker.261 
While individually, these slip-ups caused no harm; but, with so many in such a short time 
Obasanjo felt action need to be taken.  
On 12 March 1979, the NNPC issued a memo to all oil-producing companies 
operating in the country stating the following: 
This is to inform that we would like to you to furnish us with the 
following documents in respect of your crude oil liftings from Nigeria of 
both equity and long-term purchase since October 1978: 
1. Certificate of cargo discharge indicating the port of discharge. 
2. Out-turn figures at port of discharge. 
3. Certificate of honour that your company has, at no time, shipped 
or allowed Nigerian crude to be shipped to any of the prohibited 
destinations mentioned above and as contained in the sales 
agreement between you and NNPC.262 
 
Shell-BP’s response was not only to gather information and evidence, but also to create 
retroactively letters between BP and other oil companies borrowing emphasized phrasing 
from those prior agreements drafted by the NNPC. The clause (agreed upon by the oil 
companies entering into a contract) stated,  
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We hereby state that Nigerian crude oil to be lifted by this company will 
not be shipped by it to any of the prohibited destination set out in the sale 
agreement between NNPC and this company.263 
 
Shell-BP spent the next couple of months analyzing the clause above for ways to prove 
adherence with it and integrate it into the requested “certificate of honour.” Also, the 
company had to promise to “a solemn undertaking” in the future of preventing oil from 
reaching prohibited countries. In preparation, Shell-BP spent time hatching out what their 
response would say focusing on a deliberate balance of using exact phrasing expressed by 
the NNPC, while maintaining ambiguous language that it committed to little, prevented 
further probing, and made no promises about the past that could not be met.264 More 
specifically, Shell-BP wanted to avoid the key wording of “pledge” and “honour” 
requested by the NNPC. Nigeria wanted the oil companies to commit to an “unlimited 
undertaking” in the prevention of supplies reaching the prohibited countries, dating back 
to October 1978. On that promise, Shell-BP wrote that “if Fawibe is really after an 
unlimited undertaking in respect of the past, then we have a problem.”265 Shell-BP felt it 
needed to leave wording open because no shipper could absolutely guarantee that 
Nigeria’s oil would not be delivered by a distant third party to a prohibited destination. In 
the case of oil that goes through Shell-BP to the US, Shell-BP had no control because the 
US had passed anti-embargo legislation.266 While scrambling to meet the demands made 
by the NNPC in March 1979, another debacle regarding an oil vessel developed. The 
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debacle involving the Kulu vessel chartered by Shell-BP raised several issues regarding 
the feasibility and intentions of Nigeria’s mission.  
 
Date    Activity        
29 August 1978    Loaded 212,000 tons at Forcados terminal, Nigeria 
16 September 1978  Discharged 212,000 at Genoa, Italy; Lavera terminal, 
France.  
12 October 1978   Loaded 214,000 at Forcados 
24 October 1978   Discharged 214,000 at Genoa and Lavera 
1-30 December 1978  Traveled through Suez Canal and waited off Kharg Island, 
Iran until it loaded 144,000 and 66,500 at Al Bukoosh 
terminal, United Arab Emirates 
18 January 1979   Discharged 210,500 at Ain Sukhna, Egypt 
9 February 1979 Loaded 98,000 at Umm Said terminal, Qatar and 112,000 at 
Das Island, United Arab Emirates 
27 February 1979  Stops at Cape of Good Hope for repairs and mail collection 
19 March 1979  Discharged 210,000 at Lavera 
31 March 1979  Loaded 210,000 at Sidi Kerir, Egypt 
10 April 1979   Discharged 210,000 at Lavera 
5 May 1979   Attempted to load at Bonny terminal, Nigeria 
Table 4: Kulu Vessel267  
 
The Kulu Vessel 
In the summer of 1979, a peculiar event took place involving the scheduled arrival 
of an oil tanker, Kulu, for loading at Nigeria’s Bonny terminal on 30 April 1979.268 The 
popular narrative on the incident largely follows that of the local newspapers. When it 
actually happened and how it was resolved, however, are not addressed. In the papers, 
Kulu became an example of how the UK and BP engaged in trickery and deceit all in an 
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attempt to assist the white-minority regimes in southern Africa. Using evidence from 
archival material, I complete the narrative and illustrate how catching vessels like Kulu 
was part of a deliberate trap. This allowed the federal military government to force the 
emergence of a pattern of violation in preparation for nationalization.  
The fiasco started with Kulu arriving unexpectedly. The ship master, Ian Kemp, 
had been detained in Port Harcourt since the evening of 3 May 1979.269 After Nigerian 
officials discovered South African crew members on board, the loading was allowed to 
continue, but the tanker was not allowed to sail.270 Buhari saw the Kulu fiasco as a 
genuine mistake, but that government officials around him saw it as evidence of BP’s 
blatant disregard for Nigeria and the company’s failure to take Nigerian policies 
seriously.271  
To handle the matter, a military administrator for federal military government, 
Commander Suleiman Sa’idu set up a four person panel to review the case as quickly as 
possible.272 The panel was composed of two police officers and two civil servants, one of 
which served as the committee chairman.273 The committee expressed concern that the 
ship “slipped into Bonny to lift a quick cargo in a few hours for ports southwards 
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[meaning South Africa].”274 BP (Nigeria) relayed the information to BP (London), 
adding:  
Bearing in mind Nigeria and especially Yoruba propensity for seeing plots 
in everything, and with the background of Bingham, such reasoning is at 
least understandable. 275 
 
Although the conclusion drawn by the committee was largely inaccurate, the suspected 
events surrounding the vessel generated some attention. 
The story first broke in Nigerian newspapers on 12 May 1979, with a front page 
article in the Daily Tide. The press release effectively reached the public almost two 
weeks after the fiasco.276 BP in Lagos described the paper as making no mention of Shell-
BP or BP and was “mostly inaccurate.” 277 Overall, the story did not create the level of 
public outcry that BP feared. In part this was because S.M. Akpe, the General Manager of 
Sales for NNPC, issued a controlled press release on the issue, intentionally protecting 
Shell-BP. Despite his attempts, more accurate information linking BP to the tanker 
emerged in articles published throughout the summer.278 Nigerian officials warned that 
this incident marked the last time the Nigerian government would be lenient and another 
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such incident would be met with punitive action such as the revision of participation 
agreements.279 
As punishment to BP, the Nigerian government publicly claimed that it would 
take the vessel’s crude oil under NNPC ownership and sell it in a spot sale to an unrelated 
company of its choosing and the Kulu would return to the sea empty.280 According to 
Aluko, the Nigerian government seized the crude oil from BP, amounting to over 1.5 
million barrels and reduced the company’s future take on crude oil by one-third.281 It was 
also believed that Nigeria confiscated the cargo and sold it for $30 per barrel on the spot 
market, when the world price on the future market was $18.282 However, behind the 
scenes some, if not all, crude oil appears to have simply moved from one BP chartered 
tanker to another, allowing it to proceed with its trading commitments. BP instructed 
another ship, British Reliance, to stand off at Bonny (outside territorial waters) and await 
further instruction regarding a cargo transfer. Knowing that the cargo could not go from 
Kulu to a BP owned vessel such as the Reliance, it made a request to the company’s 
shipping department for the dispatch of another ship chartered by BP called World Hero, 
which was due at Bonny within the next few days. This ship loaded the Kulu cargo and 
departed without problem by the end of May because it adorned a Liberian flag and was 
Greek owned.283  
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The story of the Kulu vessel raises several important issues regarding Nigeria’s 
plan of monitoring the ports of call and destinations of oil tankers. First, the relaying of 
the events from March 1978 to May 1979 given above has been streamlined for clarity. In 
actuality, Nigeria’s carrying out of its mission unfolded piece by piece in a highly 
disorganized manner. No prior consensus was taken as to how far back the oil companies 
needed to produce their lists, with the deadline undergoing several changes. Also, the 
NNPC gave no clear indication as to the temporal distance required from when an oil 
tanker may have called at South Africa –what if a tanker nominated to carry Nigeria’s 
crude oil had called at Cape Town two years ago? For example, in Table 4, the Kulu 
vessel stopped (not called) in South Africa six months prior to its arrival. And, according 
to the schedule it never technically “called” at a port in South Africa; instead, it received 
supplies and postal mail via helicopter outside of South African territorial waters. Until 
clarified in May, Shell-BP went with a ship clearance period of six weeks. These details 
remained unclear because Shell-BP determined the best strategy was to ask few 
questions, in fear of suggesting new, strict measures. And, to what extent were the major 
oil companies operating in Nigeria responsible for independent trading companies, which 
they chartered? No comprehensive policy regarding neither the depths of responsibility, 
nor punishment for infraction was developed by Nigerian officials. 
Second, the implementation and enforcement of Nigeria’s mission proved a 
challenge. The changing of crews and shifting of supplies could have been done through 
the use of helicopters. In fact, when the ports of call issue emerged, a memo between 
Shell and BP emphasized that they needed to, 
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…ensure that future contacts in South Africa which are only by helicopter 
are not repeat are not logged… (Marine experts will no doubt say the log 
is sacrosanct, but difficult situations need difficult solutions)….284  
 
In essence, Shell and BP did not necessarily alter their activities, particularly with South 
Africa, but looked for solutions to circumvent them. With growing levels of economic 
decline and corruption in Nigeria, this became an easy proposition. When the British 
vessel Reliance arrived and anchored off Bonny in May 1979, Nigerian customs and 
immigration officials visited to inspect the ship’s log and supplies for any evidence of 
visiting or trading with South Africa. While reviewing the log book, officials found that 
the ship had last called to Cape Town on 18 March 1979, which violated the Nigerian 
ordinance. Having given the officials bottles of whisky and cartons of cigarettes, as well 
as discounted prices in the ship’s bond store of imported items, the ship was cleared 
inward and outward allowing it to load crude oil.285  
Also, in early May 1979, Nigeria alerted the oil companies that it was to apply “a 
new practice of separate inward and outward clearance,” which included the vessel’s 
master paying a gratuity prior to outward clearance being given.286 The idea of the 
practice was to also speed up turnaround time for ships, which posed a problem to 
companies such as BP who struggled to find “untainted” ships that had not visited South 
Africa within the last six months. For Nigeria, this upped the political upheaval 
surrounding oil shipping and South Africa as well as opened opportunities for Nigeria to 
catch companies in violation for publicity or financial bonuses. It became apparent that 
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the regulatory measures became a financially opportunistic venture for Nigerian officials 
working the ports as well. Exchanges such as this between foreign oil companies and 
Nigerian officials lend little confirmation that regulatory efforts by Nigeria were fully 
applied or respected within all levels of government. Further, they suggested that the 
mission leaned heavily toward being an opportunistic venture. This perspective stemmed 
from Nigeria’s supposition that its oil was traded by the oil companies to South Africa.   
 
Destination South Africa? 
What has been difficult to ascertain from the available literature is how much oil 
from Nigeria actually ever went to South Africa between 1965 and 1980. Statistical 
evidence on South Africa’s imports is scant and would require inquiries into the trading 
practices of specific oil companies, which is difficult to do. What we do know is that the 
likelihood of its happening or Nigeria being able to trace it is marginal. We also know 
that Nigeria had been struggling to find answers regarding the disappearance of crude oil. 
At the time, Nigeria failed to get a handle on embezzlement within the NNPC’s 
subsidiaries and the theft and smuggling of its petroleum out of the country. In May 1979 
two employees of NOLCHEM were charged with stealing over N250,000 from the 
company.287 The theft and smuggling appeared to include only small, local Nigerian 
traders crossing into Benin and fraudulent, private shippers taking advantage of weakly 
guarded ports.288 In 1971 the Nigerian government accused companies of exporting oil 
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from which no royalties were paid.289 And, in 1978, several oil tanker drivers were 
questioned for assisting in the smuggling of oil across borders.290 Nonetheless, people 
sought an answer to the disappearing crude oil and without surprise the major oil 
companies faced heavy accusation. Thus, the concern over Nigeria’s crude oil being sent 
to southern Africa by way of trickery was built upon previous general problems of, 
perhaps, unrelated theft. 
But, did Nigerians have a basis for linking oil theft to southern Africa? No 
evidence in BP’s archival materials suggested that trade in that part of the world went any 
other direction than clockwise around Africa. It was an efficient pattern long established 
by early African and European seamen. The Kulu vessel in Table 4 provides a basic 
example of this clockwise route –Iran south to Egypt and South Africa and then 
northward to Nigeria and on to Western Europe. Among a long list of questions posed 
during the Bingham investigation conducted in 1977, one pertaining to Nigeria was 
particularly interesting: 
Q41 There have been reports that Nigerian oil has been reaching Rhodesia 
–can you confirm this? 
A41 Oil logistics generally require Nigerian oil to move North to West, 
not South and East, so it is an unlikely requirement. We would avoid it 
anyway –and I gather Nigerians have prohibited it, just in case.291 
 
Evidence gathered regarding shipping routes agrees with this answer. The reason for this 
has to do with fundamental laws of ocean current and wind patterns that make traveling 
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against the flow difficult, dangerous, and certainly not cost effective. When discussing oil 
tankers weighed down by hundreds and thousands of tons of crude oil, this is a major 
concern. Why direct crude oil from Nigeria down to South Africa, when oil was readily 
accessible from the Middle East, barring political ruptures in the region from time to 
time. But, this information did not stop Nigeria from claiming that its oil did travel to 
South Africa. And, this line of argument was used in the nationalization of BP in 1979.  
At the announcement of nationalization, the managing director of the NNPC 
mentioned that if the UK allowed for the shipment of oil to South Africa, BP might be 
required to break its agreements with Nigeria and ship its oil southward. And, as a 
justification for not nationalizing BP’s share in the LNG project, it claimed that BP would 
not, for reasons unspecified, be able to ship LNG southwards.292 Surely, Nigeria’s head of 
state and his military council would have made this basic fact about shipping known. It 
begs the question, then, of why Nigeria continued to use this line of argument? The 
accuracy of it was not of major concern because presumably the oil was being stolen and 
snuck out of Nigeria’s ports anyhow. Also, the effectiveness of using this claim to rally 
public support, most likely, outweighed the truth. 
 
Exploring New Perspectives 
As this chapter has illustrated, plenty of egregious situations and botched 
measures occurred, which could have influenced Nigeria to take retaliatory action against 
the UK. For starters, the UK remained a quasi-ally to Southern Rhodesia, as illustrated in 
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its lack-luster Beira Patrol and weak attempt to comply with UN sanctions. Also, the UK 
approached the negotiation table with Southern Rhodesia several times only to return no 
closer to settlement. The UK effectively allowed the situation to deteriorate within the 
country because of its preference for an “internal solution.” Finally, the UK refused to 
place pressure on the source of Southern Rhodesia’s economic and military strength –
South Africa. Indeed, the list of Nigeria’s grievances against the UK is long, with many 
of the entries reaching back decades to its own colonial past. Yet, when we start to ask 
questions regarding why Nigeria chose to make its move against the UK, through BP, in 
1979, the foreign policy reason does not satisfy. 
Works on the nationalization of BP focus almost exclusively on reasons that 
pertain to Nigeria’s foreign policy initiatives in southern Africa. As this chapter has 
demonstrated, evidence from sources outside of the Nigerian government and press has 
revealed the shortcomings of these conclusions. Within this project, the primary thesis 
has been to propose a new perspective based on economic nationalism as a window into 
not only the nationalization of BP, but also Nigeria’s oil history as a whole the 1970s. The 
key to assessing the nationalization is to place it within the context of Nigeria’s economic 
policy. Doing so addresses head-on the questions of why BP and why 1979. In looking at 
Nigeria’s economic history the reason for choosing to nationalize BP is clear. Nigeria 
viewed BP as a tool of the British government. BP represented one of the most expansive 
and lucrative oil companies as well as one of the few remaining large British firms of any 
kind operating in the country. Its days as a foreign marketing company in Nigeria were 
numbered. UK officials saw the nationalization of BP as an attempt in 1979 for Obasanjo 
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to leave his post in a blaze of glory and implement a decree that his successor would not 
dare reverse. These ideas only scratch the surface of what new information emerges from 
applying the perspective of economic nationalism, as illustrated in the proceeding 
chapter. 
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Chapter 4:  Rebuilding the Narrative 
The popular narrative regarding Nigeria’s nationalization of BP relies on the 
premise that the federal military government under Obasanjo used oil as a weapon to 
punish the UK. Indeed, Nigerians harbored a sense of disdain for the UK based on its 
own experiences in addition to the empathy it felt for Africans in southern Africa. In the 
previous chapter, Nigeria made a series of ambiguous threats regarding the failure of 
sanctions, fair elections in Southern Rhodesia, and the ending of apartheid in South 
Africa. One year prior to the nationalization of BP, Nigeria began scrutinizing the 
journeys of foreign oil tankers, primarily commissioned by BP, to ensure that its ban on 
South Africa was respected. Catching oil companies in violation made for compelling 
headlines. A close examination of the popular narrative reveals gaps and exposes several 
questions about the nationalization that are unanswered. The nationalization fits into the 
trend of nationalist economic policy and the theoretical framework of economic 
nationalism.  
This chapter deconstructs the popular narrative to expose the context and 
motivations within domestic economic policy. These modifications occurred through the 
implementation of decrees and development plans by successive federal military 
governments. The 1970s marks the height of Nigeria’s intended economic revolution 
from a neocolonial state to a financially independent one. After addressing how the 
federal military government used economic policy to foster nationalism, we turn our 
attention to how nationalism, in its various forms, influenced economic policy. As much 
as the federal military government tried, ethnic and religious nationalism continued to 
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thrive. Within Nigeria, ethnic, religious, and regional affiliations took precedence over 
identifying oneself with the colonial-constructed country of Nigeria. The nationalization 
of BP, and others like it, is wrapped up in this tension. 
 
Deconstructing the Narrative 
Within the secondary literature, the nationalization of BP is placed almost 
exclusively in the political context of southern Africa. It represents a bold, courageous act 
by Nigeria with the intent of embarrassing and punishing the UK. Indeed, Nigeria’s 
commitment to the liberation of southern Africa remains a highpoint of its national 
history. Even under a military regime during an economically turbulent time, Nigeria still 
shined. Within these works, the details of Nigeria’s involvement within the OAU and its 
public declarations of not being afraid to use oil as a weapon are documented with great 
detail. But when it comes to the nationalization of BP, the particulars are less clear.  
Two reasons account for this. First, the reasoning behind it was neither presented 
clearly by the government, nor easily identifiable within the given context. This raises 
questions as to the honesty of Nigeria’s claims and the idea that better conclusions can be 
drawn by looking beyond southern Africa. And, the ambiguity gets repeated within the 
secondary literature as scholars continue to rely solely on government-issued statements 
and the Nigerian media, which, too, prints messages released by the government. Second, 
the nationalization as an event was quickly overshadowed by Nigeria’s transfer to 
democratic rule, which was completed in October 1979. In this section, the popular 
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narrative leading up to the nationalization is deconstructed, exposing the discontinuities 
and omissions presented within the literature and clearing space for new interpretations.  
Before moving into the myriad of reasons that have been presented relating to 
southern Africa, two important clarifications need to be made. First, most secondary 
works use the corporate name “BP” quite loosely without taking into consideration the 
differences between BP’s parent company based in London, and the wholly-owned or 
affiliated subsidiaries based locally. When discussing nationalization, these distinctions 
are important. They say something about the company’s country of allegiance, 
composition of management and employees, and the company’s unique mission 
statement.293 Also, “BP” was involved in all aspects of Nigeria’s oil industry through 
various joint-ventures and subsidiary or affiliated companies. For example, BP (London) 
held a 50 percent share in the joint-venture production company Shell-BP Petroleum 
Development Company, based in Port Harcourt. When Festus Marinho made his 
declaration that Nigeria intended to “increase its participation to 100%” in Shell-BP and 
BP (Nigeria), he chose his words carefully.294 Nigeria did not take over all aspects of the 
oil industry belonging to BP or its subsidiaries and affiliates. He explicitly stated that the 
Nigerian government would take BP’s share in Shell-BP and all of BP (Nigeria), the 
marketing company and BP subsidiary. Several activities in which BP was involved were 
not touched (see Chapter 4). 
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Within the secondary literature, these corporate distinctions are generally absent. 
Akiba, for example, writes that Nigeria nationalized Shell-BP. 295 Without clarifying his 
usage of “nationalization” and the corporate composition of Shell-BP in this statement, he 
has misled his readers into thinking that Nigeria took over all of Shell-BP’s assets. The 
bulk of the secondary literature simply says that Nigeria nationalized BP, without making 
any distinctions over which companies and what areas of the oil industry were actually 
affected. Marinho targeted some of BP’s operations in Nigeria, not all. In addition to the 
marketing company and its share in Shell-BP, BP (London) also participated in a newly 
developed liquefied natural gas project, crude oil refining at Port Harcourt, and a 
processing scheme with the French company, Total. By no means was BP “kicked out” of 
Nigeria for bad behavior with no hopes of returning. After nationalization, BP also 
continued to provide technical assistance to Nigeria’s state owned oil company. 
The second clarification to make here requires us to revisit Marinho’s statement. 
He never used the word nationalization and, instead, called for an “increase its 
participation to 100%” in Shell-BP and BP (Nigeria).296 Because the message he sent to 
BP regarding their change in status only exists within BP’s archives and has only recently 
become available, it has never been mentioned within the secondary literature. He 
deliberately used the term participation and emphasized that it was not nationalization in 
the popularly understood sense of an immediate and total removal of BP from Nigeria’s 
oil industry. In other words, he pressed BP to see the transfer of control as routine 
economic policy in line with other “participation” decrees as opposed to a hefty political 
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message. This issue is discussed in more detail in the following chapter, but is important 
to highlight here.  
The narrative presented in the previous chapter reflects the process of compiling 
and synthesizing those offered within secondary works. The area of discontinuity 
between narratives emerges when discussing the year of the nationalization, 1979 and, 
more specifically, what spurred Nigeria into action. Several causes have been put 
forward. Attributing it to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Akiba writes that Nigeria 
nationalized Shell-BP in response to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s announcement 
that the UK would be lifting economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.297 Onoh 
writes that Nigeria nationalized BP in response to the Thatcher’s “de facto recognition of 
the minority government in Zimbabwe.” He attributes the short timetable for 
Zimbabwean independence to Nigeria’s political based action.298 These represent only a 
sample of works that mention only Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe); there are equally as 
many that link the nationalization to South Africa.  
Several scholars explain the nationalization as stemming from the sale of oil to 
South Africa, which was the reason presented by Marinho to BP in July 1979. A 
newspaper editorial suggested that to see the nationalization as anything other than the 
officially explanation was accepting Western attempts at “blackmail, pure and simple.”299 
Nicolas J. Spiliotes suggests that the nationalization occurred in response to “BP setting 
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up swap arrangements with its North Sea and Nigerian oil, enabling it to sell to South 
Africa.”300 Nigeria and other OPEC members maintained a ban on the sale of their crude 
oil to South Africa. According to the Nigerian government, they exposed an arrangement 
whereby BP and Conoco, an oil company based in the United States, would exchange 
crude oil from Nigeria for North Sea oil. The oil from the North Sea would be diverted to 
South Africa, while Nigeria’s crude oil would go to European markets.301 The UK’s 
response was that oil reaching South Africa came from neither Nigeria nor the North 
Sea.302 Within the South African press, the situation was told quite differently. According 
to the Cape Times, Nigeria agreed to secure oil supplies for South Africa through Middle 
Eastern middlemen to maintain supplies amidst the Iranian Revolution.303  
With the ban in place, BP (London) had allegedly found it difficult to meet the 
amount demanded by South African consumers.304 Spiliotes derived his conclusion from 
a government-issued press release. Many works, however, present the nationalization as 
partially about South Africa and partially about Southern Rhodesia, which highlights the 
ambiguity. In an overview chapter on Nigeria’s growing participation in the oil industry, 
Obi and Soremekun write that nationalization took place “as a political move against the 
British Government’s sales of oil to South Africa and its support for the minority regime 
in Zimbabwe.”305 Osaghae also views the nationalization as “partly [done] in retaliation 
for BP’s participation in an oil-swap agreement, which led to the ‘indirect’ shipment of 
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Nigerian oil to South Africa,” and partly because of the UK’s handling of Zimbabwe’s 
elections. He earlier mentions that nationalization of Shell-BP was “over the company’s 
involvement in South Africa.”306 Both of these works exemplify the fact that in 1990s the 
only new conclusion available on the subject involved the merging of two previous ones 
presented primarily in the 1980s. To complicate matters further, a newspaper article from 
the Guardian in London cites the nationalization date as September 1979.307 A 
discrepancy in narratives raises questions regarding accuracy and relevance. 
On the accuracy of attributing the nationalization to the elections in Southern 
Rhodesia, Marinho makes an important clarification. To accompany his original 
declaration linking the nationalization to South Africa, he adds:  
this action had nothing whatever to do with Rhodesia, and if that [the 
elections] went wrong it would require separate and additional action.308 
  
Indeed, by July of 1979 the imbroglio with Ian Smith and his hopes of permanent white, 
minority rule had ended. Elections had taken place, putting Bishop Muzorewa as the 
prime minister. On 31 May 1979, Southern Rhodesia became semi-independent. On the 
day of the nationalization, a meeting took place in Lusaka, Zambia for members of the 
British Commonwealth. Without a definitive conclusion or opportunity for hearing Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher’s perspective on the situation, Nigeria nationalized. One 
scholar mentioned that to “most of those already in Lusaka Mrs. Thatcher was an 
                                                                                                                                                 
305 Obi and Soremekun, “Oil and the Nigerian State,” 20. 
306 Osaghae, Crippled Giant, 97, 103. 
307 John Andrews, “Top of the League,” Guardian [London] (5 October, 1981). 
308 “Nationalisation,” memo from Shell (London) to BP (London), 31 July 1979, BP 4823, 1. 
 134
unknown quantity.”309 If it was really about Southern Rhodesia, it would have made more 
sense to nationalize after she arrived and made her statements about the situation at the 
meeting. Within the foreign policy perspective, we can confidently conclude that Nigeria 
never envisioned the nationalization to serve as a punitive measure against the UK over 
the rocky elections in Southern Rhodesia. But, should we take at face value, Marinho’s 
declaration of nationalization as being linked to oil supplies to South Africa? 
By 1978, Nigeria faced serious economic problems (hence, its submersion into 
structural adjustment programs during the 1980s). It was during this time, that several 
measures to enhance Nigeria’s participation in its oil industry occurred. Thus, the 
nationalization took place in 1979 as a last resort measure to channel oil revenues directly 
to the state. In a memo from Shell to BP on the nationalization in 1979, Shell commented 
that its meeting with Marinho “was astonishingly cordial” and that it was probably 
because “he is achieving a desired objective (more oil) with the responsibility not being 
his.”310 In his work on the history of Southern Rhodesia, Anthony Verrier, inadvertently 
touched on the fact that Nigeria’s decision to nationalize “Shell-BP” did not sincerely 
hinge on southern Africa.311 He writes, 
[Lord] Carrington lost his temper –a fairly frequent, understandable, but 
damaging occurrence during these days and hours –when Nigeria’s 
Commissioner for External Affairs, Major-General [H.E.O.] Adefope, 
almost discourteously dismissed the expropriation.… Adefope merely 
shrugged and said he had to see the Queen when Carrington furiously 
declared to him that expropriating Shell-BP would not affect British policy 
on Rhodesia.312 
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Verrier describes the body language of Adefope in a way that indicates that Nigeria’s 
nationalization was not meant as a way to severe ties with the UK and that Adefope did 
not genuinely expect the decision to alter the UK’s course. The passage also suggests that 
diplomatic ties did not diminish and that Nigeria viewed the nationalization as somewhat 
separate from southern Africa. Another memo reiterated this view:  
[t]he main motive of the Nigerians was to get their hands on the oil at this 
time and use that to get the maximum amount of money.313  
 
The latter passage suggests a kind of urgency to the nationalization. In part, this has to do 
with when the transition to civilian rule was scheduled to take place. 
In his essay, Aluko presented South Africa as an excuse to nationalize BP. The 
situation in South Africa, although deplorable, had not changed. What had allegedly 
changed was the arrival of Thatcher in May 1979 and her conservative perspective on 
South Africa. Nigeria claimed that within months of her arrival, supplies to South Africa 
had increased to pre-1970 levels. Aluko writes:  
By sheer coincidence, the arrangement between BP and Conoco, an 
American group, whereby BP was to sell North Sea oil to Conoco in 
return for the supply of oil from non-OPEC sources to South Africa came 
to light towards the end of July 1979. This was used in Lagos as an excuse 
for the takeover of BP.314 
 
The quote above disconnects the “oil swap” from the nationalization. Little evidence 
suggests that the “oil swap” involved Nigeria at all. Added to which, the operations of 
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transnational companies and their subsidiaries and affiliates is quite difficult to decipher 
as we saw when companies such as BP, Mobil, and Shell were accused of violating 
sanctions. Within the context of southern Africa, these oil companies claimed to have 
separated the parent company from the subsidiaries. This gave them legal grounding to 
deny all accusations. By 1968, any allegations about their conducting business within 
Southern Rhodesia warranted the same response: “The parent companies claimed no 
control over them” and, therefore, “[n]o UK sanctions were broken if the subsidiaries 
confined their activities to within [Southern] Rhodesia”315 This placed the subsidiaries 
under the legislation of Southern Rhodesia, who placed pressure on them, of course, to 
maintain operations as much as possible. What the popular narrative does not fully 
address is why July 1979 was the chosen date for the nationalization. A look at Nigeria’s 
domestic situation in terms of oil and economic policy becomes especially important.  
 
Rebuilding the Narrative 
Would Nigeria undertake such levels of support for southern Africa without 
seeking reward? In all other regards, the federal military government has proved itself as 
rather selfish, greedy, and conniving for personal gain. The best conclusion is to merge 
both ideas and see aspects of Nigeria’s foreign policy as a tool of domestic, economic 
policy. In a later chapter, we continue the deconstruction by looking at the language, 
symbolism, and historical memory that have contributed to the construction of the 
popular narrative. In this section, we rebuild the narrative of the nationalization of BP, 
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placing it within the context of economic nationalism. We trace the establishment of 
development plans and indigenous employment programs as well as the succession of 
participation arrangements involving foreign transnational oil companies operating in 
Nigeria. Collectively, these efforts make up Nigeria’s economic nationalist project. 
 An overview of Nigeria’s policies indicate that the nationalization of BP in 1979 
was not out of character given the series of economic steps taken for overall greater 
control over its economy and, more importantly, its oil industry. Nigeria pushed through 
two developments plans, following in the steps of the first one launched in 1962 before 
the collapse of the First Republic. 
 
Total FMG    Oil    Oil % of Total  
Year  Revenue (N thousand) Revenue (N million)  Revenue           
1965/66 317,356   29.2    9.20 
1966/67  317,886   45.0    14.17 
1967/68 289,322   41.8    14.44 
1968/69 291,116   29.6    10.16 
1969/70 435,908   75.4    17.30 
1970  533,200   176.4    27.85 
1971  1,169,000   603.0    51.55 
1972  1,404,800   735.0    52.32 
1973  695.300   1368.6    80.72 
1974  537.000   4184.0    92.21 
1975  5,514,700   4568.0    82.83* 
1976  6,765,900   4834.0    71.45 
1977  8,042,000   6299.2    78.32 
1978  7,469,400   5183.7    69.40 
1979  10,912,700   10433.0   95.60 
1980  15,234,000   13123.0   86.14 
Table 5: Sources of Revenue for Nigeria316 
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Source             1974-1975       1975-1976 1976-1977 1977-78       1978-79* 
Customs and Excise 521.6  833.7  933.1  1,244.8 1,628.4 
Petroleum  4,183.8 4,611.7 5,493.8 5,965.5 4,582.5 
State Companies 278.5  167.1  302.9  542.1  528.1 
Other   193.2  243.7  340.8  606.6  294.9 
Total   5,177.1 5,856.2 7,070,6 8,359.0 7,033.9 
Table 6: Revenue for the Federal Government, 1974-1979 (N million)317 
In total, Nigeria’s various leaders have implemented eight development plans. The 
Second Development Plan from 1970 to 1974 was executed by Gowon in November, 
while the Third Development Plan lasted from 1976 to 1980 and was created by the 
Muhammed/Obasanjo regime. The development plans were drafted with similar goals in 
mind, including the desire to boost the output of high yield commodities already in 
production such as oil and agricultural products like palm oil and groundnuts. During the 
1970s, Nigeria’s oil exports substantially surpassed its agricultural production (see Table 
5). To remedy the situation, Gowon called for the “sowing of petroleum” back into 
agriculture through the utilization of Nigeria’s vast oil reserves (see Table 6).318 With that 
revenue, Nigeria’s successive governments wanted to expand industry to include 
manufacturing of basic goods and improve public works (ie, electricity, communications, 
and water). Unfortunately, when the oil boom ended in 1978 and the price of oil per 
barrel dropped significantly, Nigeria’s grand plans suffered.  
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The Second Development Plan included a vague outline for economic growth. 
Gowon, with the advice of the supreme military council, created the plan in 1970, before 
the oil boom and at the close of the civil war. The government set aside ₤N1,596 million 
and expected private investors to contribute ₤N816 million.319 The plan included the 
rehabilitation of people, buildings, and facilities damaged by the war. It also included 
hopes for balancing development throughout the country and import substitution nation-
wide.320 With regard to the oil industry, it emphasized greater involvement. Although not 
explicitly laid out, the second development plan foreshadowed a policy of direct 
participation and nationalization. Gowon took away from OPEC the importance of a 
national oil company, control of the oil industry, and the sense of national pride derived 
from being a major oil producer. To improve Nigeria’s financial gain from its oil, Gowon 
negotiated the posted price of Nigeria’s crude oil with its largest concession holder, Shell-
BP in 1972 (see Table 7). The agreement generated additional revenue of roughly ₤200 
million.321 The outcome of these negotiations in 1973 coupled with the formation of the 
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      Posted Price ($ per bbl) 
Crude Oil Type    1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Light (API Gravity 34°)  2.23 3.00 3.33 4.78 14.69 12.97 
Medium (API Gravity 27°)  2.09 2.88 3.21 4.62 14.48 12.77 
Table 7: Posted Prices for Nigerian Crude Oil, 1970-1975322 
The main goal of the Third Development Plan323 included taking advantage of the 
oil wealth to launch ambitious, long term projects. These included a major expansion 
program for Nigeria’s oil industry. For example, in 1978 plans went into place for the 
construction of a second refinery with a capacity of 100,000 bbl/d.324 Obasanjo promised 
that the new refinery would be state-owned and would fulfill domestic demands for 
natural gas, used in cooking.325 After some deliberation, Obasanjo chose Warri, a town 
east of the Niger River as the location and looked for a company outside of the majors to 
construct it. Shell-BP was not invited to apply.326 An Italian firm, Snam Procetti, received 
the contract to build it.327 Until the refinery was built, Nigeria depended heavily on 
outside refineries, such as Shell’s in Curaçao, for its crude oil and natural gas 
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processing.328 By 1976, almost half of the country’s total demand was met by imported 
petroleum products.329 Nigerians who knew this practice, grumbled about how Nigeria 
imported its own petroleum. The Warri refinery serves as just one project among many 
under the Third Development Plan.  
Imbedded within Nigeria’s development plans were several moves toward 
minimizing foreign investment and involvement in its economy as well as transferring 
many of the country’s most lucrative industries into state control. The plans showcased 
Nigeria’s ambitious plans, particularly, with its oil industry.  
 
Indigenization and Participation  
Imbedded within the Second and Third Development Plans were two broadly 
defined programs of indigenization and participation. Both military regimes in power 
during the 1970s observed with disdain the fact that all major industries, businesses, and 
its oil industry were owned and controlled by foreigners (such as British, Lebanese, and 
Ghanaian nationals). As a solution, the military regimes of the mid-1960s and 1970s 
focused on replacing expatriate staff at all levels with a Nigerian one through programs of 
indigenization. To indigenize meant the alteration of hiring practices of foreign 
companies as decreed by the state. It was estimated that British citizens in Nigeria during 
                                                 
328 “General Gowon’s Visit to the Bahamas,” memo from J.G. Doubledy to A.J. Ward, 13 May 1975, PRO 
FCO 65/1670, 1-2; Shell’s refinery in Curaçao supplied Nigeria with 120,000 bbl/d, which covered a 
substantial portion of Nigeria’s demand. EIU, Quarterly Economic Review –Nigeria, 4th Quarter (London: 
EIU, 1978), 16. 
329 “Bid to Check Fuel Shortage –Nigeria Processes Oil in West Indies,” New Nigerian [Kaduna] (11 April 
1977), 1. 
 142
the early 1970s totaled around 15,000, with around 10,000 residing in Lagos.330 The 
NPRC, for example, employed approximately 10 Nigerians and 33 expatriates in 
supervisory positions in 1971.331 While indigenization applied to almost all forms of 
industry, a great focus was placed on the oil industry. Within the oil industry, the state 
launched training programs to replace expatriate oil engineers and semi-skilled workers 
with Nigerian ones.332  Within the Nigerian press, indigenization is also referred to as 
Nigerianization. Overall, the plan of indigenization proved more difficult to implement 
than initially conceived because of slippery definitions of “citizenship,” “home country,” 
and general loopholes in the decree. For these reasons indigenization remained at the 
forefront of development initiatives for the entire decade.  
The term participation is another broadly used term meaning the involvement of a 
person, company, or state in the operations of another company or state. It is often used 
interchangeably with indigenization and nationalization. Beirsteker, for example, uses 
indigenization as a broad term to include decrees passed on employment, equity 
participation, direct participation, and nationalization.333 More so than indigenization, 
participation tends to apply to the selling of shares or equity to public or private buyers 
closely tied to the state.  
For purposes of national appeal, indigenization was used more than participation 
because indicated the government’s intentions for its citizens, from whom it received 
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praise. Indigenization struck a nationalist chord and suggested a transfer of Western 
domination back into Nigerian hands, as if to correct the legacy of colonial rule. It came 
into popular usage in the 1970s, which means that several of the decrees calling for the 
hiring of Nigerians in the 1960s fall into the category of indigenization but were not 
called such. To private companies indigenization is substantially less threatening than 
participation. Thus, participation plans such as the Nigerian Enterprise Promotions 
Decrees discussed below were often referred to as “indigenization decrees” for political 
reasons. 
Finally, the term nationalization calls for the transfer of complete control 
(activities, management, and citizenship of staff) from typically a private company to the 
state and is often discussed separately from indigenization and participation. It is often a 
publicized event coupled with an aggressive nationalist economic policy. The 
nationalization of a company is typically viewed as final and irreversible. No other 
economic measure holds the same politically charged message as nationalization. Strictly 
speaking, Nigeria increased its participation in BP’s operations in 1979. Outside 
observers saw the linkage between indigenization and nationalization and attempted to 
understand where Nigeria stood. The UK’s High Commissioner in Lagos, commented on 
this distinction:  
But the Nigerians’ world is Africa, and, with the exception of Ghana 
(where it was widely believed her, enforced indigenisation caused chaos), 
African precedent have, I think, all been of nationalization –a rather 
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different thing and one which is regarded with some caution by the present 
Nigerian government and applied only in a limited area.334 
 
Not all oil companies, of course, were nationalized; and, not all countries wanted to 
nationalize them. The recent trend of privatization in the 1990s suggests that 
nationalization did not always improve a country’s economic position. Through 
privatization, the nationalized companies of the 1960s and 1970s were essentially being 
returned to private investors. But, in the 1970s with the long term outcome of 
nationalized industries largely unknown, it did stand for many as an ultimate goal. For 
members of OPEC, nationalizing branded a country as courageous and committed, 
warranting the respect of other members.  
In the case of Nigeria, as suggested in the quote above, Nigeria under Gowon 
exhibited no intention of nationalizing. This is for two reasons. First, with regard to 
Gowon’s economic policy (quite different than his publicized foreign policy), he 
maintained positive relations with foreign, especially British, companies. Second, he saw 
Nigeria as not prepared for ambitious programs of participation or nationalization. 
Instead, he chose to focus on indigenization, which proved more palatable for the foreign 
companies operating in Nigeria. By and large, the Second Development Plan focused 
heavily on indigenization with some provisions for participation. The 
Muhammed/Obasanjo regime took Gowon’s ideas and accelerated them. Through the 
Third Development Plan, they scrapped the process of indigenization (although continued 
to use the word in their decrees) and focused on participation. Taking an historical 
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overview, the stages of greater control can be easily identified. The first half of the 1970s 
emphasized the first stage of indigenization; the second half of the decade focused on the 
second and third stages of participation and nationalization. 
By seeing nationalization as the third stage in the process of Nigeria attempting to 
obtain greater control over its oil industry, the nationalization of BP makes sense. Instead 
of seeing it as an isolated incident, or political move, related to southern Africa, it can be 
seen as nestled into a larger trend of Nigeria’s economic policy. Let us look at Nigeria’s 
approach to indigenization and participation closely. 
 
Indigenization 
Nigeria’s leaders used the development plans as an avenue to force companies to 
hire Nigerians in not only unskilled positions, but also management ones. One of the first 
attempts to indigenize was through the Quota Allocation Board (1967) and Decree No. 51 
passed in 1969, which required an oil company’s labor-force to include 70 percent 
Nigerians within seven years of operation.335 The Quota Allocation Board was 
established through the commissioner of internal affairs to regulate and restrict the 
number of businesses and accounts owned by expatriate individuals or firms. In 1971, the 
procedure changed to reduce the application process from months to weeks based on 
necessity. Companies with technical training available for Nigerians and a plan to 
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establish an industry in a less-developed part of the country got preferential treatment.336 
Decree No. 51 stated that within ten years of receiving a mining lease, an oil company 
had to ensure a minimum of 60 percent of its workers were Nigerian.337 In 1970, 
however, Shell-BP’s twelve-person managerial staff included only one Nigerian. 
According to Nigeria’s federal minister of mines and power, Philip C. Asiodu, the other 
major oil companies had worse hiring practices, which included “racial overtones and 
other vexations.”338 And, when the process of indigenization moved slower than people 
had hoped, accusations began to emerge. One opinion piece declared:  
We [Nigerians] believe that the blackman is as educable as the white, all 
things being equal. To continue to import white men into [the] oil industry 
in this country is extremely dishonest. The Federal Government must do 
something. Our Universities are turning out young petroleum engineers 
with good qualification[s], even better than what some expatriates are 
having.339 
 
These plans failed to reduce the employment of expatriates in the job market, warranting 
more aggressive measures than previously designed. 
In the early 1970s, Gowon took steps to move Nigerians into key positions within 
Nigeria’s economy. He emphasized the training of Nigerians in the field of petroleum 
engineering for the future and the immediate integration of Nigerians into the 
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downstream sector of the industry. Running petrol stations, driving trucks, and managing 
depots required less advanced training programs than the upstream operations. In many 
cases, the foreign marketing companies provided one- to twelve-month training and on 
the job instruction.340 In addition to pressuring oil companies to hire more Nigerians, the 
federal government also implemented steps toward a technology transfer, whereby 
Nigerians received training in the day-to-day running of an oil industry. For example, the 
government established the Petroleum Training Instituted at Warri in 1975 and awarded 
students scholarships to attend colleges of technology within and outside Nigeria and 
gave substantial grants directly to universities to facilitate research on petroleum.341 
Within the NPRC, we can see the effect of the indigenization decrees. The 
expatriate staff totaled 48 out of 400 employees in 1968 and was reduced to 26 by 
1972.342 The composition of the board of directors changed to include a Nigerian as 
chairman of the company and Nigerians were employed in decision-making positions 
such as assistant general manager.343 Similarly, the number of Nigerians within Agip’s 
management team went from none in 1962 to 46 in a decade.344 The construction of the 
Warri refinery required nearly 3,500 and 1,180 of them Nigerians.345 A visitor to the 
Warri refinery’s construction site wrote: “It gave one a pleasant feeling of pride to see 
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fellow Nigerians manning highly technical positions in various aspects of the job….”346 
Nigeria, however, accused companies of appointing Nigerian managers as “window-
dressing,” who actually held no decision-making powers.347 Further, the Nigerian 
government warned the oil companies to stop terminating appointments of senior 
Nigerian staff and pressuring them into “voluntary resignations.”348 Overall, the plans of 
indigenization were considered failures because Nigeria lacked the skilled labor pool 
required and government-level nepotism left no room for civilian participation. For 
example, the Nigerian chairman appointed to the NPRC in 1972 also served as a member 
of the military government.349 Strides toward indigenization remained relatively small 
and plans of expanding Nigerian participation through shareholding overshadowed the 
ideas of indigenization by the early 1970s. 
 
Participation 
As part of the Second Development Plan, Gowon put forth an innovative program 
for increasing participation within Nigeria’s economy. Through his Nigerian Enterprise 
Promotions (NEP) decree, he singled out specific sectors of the economy and set 
timelines in the form of segmented schedules. True to Gowon’s governance, he sought 
indirect input from the major foreign investors by leaking information to provide “a 
measure of consultation without loss of face and without altering their policy of 
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government by arbitrary decree.”350 BP, however, predicted such a decree because a 
similar one, described as “partial nationalization,” was passed in Guinea, in June of that 
year, targeting oil marketing companies.351 The NEP decree was announced in June of 
1971 and implemented on 28 February 1972. Gowon attempted to reserve a range of 
enterprises “exclusively for Nigerians and to ban foreign firms” with capital exceeding 
more than ₤N200,000.352 The plan called for adherence based on a two-tier schedule 
designated by skill level and financial commitment: 
Schedule 1: All enterprises in which Nigerians were sufficiently 
experienced in an operational and managerial capacity. These would 
become wholly owned Nigerian enterprises.  
 
Schedule 2: Businesses in which Nigerians would have a 40 percent 
minimum equity participation.353 
 
The businesses under Schedule 1 included such occupations as cosmetics and perfume 
manufacturing, department stores and supermarkets, furniture making, poultry farming, 
wholesale distribution, and coastal and waterways shipping. This group included 
companies such as the United Africa Company and British Portland Cement.354 All other 
kinds of businesses belonged in Schedule 2, including select activities of the major oil 
companies. In practice, however, all businesses were not equal. 
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As Nigeria’s former colonial ruler, the British firms ranked high on the list of 
foreign investors to replace. Almost half of Nigeria’s exports went to the UK. And, nearly 
40 percent of all goods imported into Nigeria came from the UK. Shell-BP alone 
controlled over 70 percent of Nigeria’s crude oil production. The UK’s presence in 
Nigeria’s economy became a major target for the NEP decree. By 1975, Nigeria’s exports 
to the US reached roughly 30 percent of its total exports. Needless to say, foreign 
investment, British or not, represented a substantial portion of Nigeria’s economic 
activity, and the express purpose of the NEP decree was to change this situation. 
While the downstream operations largely fit into Schedule 2, the production 
companies fell under a separate participation scheme. Gowon increased equity 
participation within the upstream sector across the board to 35 percent (with the 
exception of Agip/Phillips who went to 33⅓ percent) between 1971 and 1974 (see Table 
8).355 By 1974, Gowon had increased equity participation again unilaterally to 55 
percent.356 Arrangements of this magnitude cost the federal government N780 million, 
but was offset by receipts of N5,000 million.357 The partial appropriation of the 
production companies, while coinciding with the NEP decrees, was conducted separately. 
Nigeria was a new member of OPEC and was eager to gain greater control over 
production levels and facilitate negotiations with the major oil companies over posted 
prices.  
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Company  Participation  Date Acquired 
Elf (Safrap)  35%   1 April 1971 
   55%   1 April 1974 
   60%   1 July 1979 
 
Agip/Phillips  33⅓%   1 April 1971 
   55%   1 April 1974 
   60%   1 July 1979 
 
Shell-BP  35%   1 April 1973 
   55%   1 April 1974 
   60%   1 July 1979 
   80%   1 August 1979 
 
Gulf   35%   1 April 1973 
   55%   1 April 1974 
   60%   1 July 1979 
 
Mobil   35%   1 April 1973 
   55%   1 April 1974 
   60%   1 July 1979 
 
Texaco   55%   1 May 1975 
   60%   1 July 1979 
 
Pan Ocean  55%   1 January 1978 
   60%   1 July 1979 
Table 8: Participation Interests (Exploration and Production)358 
A few months into the program, the NEP decree exhibited problems. While the 
principles and objectives of it were clear, the plan of execution, such as exactly which 
firms fit into which schedule, remained hazy. The government found it difficult to 
translate the decree’s “statement of intent” into legal code.359 Through successive 
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amendments in 1973 and 1974, Gowon attempted to improve upon his original decree.360 
One of the looming issues included whether Nigerian investors actually had access to the 
large capital necessary to meet the provisions. Some Igbo businessmen complained of 
being excluded from the NEP program because they lost much of their wealth and 
stability during the war.361  
In addition to a possible lack of Nigerian investors, the effectiveness of the decree 
was compromised through a lack of stern regulation. The federal military government 
adopted provisions, which allowed for extensions of time and exemptions undermined the 
effectiveness of the NEP decree. By July of 1972 discussions had begun over which 
countries or businesses would be exempt. By 1974, 15 firms of primarily British origin 
received exemptions in exchange for selling some shares to Nigerians.362 Nigeria put 
forward the OAU Clause, which exempted members of the OAU from the indigenization 
decree. 363 Looking back at the first NEP decree, Muhammed’s government scrutinized 
the devices used to avoid full implementation of the decree, which included: 
…fronting, application for naturalization, extended the use of the 
definition of Nigerian citizenship, international problems of classification 
of enterprises, the gentle approach to implementation of the Decree and 
frequent amendments providing for exemptions on flimsy grounds.364  
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Many of these activities occurred with the help of “some misguided citizens.”365 In 
retrospect, the federal military government recognized the inherent flaws, which included 
a “failure to make it obligatory for more companies to seek compliance by issuing their 
shares through the Lagos Stock Exchange” and “the weak and under-staffed 
administrative machinery for implementation.”366 Only about one-third of the firms 
affected by the decree complied with the provisions by 30 June 1975. This ratio included 
a break down in this manner: 55 percent of Schedule I and 89 percent of Schedule II had 
complied. Out of the 950 businesses operating in Nigeria, 357 transformed 100 
percent.367 Overall, the first NEP decree fell short of expectations with several companies 
exploiting the exemptions clause or ignoring the deadlines.  
After removing Gowon, Muhammed and Obasanjo expressed their intention to 
take more aggressive measures. They implemented a new development plan, NEP decree, 
and plans for increasing equity participation in the upstream sector. They also 
nationalized several companies within the downstream sector. The emphasis on 
indigenization through employment was replaced with a grander vision. The Third 
Development Plan was created with a clear agenda: 
For the sake of national security, national investment decision, and 
managerial opportunities to enable Nigerians to take effective control of 
the oil industry eventually, it has become mandatory that government 
should be directly involved in the oil industry. To this end, during the plan 
period, government will participate in the three phases of the oil industry, 
namely exploration, refining, and distribution. A National oil corporation 





together with an associated public quoted company will be established for 
this purpose.368 
 
Participation placed Nigerians in direct control of a company’s future investments, salary 
packages, and educational opportunities. With regard to oil, the formation of the NNPC in 
1977 as an operational state oil company assisted this goal. Under Muhammed and 
Obasanjo, the usage of indigenization changed; it was expanded to address not only 
employment, but also business ownership.369  
The second NEP decree was introduced on 29 June 1976, with the same level of 
public ceremony as the first. It was scheduled to go into effect on 13 January 1977 and 
finish what the first decree had started.370 It was viewed as the second phase of Gowon’s 
decree because it built off the small gains from it. The decree retained the two categories 
developed by Gowon in 1971 and added one more in the middle: 
Schedule 2: Included enterprises in which a 60 percent minimum equity 
participation by Nigerians could be achieved.371 
 
Businesses included in the revised Schedule 2 included banks, mining companies, 
the upstream sector of the petroleum industry, fertilizer production, salt production, and 
paper production.372 The list of businesses for each schedule this time around was much 
more specific. To foreign firms, the measure was dramatic. A panel organized by the 
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Nigerian Institute for Management, however, made a strong recommendation to the 
government at the time to increase participation not by 60, but by 80 percent.373 Schedule 
2 and 3 included many capital intensive businesses requiring highly skilled workers, 
which would be transformed in phases. The last two phases were expected to begin 1 
April 1977 and be completed by 31 December 1978.  
Schedule 3 included the largest, most technologically sophisticated industries. BP 
(Nigeria) and Shell-BP both fit in this category. In line with the decree, BP (Nigeria) 
turned over 40 percent to the federal military government. With this decree, the 
government created stipulations for those failing to adhere. The company examined 
closely the proposed changes in the decree and concluded that the decision needed to be 
placed in context:  
There is no doubt that the government is extremely worried about its 1973 
cash flow. Some reports indicate that at a barracks meeting on this subject 
Buhari indicated that there might be more money obtainable from the oil 
companies from participation compensation. According to his story Buhari 
was told to follow it up but not to kill the golden goose in the process.374  
 
Regardless of BP’s insight into the underlying motivations for the decree, it played its 
part and complied. In accordance with Schedule 3, BP (Nigeria) sold 40 percent equity on 
the Lagos Stock Exchange for Nigerian investors to purchase between September and 
December of 1978.375 The price per share of 60 kobo was fixed by the Nigerian Securities 
Exchange Commission (NSEC), which provided each investor with a dividend yield of 
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13.3 percent, earning 34 kobo per share.376 BP considered the price low in comparison to 
previous years where a share yielded 17.7 percent377 BP (Nigeria) received its official 
letter of compliance from the government on 5 January 1979.378 Similarly, Agip 
(Nigeria), also a marketing company, sold 2,680,000 shares at 54 kobo per share.379 
While BP provides an example of a complying company, Nigeria became frustrated and 
demanded that any company defaulting would be taken over completely. In response to 
such threats some companies pulled out of Nigeria all together. IBM, which was liable 
under Schedule 3, withdrew from Nigeria in 1978 after applying for exemption.380 
Overall, like the first decree, the conclusions fell short of expectations.  
 Independent of the second NEP decree, Obasanjo oversaw the transfer of equity 
participation launched by Gowon back in 1974. Since April of that year, the Nigerian 
government had been paying compensation through a series of installments. But, what 
appeared progressive in the era of economic nationalism in 1974 among OPEC members 
did not seem so by three years later. Shell-BP found itself in a difficult situation and faced 
hostility from a financially stretched Nigeria. Gulf had received its compensation within 
the same year the declaration was made and Agip/Phillips had received its in 1976.381 The 
compensation process for Shell-BP completed halted in1978 when the federal military 
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government failed to pay the final installment to make the participation agreement 
complete.382  
The situation was further complicated by the fact that instead of paying the fourth 
installment, the Obasanjo regime wanted to revise the arrangement so that the partnership 
was based on the updated book value (UBV) and no longer the net book value (NBV) as 
had been the original plan. In 1974, Nigeria had based its decision on the Middle Eastern 
oil producers who based compensation on the UBV. Since that time, however, several 
OPEC members had shifted to the NBV. Also, among OPEC members the push for 55 
percent had been replaced with a demand for 60 percent. Instead of completing the 
payments wanted to invoke this ratio in mid-payment. 383 The issue was settled by a 
round of increases in equity participation within the entire upstream sector to 60 percent 
on 1 July 1979 (see Table 8). This arrangement ensured the insertion of the newly formed 
NNPC into the production. This move proved the boldest yet because it was the third 
increase in nine years. It reduced the shares of all the major oil companies to 40 percent 
and in the case of Shell-BP, even less. 
Within the downstream sector, the federal military government, under both 
Gowon and Obasanjo, also made a few changes separate from the NEP decree. In 
September 1971, Nigeria increased its share of the NPRC from 50 percent to 60 percent. 
It did this by taking 5 percent from both Shell (London) and BP (London). By mid-
October of 1978, BP and the NNPC had completed negotiations for the sale of BP’s 
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remaining 20 percent share within the NPRC.384 At the conclusion of the agreement 
Asiodu expressed his frustration with BP during the negotiation process. He described BP 
executives as “extremely difficult to deal with” and BP, in private, recognized that the 
negotiation did not go well.385 Asiodu also expressed plans for 100 percent equity 
participation in NPRC, in perhaps, five years time.386 To be clear, this exchange happened 
before the formal nationalization of BP (Nigeria) and BP’s (London) shares in Shell-BP 
and included no mention of southern Africa. This independent take over of the NPRC 
came from the federal military government’s concern over the dramatic price differences 
for petroleum products throughout the country and, more specifically, the high prices in 
the northern states. Oil experts recommended that the solution to this problem required 
taking over businesses within the downstream sector. 387  
In a related manner, Nigeria also took over entirely Esso, the US-based marketing 
company, in December of 1976. The company was renamed Unipetrol.388 To assist with 
the transfer of operations to local businessmen the federal military government launched 
a one week training program for Unipetrol on the marketing and selling of petroleum 
products.389 It also acquired 60 percent direct participation in the Shell marketing 
company in April 1975. Publicizing this change, several petrol stations bore the name 
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National Oil Marketing Company to represent the new company, NOLCHEM. The 
company was sold to the Nigerian government for N1,986,768.390 The increase in 
participation within the NPRC and Shell’s marketing company as well as the 
nationalization of Esso were not were not part of any particular promotions decree, but 
were additional steps taken in the spirit of the decrees to ensure that all regions of Nigeria 
received regular supplies of petroleum products.391 At the same time Nigeria announced 
the nationalization of Esso, the federal government also stated that “seven other foreign 
oil marketing companies will be fully nationalized by 1980.”392 The take over of BP 
(Nigeria) and BP’s (London) remaining share of Shell-BP followed in a similar manner a 
few years later. 
Oil and Nationalism 
Bringing the journey through Nigeria’s economic policy full circle, we return to 
issues raised at the beginning of this chapter. First, and foremost, a combination of 
development plans and decrees passed by the military government during the 1970s 
illuminates the expansive and inclusive nature of Nigeria’s economic policy. While oil 
played a significant role, it rarely stood alone as the sector to undergo the most profound 
changes. In fact, much of the focus of the Nigerian Enterprise Promotions Decrees 
focused on banks and trading companies. What becomes clear in looking at the various 
phases and schedules proposed is the extent to which oil was integrated into them. 
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Decrees passed that affected foreign oil companies fit into a recognizable and explicitly 
articulated pattern of take overs. In light of these conclusions, the nationalization of BP in 
1979 does not at all seem out of place. The evidence offered in this chapter shows how, in 
this vein, the nationalization of BP is not exceptional. Interestingly, that very point –in 
conjunction with the mystique surrounding the connection of southern Africa– is 
precisely what makes the nationalization of BP within a global context unique.  
Second, while the perspective of economic nationalism illuminated the context in 
which the nationalization of BP fits, it also highlights how nationalism shapes economic 
policy. Most scholars recognize Nigeria as a fractured state along ethnic and religious 
lines; yet, discussions of this issue are often shelved when discussing the 1970s. Is it 
possible that those forms of affiliation and nationalism acquiesced in the arrival of 
government-sponsored economic nationalism? Does this mean that no one segments of 
the population influenced the shaping of Nigeria’s economic policies? Given the 
precarious nature of the federal military government’s revenue allocation schemes, 
development plans, and indigenization decrees, the abandonment of these forms of 
nationalism are unlikely.  
The contemporary conflict in the Nigeria Delta between local villages, upstream 
oil producers, and the state can, in part, be traced back to the 1970s. This case 
exemplifies how ethnic nationalism channeled through the voice of the state influences 
national economic policy. Ethnic nationalism never really disappears, but is reassigned as 
state-wide through both manipulation of the press as well as the simplified tension 
between the local inhabitants and the oil companies. When their demands no longer 
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match those of the federal military government’s, the appearance of the state was shed 
exposing the ethnic underlays. Going against the vision of national unity, ethnic 
campaigns during the late 1970s are disguised or vilified as undermining the federal 
military government and the nation. 
In the heart of the Niger Delta lie Nigeria’s main production fields, from which 
Shell-BP produced the bulk of crude oil. Several ethnic groups, with populations 
typically less than one million, inhabit the area. They complain of political 
marginalization and neglect. Oil production in the region is disturbing the fragile 
ecosystem, on which these groups rely, and providing no economic compensation in the 
form of aid or employment to them. Villagers in the Niger Delta initially directed their 
grievances to the oil companies and pressured the federal military government to take 
over the operations of the foreign oil companies. For example, 200 people of the Ogoni 
ethnic group tried to prevent Shell-BP’s oil workers from laying a pipeline in their village 
in April 1972.393 The protest was described within the context of the Rivers State as 
opposed to the Ogoni; state instead of ethnic. Several newspaper articles expressed the 
hopes of delta residents in the government pressuring the oil companies for compensation 
and structural improvements.394  
These concerns appeared as complaints by states as opposed to one particular 
ethnic group because states used these complaints as a way of pressuring the federal 
military government for funding through the revenue allocation scheme. What these 
complaints illustrate is that ethnic affiliations did not disappear, but were temporarily 
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replaced within public discourse by state affiliation. Fortunately for the federal military 
government these complaints about the flagrant destruction and pollution by oil 
companies in the Niger Delta dovetailed with its nationalist economic policies.395 For the 
most part, these groups remained a peripheral nuisance to the production companies who 
controlled production.  
By the end of the 1970s, however, the situation did not improve and the extent of 
environmental damage was apodictic. The NNPC did not support complaints aimed at oil 
production activities in the Niger Delta and it responded harshly to protests and criticism. 
The nationalization of BP, combined with the increased participation in many oil 
companies, placed the communities and the state in almost direct confrontation. Those 
living within the Niger Delta realized that they had to fight not only the oil companies, 
but also the federal military government. This conclusion marked the end of appeals to 
the national government and the disintegration of nationalist sentiments beyond the 
ethnic. The nationalist vision within the Niger Delta no longer dovetailed with the federal 
government’s plan of maximum oil production with little interference.  
The conflict erupted in the 1990s, when the Ogoni people took their case to 
international pressure groups and directly confronted Nigeria’s military government. It 
became a brutal clash with not only Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), in 
which the Nigerian government held an 80 percent share, but also military forces.396 The 
nationalization of BP placed the government and the local community within direct 
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confrontation. Not because the NNPC ran SPDC, but because the federal military 
government had a vested interest in the production more than ever before. Indeed, one 
can speculate that without the nationalization of BP in 1979, tension within the Niger 
Delta would have turned out differently. The case of the Niger Delta illustrates the 
temporary dominance of economic nationalism through individual states and the eventual 
return of ethnic nationalism by the end of the 1970s. Ethnic nationalism, therefore, never 
disappeared as is the impression given by many secondary sources. Ethnicity-driven 
demands made through state structures influenced, with relative ease, the federal military  
government’s economic policies. When they no longer did, the federal military 
government resorted to punitive measures as illustrated in the 1990s with the Ogoni 
people.  
The perspective of economic nationalism, as illustrated in the case of the Niger 
Delta, reveal how various forms of nationalism influenced economic policy. Economic 
nationalism allowed for a relatively open exchange between businessmen in Nigeria and 
the government with regard to economic policy. This is where the distinction between 
socialism and economic nationalism, as defined in this project, becomes important. These 
technocrats and businessmen did not necessarily want foreign businesses taken over to go 
directly under state ownership and control. Indeed, they pressured the federal military 
government to turn most businesses over to them. Within Nigeria, those who could 
understand and afford to take part in stock markets and the occupation of being a 
shareholder were few. For the most part, it was an elite endeavor. During the 1970s we 
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see the rise of not only union activity, although officially banned, as well as the solidarity 
of business men and global trade theorists. For example, the Nigerian Economic 
Association held regular conferences in Ibadan to discuss ways to improve the economy. 
Similarly, a group comprised of military officers, government officials, and 
businessmen in northern Nigeria is said to have wielded a great deal of influence over the 
federal military government’s economic policies. This group, referred to in the literature 
as the Kaduna Mafia, worked for the “defence and advocacy of Northern interests as well 
as individual business interests.”397 The Kaduna Mafia was seen by concerned observers 
as an “embryonic state class,” emphasizing the political connections of its members with 
the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime.398 Quantifying and assessing the level of influence the 
Kaduna Mafia and Nigerian Economic Association is difficult, but we are left in no doubt 
that economic nationalism was carried out by technocrats and espoused by officials. 
Efforts to influence economic policy became polarized between the North and South, 
with strong religious and ethnic undercurrent. Why are these outside influences 
successful and how do they influence? In the conclusion, we will assess the effectiveness 
of economic nationalism. These groups operated in the absence of legal political parties, 
which were banned until 1979.399 
Economic nationalism as a perspective illuminates several important areas within 
the study of oil in Nigeria. First, it allows us to better understand how and why Nigeria 
nationalized BP. This chapter argues that the fate of BP fits better into the narrative of 
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economic nationalism (in the sense of nationalist economic policy put forward by the 
state) as opposed to the popular narrative involving the UK’s handling of white-minority 
regimes in southern Africa. Second, economic nationalism keeps our attention on 
domestic issues and draws attention to the possibility that nationalism in the form of 
ethnic, religious, or regional influenced the federal government’s nationalist economic 
policies. Within this chapter, ethnic nationalism disguised as state nationalism illustrates 
this point. Placing the nationalization of BP within the context of economic nationalism 
also brings our attention to historical context of the conflict in the Niger Delta. Examples 
of regional and religious influences on the federal military government’s policy are also 
presented to show the complex nature of economic nationalism. After all, no economic 
policies are developed in a political vacuum. In the next chapter we look at the 
nationalization of BP within broad, theoretical discussions about nationalization. The fate 
of BP in Nigeria represented a peculiar style of nationalization in comparison to other oil-
producing countries of its caliber.  
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Chapter 5:  Nationalization of British Petroleum 
The nationalization of oil operations world-wide has generated a great deal of 
interest among scholars of oil and national histories. Within many countries, a 
nationalization exhibited strong undercurrents of socialism, anti-neocolonialism, and 
nationalism. The rate of nationalizations occurring in developing countries during the 
1970s reached unsurpassed levels. Nationalization not only represented the act of 
expropriation of an enterprise for public or private control, but also an era of major 
economic transformation and revolution. In Nigeria’s case, the nationalization of some of 
BP’s operations represented the country’s only attempt at politically-driven expropriation 
in the same vein as many of its OPEC allies. It marked the largest transfer of control 
within the downstream and upstream sectors. Within Shell-BP alone, Nigeria claimed an 
80 percent share, making the NNPC a partner in the production of Nigeria’s largest oil 
fields. Since this nationalization, Nigeria’s oil industry has changed very little.  
In this chapter, the nationalization of BP is placed within theoretical discussions 
on it as well as in comparison to other major oil-exporting countries. We look at the 
origins of nationalization as well as the assumptions and meaning applied to it. This 
chapter also finishes the narrative on nationalization started in earlier chapters, providing 
detail on events from July 1979. The argument laid out in this chapter is that within a 
global context, the case of BP and the vein in which the nationalization was enacted is 
exceptional. It calls for a reconceptualization of the term and its level of descriptive 
ability. I put forward the idea of deceptive nationalization. This chapter also highlights 
two other important points that help situate the nationalization to better understand it. 
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First, Nigeria expressed no intention of “kicking out” BP from its entire oil industry. 
Indeed, BP is still very much an integral player in not only oil, but also natural gas. A 
second, related point is that Nigeria nationalized only select aspects of BP’s assets. These 
peculiarities are underscored by the declaration made by Marinho on 31 July 1979, which 
described the take over as a 100 percent increase in participation in Shell-BP and BP 
(Nigeria).400 Why did he not use the term nationalization? What is the distinction 
Marinho was trying to make? 
 
Nationalization: Theory and Practice 
The term nationalization has been a slippery concept for scholars. Definitions for 
the term, and others associated with it, have only recently been formulated. The term also 
carries with it several negative associations as it has been largely carried out in 
developing countries as a perceived gesture of rebellion and punishment initiated by 
greedy authoritarian rulers. For many scholars, J. Frederick Truitt’s 1974 book, 
Expropriation of Private Investment, offered the first concrete definition of 
nationalization. He writes that nationalization typically “signifies pursuance of some 
national political program intended to create out of existing enterprises, or to strengthen, 
a nationally controlled industry.”401 This project builds on that definition, but with more 
specificity, and adheres to the idea that nationalization refers to broad economic policies 
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in which a foreign company’s assets and operations are partially or completely 
transferred, by force, to state or local business persons.  
In addition to the term nationalization, scholars have used other related terms in 
conjunction with or in place of it. They include expropriation, indigenization, and 
participation. All of these terms indicate, generally, the same process of transferring 
foreign corporate activities to indigenous hands. They differ only in where the emphasis 
is placed by primarily the participants, and secondly, the outside observers on how it 
transpired. With the exception of Mexico, the terms used in place of nationalization were 
deliberately chosen to shape the political climate. Many countries, such as Nigeria, knew 
the term nationalization, but avoided using it. Truitt sees nationalization as an umbrella 
term, under which fall expropriation and confiscation. While addressing nationalization, 
Truitt focuses his attention more on expropriation. He explains the difference:  
Generally narrower in scope and intent than the concept of nationalization, 
but the two do not differ in legal nature. Expropriation often refers to a 
singular case of a state taking property, a nationalization usually entails a 
number of individual expropriations. Expropriation may be an oscillate or 
even arbitrary act of government.402 
 
The term expropriation was first applied to Mexico’s nationalization of US and British 
interests in 1938.403 As indicated by Truitt’s definition above, expropriation does not 
differ greatly from nationalization. It does, however, carry the added meaning of taking 
without compensation in a hasty manner. From the transnational oil company’s 
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perspective it is seen almost as theft, which reflected the foreign oil firms’ perspective. In 
the case of Mexico, the declaration of nationalization was followed by a tense legal battle 
involving not only the transnational oil companies, but also the governments over 
compensation. Mexico did not originally intend to pay financial compensation and the 
transnational companies insisted on it. The case of Mexico set legal precedence for 
required compensation payment that would be agreed upon by both parties as part of the 
nationalization process. Thus, expropriation tends to refer to a relatively unanticipated 
transfer of operations with minimal negotiation involved. 
Like expropriation, indigenization is another term that is related to, and 
encompasses much the same meaning as, nationalization. Within discussions on Nigeria, 
particularly, the term indigenization appears more often than nationalization. Scholars 
adhere to this usage to highlight the placement of foreign activities in local, indigenous 
hands. Biersteker writes exclusively about indigenization when discussing Nigeria’s 
policy of transferring control of multinational companies to public and private ownership. 
For him, nationalization is a restrictive term because it is “a form of indigenization in 
which only the state, rather than the state and private individuals in the local business 
sector,” is involved.404 What he has done is taken the popular language applied to the 
NEP decrees in the 1970s and extended it to all decrees of this nature, including those 
passed in the 1960s not bearing that term. As discussed in previous chapters, 
indigenization was most used in public conversations in reference to employment. 
Nigeria’s decision to use indigenization over nationalization reflects its desire to temper 
its activities and mollify the transnational oil companies. 
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Finally, behind closed doors, discussions between states and transnational oil 
companies almost exclusively include the term participation and its two forms of direct 
participation and equity participation. Throughout this project these terms are used to 
highlight the true ambitions of Nigeria’s federal military government. While the outcome 
of participation does not differ from nationalization or expropriation, the focus of the 
process does. Participation, as indicated in previous chapters, emphasizes the incremental 
transfer of activities from a transnational company to a local, private one to a state one. 
Within the secondary literature, participation rarely used because it lacks political a 
provocative political agenda and, as a result, lacks popular recognition. 
Differentiating between participation, expropriation, and nationalization, however, 
only scratch the surface because they largely describe the strictly legal and corporate 
definitions of these transfer processes. In search of a more descriptive term Kobrin uses 
the phrase “forced divestment,” emphasizing the experience from the transnational 
company’s perspective.405 Overall, terms available thus far give no indication of the 
context and offer no clear indication of the historical significance for the country that 
chose to take such a monumental step. What are lacking within the discourse on 
nationalization are terms that address motivation, context, and symbolism; terms that are 
descriptive.  
Questions on the nationalization should center not only on the legal characteristics 
of nationalization, but also from what tension did it emerge. Also, what is the relationship 
between nationalization and development or nationalization and authoritarian leadership? 
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What comparisons can we draw between countries and their experiences with 
nationalization?  For the most part, nationalization (and terms derived from it) come out 
of specific cases. Developing countries that took over the activities of transnational oil 
companies during the 1960s, for the most part, defined nationalization. Yet, with such 
regional and political distinctions between developing countries, the term is only a 
skeleton. The context and motivation in which one country nationalized may bare little 
resemblance to another. Well documented cases such as those of Mexico, Libya, and Iran 
can be identified as derivative nationalizations, because the tension and context are easily 
traceable. For the most part, the public reasons stated do not drastically differ from those 
given in private. Nigeria and BP, however, is a slightly different case. Its nationalization 
is best described as deceptive nationalization because in public southern Africa was 
presented as the reason, while evidence strongly indicates that economic nationalism was 
the actual impetus for it. In this way, Nigeria’s federal military government deliberately 
deceived the international community. Undoubtedly, more forms of nationalization exist. 
But they will always be linked together by the common origin of nationalization as an 
economic concept that surfaced in the late 19th century.  
 
Origins of Nationalization 
The concept of a state mandating a take over of a private company’s assets and 
operations does not belong exclusively to the mid-20th century. The emergence of 
nationalization coincides with the rise of the nation-state and the dilemmas posed by the 
Industrial Revolution. The lucrative entrepreneurial activity conducted by businessmen 
with little or no ties to the state threatened the financial and political control of the state. 
Nationalization served as the perfect solution. Samuel Freidman references 19th century 
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French Civil Code as among the first examples of nationalization. An article within the 
legal code states that “no one is compelled to give up his property unless it is for public 
use…” indicating that the state reserved the right to confiscate strategic land and business 
activities at anytime.406 Nationalization served as a method of enforcing boundaries, 
preserving state control over the created nation-state, and suppressing any form of 
affiliation (ethnic or otherwise) that would threaten the power of the state. 
Nationalization is also associated with the Enlightenment and Industrial 
Revolution in Europe. The rise of manufacturing and transnational corporations created 
demand for a large labor force. The conditions under which workers toiled revealed the 
negative side of this revolution. Long hours, health perils, unsanitary conditions, and 
meager wages contributed to the rise of a discontented labor force, for which Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels sympathized and offered a solution. Together in Germany they 
developed theories about the economy and rallied for the liberation of the working class 
within the burgeoning industrial societies across Western Europe. Crossing over into 
ideas most associated with the Enlightenment, Marx and Engels addressed issues of 
equality and nationalism. They wrote about the welfare of the individual and the living 
conditions of the working class, emphasizing the need for solidarity (nationalism) and 
protection within a worker-oriented state. To break away from capitalism and move 
toward socialism, a workers’ revolution, whereby the state embodied the workers’ vision 
and met their needs, would have to take place. Nationalization represented a step in this 
process. The ideas of communal ownership, contribution, and equality discussed at the 
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turn of the century became the cornerstone principles behind nationalization and the 
expansion of state-run industries. 
While European governments did not necessarily accept the socialist ideas of 
Marx and Engels en total, they certainly saw the value in state-owned industries and the 
improvement of working conditions and worker welfare as a concern for national 
security. European governments in the late 19th century and early 20th century saw the 
value of moving toward state control over key industries. The history of BP is an 
excellent example of national security culminating into a government crossing over into 
global business. BP began in the late 19th century as an independent petroleum company. 
In 1914, the UK purchased roughly 40 percent of the company’s shares to ensure that oil 
supplies for the Royal Navy would never diminish. Other state-sponsored take overs 
included public works, with the idea of making many basic amenities such as water, 
railroads, and sanitation available to everyone. Collectively, these take overs contributed 
to nation-building, social welfare, and equality. European countries, for the most part, 
borrowed ideas from Marx and Engels such as nationalization but never became socialist 
states. But, socialist theory developed by Marx and Engels neither addressed the situation 
outside of Western Europe, nor did it provide a blueprint for operating as a socialist state. 




Nationalization and Nationalism 
Within Africa, socialism became the foundation for anti-colonial movements and 
nation-building strategies. It became ensconced in theories of nationalism outside of 
Europe, which either moved beyond the scope of Marx’s and Engel’s work or 
contradicted it. For example, neither Marx nor Engel’s developed in any detail their 
views on resistance to European imperialism that occurred in places such as Africa. In 
fact, Marx and Engels held the cultural bias against Africans that was so prevalent in 
Europe at the time. Engels is said to have responded positively to French imperialism in 
Algeria, agreeing on the need to spread European civilization. Also, Marx and Engels saw 
nationalism as a bourgeois project, designed to lock internal markets within a capitalist, 
exploitative structure in their favor.407 Instead, Marx and Engels only dealt with 
proletariat internationalism as far as it concerned workers within Europe. They saw 
ethnicity and religion as irrational aspects of society and counter-revolutionary.408 Despite 
these limitations, socialist theory still appealed to nationalist leaders outside of Western 
Europe. 
Leaders from developing countries drew some of their inspiration from the 
writings of Vladimir Lenin in Russia, who attempted to draw a connection between 
Marxism (socialism) and nationalism. He concluded that exercising the collective rights 
was essential to the revolution as a way of ensuring that it would happen in 1917; 
however, he did not condone any particular ethnic group within Russia from claiming 
sovereignty after the revolution. Many leaders outside Russia, particularly within Africa, 
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adopted Lenin’s views, creating a liberation ideology against colonial rule based on the 
fusing of socialism and nationalism. Components of the basic ideology were upheld and 
ignored by these leaders as they saw fit. For example, few leaders espousing notions of 
total social and economic equality also campaigned for their own removal from power as 
authoritarian rulers. Many leaders such as Gowon and Obasanjo did not campaign for 
complete socialism, but state control over the most socially important and economically 
valued enterprises. This vision also included the transfer of businesses and jobs from 
expatriate firms and individuals to Nigerians ones. In both cases, nationalization was at 
the forefront of a country’s economic policies. For these reasons, nationalization has been 
strongly associated with socialist movements throughout the developing world. 
 Socialism appealed to anti-colonial activists during the 20th century because it 
offered a compelling solution to the question of how to not only become politically 
independent, but also economically. The adoption of socialism meant the abandonment of 
capitalism, which was at the core of European imperialism. Many African visionaries saw 
socialism as a way of preventing the continuation or later return of colonial domination. 
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Amílcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau are most known for 
adopting socialism into their anti-colonial struggles. They hoped to extricate their 
countries from the global capitalist system, within which Europe held the dominant 
center position. Socialism also appealed to newly independent African countries because 
it recalled a semi-mythical past in which African societies lived as socialist nations. Many 
African intellectuals alleged that prior to colonial rule Africans lived contently within 
strong communities that distributed wealth and labor equally. Thus, African nations 
needed only to tap into this way of life, creating a unique form of African socialism that 
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facilitated the blending tradition into a modern state structure.409 Finally, these 
developing countries saw successful examples of public companies operating in Europe.  
The popularity of nationalist economic policies, which fuse socialism and 
nationalism together, emerges primarily after World War II. Truitt describes 
nationalization (he uses the term expropriation) as being linked with the “historical forces 
of the 20th century,” which included rapid industrialization, socialism, and economic 
development to name a few.410 At the height of the Cold War, Western countries became 
particularly sensitive to actions that in any way replicated those done by the Soviet 
Union. This included the socialist revolution and complete nationalization of all 
industries, foreign and indigenous, that took place in 1917. Fear of these actions 
spreading among developing countries resulted in the vilification of such endeavors. The 
term socialization came to be used as a way to describe the act of transforming all, or 
nearly all, private property into public as part of a political and economic ideology.411 
Nationalization was considered part and parcel of this “radical” politicking and 
experimental economic vision in the developing world. 
Scholars from outside a country commenting on nationalization, especially in the 
1970s, tended to associate political instability with nationalization. And, the more 
unstable a country was politically, the more likely it was to engage in “extreme” policies 
such as nationalization. Further, they attributed the decision to only an authoritarian 
leader and not to intellectual pressure groups or cabinet advisors. What accounts for this 
conclusion? The basis for the linkage between “radical” politics and nationalization 
                                                 
409 Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path, 438-45. 
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comes from it often coinciding with a regime change, whereby a new economic 
philosophy replaces the previous one. In the case of Nigeria during the 1970s, the new 
regime proposed more aggressive reform than the one preceding it. The fate of BP in 
Nigeria certainly fits this idea. But, not all nationalizations should be characterized this 
way. Recent scholarship emphasizes the role of pressure groups with a developing 
country at the time of nationalization. In the case of Mexico, the nationalization of 1938 
occurred, in large part, because of pressure from oil workers on the government.412 Also, 
Forrest highlights the pressure placed on the military leaders in Nigeria by the intellectual 
community. The Nigerian Economic Society, for example, called on Obasanjo to mandate 
sweeping reforms favoring the replacement of foreign investors with Nigerian ones.413 
Radical politics and regime changes only provide a partial answer to why nationalizations 
took place. 
Similarly, nationalization is viewed as the outcome of ethnic nationalism that 
crept into economic policy, as if it contagious and emotion-driven. The view also takes 
the cross over of nationalism and economic policy as an exception to the general 
acceptance that “irrational” nationalist sentiment and “rational” economic policy 
normally run on separate, parallel planes. Believing that strong emotions exist only for a 
short period of time, some scholars did not recognize nationalization as a calculated, 
long-term policy. In the case of Algeria, nationalization of the upstream sector had been 
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considered a long-term goal nearly a decade prior to the actual nationalization in 1971.414 
One scholar addressed the need for revising this attitude in 1980, when he emphasized 
that we should see nationalization as a “policy instrument utilized to achieve relatively 
long-run political and economic objectives.”415 Indeed, nationalization represents a 
dramatic departure from the modernization promoted by the West to developing countries 
during the 1960s. 
Modernization theory dominated discussions on how to development African 
nations until the 1970s. It called for the three basic focal points to ensure economic 
success: the institution of a free market economy (effectively ruling out socialism as a 
viable option); establishment of industry; creation of political, social, religious, and legal 
institutions to facilitate the modernization of people’s minds.416 Proponents of this theory, 
often described as neoclassicalists, saw nationalization as “political interference,” which 
prevented benevolent foreign investors from carrying out their economic goodwill.417 The 
dominant conclusion about the rise of nationalization within developing countries is that 
it happened because of these countries becoming frustrated with the slow pace of long-
term economic growth just before the oil boom. Several scholars saw nationalization 
projects as a way of accelerating the pace of economic development.418  
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Nationalization, however, does not mean the abandonment of capitalism and 
complete shunning of Western, foreign investors and governments. In the case of Nigeria, 
scholars identify Gowon as maintaining a positive economic relationship with the UK 
and promoting capitalism. One can argue that the nationalization does not need to be 
always linked to socialism and radical politicking. Outside the realm of economic policy, 
most scholars agree that countries such as Nigeria often attempted to replicate Western 
politics, culture, and education standards. What, then, is the global appeal to having state-
owned companies and why is nationalization most associated with developing countries? 
Several reasons can be identified for wanting key industries under the control of a 
state institution, especially in developing countries. For all countries, the appeal includes 
a desire for the government to generate and collect revenue from a reliable and lucrative 
source in a simple manner. Within developing countries that lack sound infrastructure, a 
public company serves as a way to ensure revenue without relying on weak methods of 
revenue collection such as taxation. States also want control over certain aspects deemed 
necessary to everyone, which vary from country to country, in order to reduce the cost 
and make available nationwide. In most cases, these aspects include telecommunications, 
electricity, water, and transportation. For Nigeria, petroleum products were viewed as 
essential to raising the standard of living nationwide and the cornerstone of Nigeria’s 
economy, which necessitated state control. These were also the reasons that Nigeria chose 
to heavily subsidize the cost of petroleum products within the country. Many countries 
also view state control over industries considered “dangerous to public health, safety, or 
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national security” as essential.419 Developing countries also held additional interests in 
nationalization. 
Many developing countries, carrying the experience of colonialism, into their 
development projects, looked for alternative economic systems to set themselves apart 
from their former colonial rulers. Thus, these countries tended to exhibit a “philosophical 
predisposition” to nationalization.420 Some saw nationalization as an immediate, but long-
term, solution to their economic problems. The logic being that the state would inherit a 
well-run, profitable industry, which would create a direct line to large amounts of 
revenue. The money would be used for development projects and training programs for 
local citizens. How these countries chose to execute these takeovers varied from country 
to country. Did they couch nationalization into broad development plans or did they 
mandate nationalization with great fanfare and anti-Western propaganda?  
The nationalization of oil companies has attracted a great deal of scholarly 
attention and has produced a wide range of conclusions. In his study of expropriation in 
developing countries, Michael Minor highlights that oil represented the second most 
likely sector to be nationalized between 1970 and 1985. He mentioned that 20 to 28 
percent of all nationalizations occurring in the oil sector, with the majority of them 
happening between 1970 and 1980.421 For countries such as Nigeria, oil represented the 
single most lucrative industry (see Table 10). The global oil industry represents one of the 
most diverse and complex areas to study nationalization. While the outcome is largely the 
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same, the methods of and reasons for nationalization varied a great deal. Let us look at 
Nigeria’s nationalization of BP before drawing global comparisons. 
 
Company   Production (thousand bbl/d) 
Shell-BP/NNPC   1,083.7 
Gulf/NNPC    261.7 
Mobil/NNPC    199.6 
Agip-Phillips/NNPC   223.8 
Elf/NNPC    77.3 
Texaco/NNPC    43.0 
Ashland/NNPC   8.8 
Pan Ocean    9.7 
Tenneco-Mobil-Sunray  1.5 
Table 9: Oil Production in Nigeria (1978)422 
 
Crude Type*  Estimated Supply  Price ($ per bbl) 
Medium  150,000   22.02 
Forcados  550,000   23.12 
Pennington  50,000    23.39 
Escravos  350,000   23.39 
Bonny   525,000   23.49 
Qua Ibo  250,000   23.50 
Brass River  225,000   23.52 
Table 10: Crude Oil Prices (1979)423 
 
                                                 
422 EIU, Quarterly Economic Review –Nigeria, Second Quarter (London: EIU, 1979), 19. 
423 EIU, Quarterly Economic Review –Nigeria, no. 4 (London: EIU, 1979), 18. *The crude types are 
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The Nationalization of British Petroleum 
During the 1970s, Nigeria had become one of the world’s largest producers of oil 
in the world. Crude oil production existed largely along the coast, in south eastern 
Nigeria. Several oil companies took part in the upstream sector, including the French 
company Elf, Shell-BP, Gulf Oil, Mobil, and several others. By the mid-1970s they all 
operated through joint-venture agreements with the state-owned NNPC as listed in Table 
9. Within Shell-BP, the NNPC held 60 percent and Shell and BP held 20 percent each by 
1 July 1979. Shell-BP not only produced the majority of Nigeria’s crude oil, but also the 
crude oil of the highest quality (see Table 10). Crude oil from Shell-BP’s fields 
consistently attracted the highest prices. At the time of nationalization, Shell-BP 
generated an annual profit of N4.39 million.424 BP’s (Nigeria) marketing operations also 
included overseeing petrol stations bearing the BP trade name and BP (London) 
participated in the running of the Port Harcourt refinery. Overall, BP’s participation in 
Nigeria’s oil industry changed substantially during the 1970s –much in line with the other 
major oil companies.  
During the summer of 1979, Nigeria became concerned with the routes and ports-
of-call pertaining to tankers hired by BP to ship Nigeria’s oil. On the one hand, Nigeria 
appeared set on catching BP in violation of its 1971 ban on any relations with South 
Africa. On the other, when Nigeria caught BP it publicized the affair, but allowed BP to 
continue its operations without repercussions. On 1 July 1979, all of the major producing 
companies operating in Nigeria underwent another raise to 60 percent in the NNPC’s 
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participation. In the case of Shell-BP, this left BP with only 20 percent. On 30 July 1979, 
F. Marinho called the managing director of BP (Nigeria) to say that starting at midnight 
the Nigerian government would “increase its participation to 100%” in Shell-BP and BP  
(Nigeria).425 Until fully taken over, a military administrator was appointed to run the 
company and the transfer of ownership would be completed by 31 August 1979. At the 
time, BP’s involvement in Nigeria included:  
1. A 50 percent share in Shell-BP, through which BP held a 20 
percent interest in the concessions. This arrangement provided BP 
with 230,000 barrels per day of crude.  
2. 60 percent shareholding in BP Nigeria, the marketing company; 
3. A processing deal with NNPC (in association with Total); 
4. Participation in a LNG scheme; 
5. A relationship with NPRC, the Port Harcourt refinery.426 
 
The nationalization proposed in 1979 only applied to BP’s (London) share of Shell-BP 
and BP (Nigeria), of which the government already had a sizable share. BP’s (London) 
activities in liquefied natural gas (LNG) project,427 which was still in the early planning 
stages, was not affected. Nor was its participation in the Port Harcourt refinery. Marinho 
assured BP that the action taken in 1979 should not be considered as Nigeria as having 
“locked the door and thrown away the key.”428  
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In accordance with international law and established protocol, compensation was 
determined through negotiations between BP and the Nigerian government. On 1 August 
1979, Nigeria appointed ‘Tunji Olutola, formerly a member of the cabinet office, to take 
over as chief executive of BP (Nigeria).429 The shares were also effectively transferred to 
the federal military government on that day. Additionally, all employees of BP not hired 
by the NNPC were required to leave the country on or before 21 August.430 The transfer 
of operation and control of BP (Nigeria) and BP’s (London) share in Shell-BP was 
completed by the end of the month. BP’s (Nigeria) operations were replaced by those of 
the state-controlled African Petroleum (AP) and BP’s (London) shares in Shell-BP were 
taken over by the NNPC. Shell remained in the company as the primary provider of 
managerial expertise and skilled labor. 
 
The Formation of the SPDC and African Petroleum 
With the withdrawal of select BP activities, the two companies needed 
restructuring. By the end of August, it became clear to BP that any prospect of persuading 
the Nigerian government to reverse its decision had past. The UK saw Shagari’s tenuous 
hold as president since October 1979 as the main reason that denationalization would not 
take place. The High Commission in Lagos wrote to the Foreign Office that, 
the initial stages of Shagari’s presidency seem likely to be overshadowed 
by the controversial means by which he was elected and the position must 
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be somewhat delicate. It therefore seems unlikely that he would be 
prepared to take the risk of reversing the decision, a decision which on the 
whole is intensely popular here.431 
 
BP attempted to achieve sufficient compensation both for its exploration and marketing 
interests. The process of settling the transfer of shares and altering the company’s identity 
and administrative staff took several months, partly because BP waited for 
denationalization. Two months prior to nationalization, BP (London) operated as usual 
lifting its share of crude oil and processing it. BP (London) ceased its financial activities 
in August while waiting for the outcome of the compensation issue, leaving payment to 
Shell-BP unpaid. This placed Shell under pressure to pay the NNPC as the “designated 
purchaser.”432 The primary focus for BP (London) was to get their claim to the 230,000 
bbl/d of crude to fulfill a long term purchase agreement already made. BP (London) 
wanted compensation in the form of fair cash value or a fair supply of crude at a 
discounted price. Also, the company hoped to set a price of $600 million for its interests 
in Shell-BP, which included the loss of future earnings over the life of the concessions 
and associated losses from the loss of direct access to Nigerian crude.433  
BP’s (London) portion of Shell-BP would be compensated based on the 
internationally accepted practice of the net-book value of the fixed assets, estimated at 
around ₤73.2 million.434 The federal government also calculated BP’s (London) 
outstanding debt, totaling around N62 million, for the undervaluation of buy-back and 
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option crude between October 1973 and March 1974 (the period of the Arab oil 
embargo).435 BP (London) responded by stating that the nature of the nationalization, as 
laid out by the UN Resolution of 1962, called for the compensation based on the concept 
of “appropriate compensation.” Additionally, BP (London) offered to continue in other 
aspects of Nigeria’s oil industry, emphasizing technical support. After a series of 
negotiations over compensation, Nigeria paid N71 million worth of crude oil to the 
British government.436 By October 1979 the issue was settled and Shell-BP became Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), which is still in operation today.437  
With SPDC up and operating, BP and Nigeria turned their attention to settling the 
transfer of BP (Nigeria) into the newly formed African Petroleum (AP).438 The NNPC 
agreed to compensate BP (Nigeria) based its stock value. BP came up with its own 
figures for BP (Nigeria) at N13.86 million.439 AP acquired 9 million shares and became a 
subsidiary of the NNPC. At the time of nationalization, BP (Nigeria) recorded a net profit 
of N7.45 million. Once in full-operation, AP moved into other areas of the economy, 
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including the processing of gari in Kaduna.440 Although the transfer from BP (Nigeria) to 
AP was completed within a few months, Nigerian officials selected a trademark logo that 
would always remind people of the nationalization. A description of the transfer from BP 
(Nigeria) to AP stated: 
An extraordinary meeting of BP Nigeria was held on November 15, 1979 
to approve the change of name to African Petroleum. The new logo 
consists of the letters AP in a pointed oval shield backed by a semi-erect 
lance. Green and yellow have been retained as the house colours.441 
 
The selection of a logo that closely resembled that of BP highlights the symbolic value of 
the nationalization. When Nigeria replaced Shell’s marketing company in Nigeria with 
NOLCHEM and Esso’s with Unipetrol, no attempt was made to create that same sort of 
nationalist symbol. As shown in Illustration 4, the similarity in logos is unmistakable.  
The formation of AP represented a bold and unique piece of Nigeria’s political 
and economic history. Keeping AP on the cutting edge as a symbol of progress has been 
important for the NNPC. The company remained within the direct fold of the state-owned 
NNPC until 1998 when the company was among the first to be privatized. Within the past 
decade, AP has worked closely, in a technical capacity, with BP (South Africa) based in 
Cape Town, South Africa.442 Although archival materials at this time are limited to pre-
1977, the re-acquaintance of a BP affiliate to Nigeria’s markets, suggests that perhaps a 
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linkage always remained. Indeed, this confirms that Nigeria took BP’s offer of technical 
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Nigeria and Global Nationalization 
In comparison to other oil-rich developing countries of similar production and 
export caliber, several peculiarities surrounding BP’s nationalization can be identified. 
Even within Nigeria’s oil history, the nationalization of BP has its own distinctive 
qualities. First, Nigeria did not link the nationalization to the reasons most commonly 
stated by other countries. Second, Nigeria singled out a specific company to nationalize 
instead of implemented a unilateral nationalization as other countries had done. Third, the 
nationalization as well as the formation of a national oil company occurred later than 
most other countries in Nigeria’s situation. Before addressing these points of difference, 
let us look at the basic features that have united Nigeria to other oil-rich developing 
countries. These include historical context, economic situation, and relationship with the 
same set of major transnational oil companies.  
Almost all oil producing countries share the historical experience of being 
subjugated under European imperialist designs. Regardless of the technical status of 
mandate, protectorate, or colony, these countries faced systematic exploitation, social 
humiliation, and forced political subservience. Indeed, the boundaries that demarcate 
many of these states were set by European powers. For many countries, strong alliances 
formed transcended state boundaries.  
Shared cultural and historical experiences included and excluded other states for a 
country. Libya, like Nigeria, maintained a list of prohibited countries with which it 
refused to associate based on its expression of solidarity with its Arab friends in the 
Middle East against the establishment of Israel. No person connected to Libya could also 
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be connected to Israel. Libya shared a so-called “Blacklist,” which included several 
employees of BP. Libya expelled some BP employees on grounds of having financial 
and/or political dealings with Israel.444 Nigeria maintained similar bans to show solidarity 
with black Africa against the white-minority regimes in southern Africa. These bonds 
also moved beyond the political into the economic realm. The decolonization process, 
many argue, continued well after formal independence was achieved. Algeria’s leadership 
grumbled over its confinement as a neo-colonial country under the thumb of French 
paternalism long after independence.445 Among African countries, especially, Algeria was 
not alone in expressing this frustration.  
Like Nigeria, oil-rich developing countries all over the world struggled to reduce 
their reliance on their former colonizers or other foreign influences. They struggled to 
take an arbitrary state creation and turn it into a functioning nation-state. Nation-building 
to become a nation-state became an endless exercise in catching up to the demands of 
being a modern state. Almost all of these countries started independence with little vision 
for the country beyond the anti-colonial campaigns. Short-sighted military leadership 
became commonplace. These characteristics also carried over into the continuance of 
mono-crop economies without sufficient long-term planning for sustainable growth. 
Modernization theory, crafted by the West, offered little assistance with the legacies of 
colonial rule. Economic instability fueled the unfortunate cycle of unstable governments, 
in which heads-of-state pooled their country’s financial and political resources into 
maintaining power and security. In the case of Libya, Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi 
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came into power through a military coup in September 1969 and still remains the de facto 
chief of state today. Many of these leaders benefited from the fortunate timing of the oil 
boom of the mid-1970s, which boosted their popularity and spending capabilities. 
Conspicuous investment on stadiums and conference centers were among the most 
criticized ways of spending the money. Oil became the cornerstone of economic 
development and nationalization a crucial part of this vision.  
The tension between host governments and major transnational oil companies has 
been well documented. In almost every oil-rich developing country, the three largest oil 
companies in the world have operated in a variety of capacities within the upstream and 
downstream sectors. As in the case of Nigeria, production of crude oil was largely an 
export industry. These industries, especially in the Middle East, represented isolated 
enclaves of foreign activity. In Iran, for example, foreign oil workers lived and socialized 
together rarely leaving the corporate compounds. Developing countries complained that 
they received marginal returns from this industry, while the oil companies made 
exorbitant profits.  
Allegations of oil companies manipulating production levels and violating the 
erratically enforced labor and trade laws filled public discussions within each country. 
People also expressed frustration over uneven marketing of petroleum products 
throughout the country that favored coastal urban centers and heavy importing of 
petroleum products extracted in crude form from their own country’s reserves. For 
Nigerians living in the Niger Delta, human displacement and environmental destruction 
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were particularly poignant problems. Through the formation of OPEC many of these 
complaints, especially regarding economic benefits, became formalized into collective 
action. Working together, OPEC members and those in support of the organization placed 
pressure on oil companies to increase their participation, employ indigenous workers, and 
increase the posted price.  
One of the most common ways to ease the tension and prepare their citizens for 
greater participation within the oil industry included the establishment of oil-related 
training programs and scholarships to send students to overseas petroleum engineering 
programs. Without establishing a well-trained labor pool, nationalization projects were 
certain to fail. The two founders of OPEC, for example, received education and/or 
training within the United States. Saudi Arabia’s Abdullah Tariki studied petroleum 
engineering at the University of Texas at Austin. Solutions such as these, however, only 
marginally subdued the pressing need for greater control over their oil industry for 
developing countries. 
When it came time, of which was specific to each country, to nationalize, the 
similarities of which these countries shared dissipated. Countries within Latin America 
and the Middle East, which nationalized before the nationalist period of the 1970s, 
established the definition of nationalization. The features that observers came to 
recognize as part of nationalization included the declaration begin publicly celebrated and 
full of emotion, while also grounded in logical economic planning. The desire to control 
their oil resources and end the frustration of feeling like a neocolonial state escaped no 
one’s attention. Revealing solidarity over the collective quest initiated by OPEC members 
to increase the posted price and control the global oil market became the focus of 
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nationalization. This form of nationalization is considered derivative nationalization 
because the reasoning was stated publicly and relayed in the same manner within the 
secondary literature. The case of Libya, Iraq, and Algeria fall into this category. Nigeria’s 
nationalization of BP, however, proves an exception to the rule. Instead of declaring the 
action as part of the economic nationalism project, Nigeria attributed it to events 
unfolding in southern Africa. It also maintained an aura of mystery surrounding the 
nationalization of BP deliberately, which illustrates the duplicitous manner in which 
Nigerian diplomacy often operated, especially under the leadership of Obasanjo. This 
case can be described as deceptive nationalization to highlight the deceiving nature in 
which it was conducted. The compelling evidence for this lies in the careful selection of 
language applied during the nationalization of BP. 
In his declaration, Marinho emphasized to BP that it was to undergo an increase in 
“100% participation,” and not nationalization.446 The newspapers in Nigeria, repeating 
the official press release, also described BP’s fate as part of a participation project. The 
Daily Times in Lagos declared “Nigeria Takes Over BP Shares.”447 The newspapers also 
made the clarification that BP (Nigeria) marketing company and BP’s shares in Shell-BP 
were being expropriated. In making a distinction between terms, the NNPC hoped to 
clarify its motivation and political stance without explicitly saying so. It reveals that the 
term nationalization, as a dramatic and politically charged measure, was universally 
understood. The NNPC wanted to avoid sending the wrong message to BP. One 
exception is the bold reporting of the Niger Delta, in which the take-over was celebrated 
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and struck a strong political chord. On 17 August 1979, the Nigerian Tide based in Port 
Harcourt declared BP as having been nationalized.448 When nationalizations occurred in 
other countries, such as Libya, the Nigerian government and press did not hesitate to 
label them as nationalization. The transformation of labeling the take over as outright 
nationalization does not appear within government publications and newspaper within 
Nigeria until the compensation and transfer of control were complete in the early 1980s. 
Some scholars looking back at nationalizations in developing countries have made 
the argument that these acts reflect as much, if not less, economic policy than political 
maneuvering. For example, Laura Randall argues that the nationalization of foreign oil 
production companies in Venezuela had a strong political component to it; although the 
specifics were not identified.449 Several contributors to an edited volume on Mexico’s 
experience with nationalization in 1938 highlights two culminating factors. The first 
being the state’s support for the unionized oil workers that launched a series of protests 
starting in 1934, which conveyed sentiments against President Lázaro Cádenas and 
threatened his position of power.450 In both the case of Venezuela and Mexico, economic 
interests played the dominant role in the nationalizations. Behind every economic policy 
are political considerations regardless of the form of government. Cases such as these still 
reflect economic nationalism and an alignment between action and words. 
Nigeria also set itself apart from most other cases of nationalization by singling 
out select operations by BP as opposed to passing a unilateral decree declaring the 
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nationalization of all crude oil and natural gas activities. For Nigeria, focusing on BP 
displayed a strategic plan for increasing participation without major disruption within the 
industry. In the case of Shell-BP, Nigeria had the opportunity of increasing its equity 
participation through nationalizing only BP (London) without increasing government 
expenditure and responsibility in such as major operation. Nationalizing Shell’s 40 
percent was not an option because the NNPC would inherit the managerial side of Shell-
BP, which Nigeria claimed it was not ready to do. By replacing BP’s portion of Shell-BP, 
Nigeria invested the least amount of effort and capital for the most amount of return. 
Nigeria also did not “kill the golden goose” in the process by nationalizing new 
and technologically advanced ventures such as BP’s experimentation with a LNG 
industry. Algeria was one of the few others that singled out companies. Algeria declared a 
unilateral nationalization of all oil and gas operations in February 1971. All aspects of 
those industries were transferred to SONATRACH, the national oil company, except 
Getty Petroleum and El Paso Natural Gas. Algeria decided to exempt Getty because of a 
favorable participation agreement implemented in 1969 and El Paso because it worked 
with SONATRACH in the new area of LNG.451 Algeria and Nigeria viewed El Paso’s and 
BP’s expertise, respectively, in the realm of LNG as not expendable. All areas of BP’s 
activities, however, were singled out as logistically feasible take overs. In comparison to 
other oil-rich developing countries, Nigeria sets itself apart by singling out BP’s 
(London) production activities for nationalization. 
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In relation to other oil-rich developing countries, Nigeria’s first step toward 
forming a national oil company and initiating nationalizations, especially within the 
upstream sector, occurred late. By the mid-1970s, the most influential OPEC members 
such as Venezuela, Iran, and Libya had already formed state-owned oil companies and 
nationalized the operations and assets of the major transnational oil companies. 
Venezuela formed its first state-owned oil company, Corporación Venezolana del 
Petróleo, in 1960 and Indonesia formed its company, Pertamina, in 1957.452 In contrast, 
Nigeria formed its first company, the NNOC, in 1971. One of the main reasons for this 
lateness came from Nigeria’s leadership. Under Gowon, Nigeria maintained an attentive, 
but relatively reserved relationship with OPEC members. Gowon expressed little interest 
in losing the UK as an ally, which it would risk by engaging in hasty nationalization 
schemes. He also claimed that Nigeria was not in any position to effectively take over 
aspects of the oil industry as the country severely lacked the skilled people. Terisa Turner 
argues in her work that his assessment was not only incorrect, but deliberately 
fraudulent.453  
When Muhammed and Obasanjo took over in 1975, they shifted Nigeria’s 
indigenization and nationalization plans into high gear. The nationalization of BP 
represented the grand finale of rule. Nigeria’s leadership explains why the nationalization 
did not take place before 1976, while the collapse of oil prices explains, in part, why the 
nationalization happened in 1979. Nigeria pressed upon Shell-BP the importance of 
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drawing up the figures of compensation as soon as possible to have it completed by 
August, with as little disruption to production as possible.454 Also, the production 
companies paid royalties bi-annually, which Shell-BP paid typically by August and 
February. Announcing the nationalization in July ensured no complications with payment.  
The concern over timing reflected another idea that Nigeria chose to nationalize 
when it did to take advantage of the short-lived moment of high oil prices in 1979. 
Nigeria may have sought the opportunity of placing its own share of oil on the sport 
market as a way of ensuring high profits and moving its oil quickly. Nigeria experienced 
harsh economic times and quick sales would have been a beneficial short-term strategy. 
Spot markets offer sellers to trade their crude oil at the moment, as opposed to a futures 
market, which allowed a seller to possibly fetch a high price. Engaging in the spot 
market, however, is not a smart solution for the long-term because of price fluctuation 
and uncertainty over quantities demanded. Going to the spot market also undercuts the 
goals of OPEC. Although in practice it is a relatively common practice among OPEC 
members, but is publicly denied.455 Aside from the typical reasons for nationalizing, 
observers isolated a few specific, revenue-oriented, reasons to explain why Nigeria chose 
to nationalize when it did. 
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Nationalization and Economic Nationalism 
The act of a state nationalizing private assets and operations has a history that 
dates back to the 19th century with the rise of states, nation-states, and notions of human 
welfare and equality. The role of the state became more than simply a hollow structure 
containing and regulating citizens; it turned into a series of institutions designed to ensure 
safety, establish basic infrastructure, and distribute wealth. Within contemporary 
programs of economic nationalism, nationalization represents an integral component. 
But, nationalizations are not all the same. Within the secondary literature, the act 
described by most as nationalization has been reconfigured within the guidelines of legal 
code. Thus, terms such as expropriation, confiscation, and indigenization have been 
developed to better articulate the legal aspect of how a transfer of operations took place. 
Yet, these terms offer neither the information about the mindset of a government, nor the 
context in which it took place. In this chapter I have proposed as a point of departure two 
forms of nationalization. Derivative nationalization, as applied by countries such as 
Venezuela, Mexico, Iraq, and Libya, focus on the common problems of participation, 
posted prices, and the accessibility of petroleum products. The reasons stated publicly are 
largely believed to be in line with those discussed behind closed doors. In contrast, is 
deceptive nationalization, which is exemplified by Nigeria, describes the way in which 
declared reasons differ from the contextual-derived reasoning. The nationalization of 
select portions of BP’s operations in Nigeria fits into this category. The idea behind 
pinning the nationalization on southern Africa as opposed to the domestic program of 
economic nationalism is explained in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6:  Looking Outward: Nigeria and Southern Africa 
 
In a 1981 publication, Andrew Young, a promoter of US-Nigerian relations, made 
this statement: 
Nigeria will endeavor to foster its interest in economic development and 
stable trade relationships with the West while simultaneously continuing to 
use its leverage with Western nations and corporations in the interest of its 
political goals on the African continent –especially with regard to South 
Africa.456 
 
This description of Nigeria illustrates the global recognition of Nigeria’s leadership 
position in the liberation of southern Africa. It also highlights Nigeria’s willingness to use 
its “leverage,” meaning its ability to take punitive measures against Western countries 
and firms who interfere with the liberation process. Most importantly, the passage above 
explicitly links Nigeria’s economy to its nationalist project. This passage serves as an 
excellent way to introduce three main ideas argued in this chapter.  
First, the primary goal of this work has been to show how Nigeria’s 
nationalization of BP hinged on domestic economic policy as opposed to foreign policy 
pertaining to southern Africa as indicated in the secondary literature. This conclusion, 
however, does not suggest that developments in southern Africa played no part. Nor does 
it pass critical judgment on Nigeria’s method of operation; indeed, the strategy proved 
highly effective. This chapter shows how Nigeria deliberately linked the two events 
together for the greatest return in its quest for nationalist sentiment and why.  
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Second, economic nationalism as an analytical perspective thus far has been used 
in emphasizing the importance of addressing economic policy as a form of nationalism. 
In this chapter, we take economic nationalism to the ultimate test of applying it outside 
the comfort zone of domestic economic initiatives and into the realm of foreign relations 
and expressions of cultural nationalism. Instead of looking at economic policy as a tool of 
nationalism, we explore nationalism as an influence on economic policy. In doing so, we 
see the undervalued influence of pressure groups and the Nigerian media. Most 
secondary works separate Nigeria’s foreign policy from its economic policy, offering 
conflicting conclusions about Nigeria during the 1970s. This chapter seeks to reconcile 
this disparity and in doing so confronts assumptions about authoritarian leadership.  
 
Looking Outward 
Nigeria’s foreign policy underwent significant changes between 1965 and 1970. 
Scholars divide its development during this period into three broad phases. It is no 
coincidence that these phases coincided with Nigeria’s change in leadership, although 
none of the coups were driven by the failings of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The first phase 
coincides with President Tafawa Balewa during the First Republic; the second with 
Gowon (1966-1975); and the third with the leadership of Muhammed (1975-1976) and 
Obasanjo (1976-1979). Overall, Nigeria’s foreign policy underwent a deliberate 
expansion away from an exclusive political and economic relationship with the UK 
toward a more diverse one. Nigeria toyed with fostering trade relations, albeit weak ones, 
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with Japan, and the Soviet Union; and, with great success, its West African neighbors. It 
was Gowon who turned Nigeria’s greatest amount of attention ward the problems of  
southern Africa. 
Ibrahim A. Gambari best characterized the first phase taking place during the First 
Republic (1960-1966) as a time of “uncertainty” and “timidity” largely stemming from a 
lack of “national ideology” and “nation-wide consciousness.”457 Balewa adhered to a 
policy of nonalignment, whereby Nigeria maintained an intentionally pragmatic and non-
ideological policy placing it in a neutral position. With particular regard to African 
politics, this policy removed Nigeria from any responsibility of deploying financial or 
military assistance. Nonalignment, however, did not prevent Nigeria from maintaining a 
minimal membership in the OAU since its formation in 1962. In theory, Nigeria 
cherished the anti-colonial commitments laid out in the organization’s charter. In reality, 
Nigeria continually rebuffed progressive steps toward total liberation of Africa put forth 
by the organization.  
On the topic of independence for people of color in South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia in the early 1960s, Balewa called for gradual independence with 1970 as a 
feasible goal. Pressure within Nigeria grew through groups, such as the Nigerian Youth 
Congress, clamoring for Nigeria to change its position and take an active role in the 
liberation of southern Africa.458 Nonalignment served as a policy of convenience, which 
allowed Nigeria to nurture its fragile economic state under the financial and political 
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protection of the UK. During the First Republic, Nigeria deliberately avoided liberation 
movements in Africa and was beginning to generate criticism from its African 
neighbors.459  
After the fall of the First Republic, Nigeria entered into its second phase best 
described as one of intensive activism, particularly in African politics. Several reasons 
accounted for this change. Nigeria’s leaders starting with Gowon, some argue, brought 
Nigeria together in part because of their own lack of cultural/regional connection. 
Although murmurings of regional bias by Nigeria’s leaders always appeared in public 
forums, the fact is that after years of living and studying abroad and taking part in 
military campaigns outside of Nigeria, leaders such as Gowon laid little claim to any 
particular region. Also, a central government simply suited the demands of a military 
leader better than a fractured distribution of power and revenue. This proved particularly 
true with the swelling revenue generated from Nigeria’s oil industry.  
A second reason for Nigeria’s policy shift toward activism had to do with 
bouncing back from Nigeria’s civil war. After the return of the oil-rich eastern region 
(renamed Biafra during the war) in 1970, Gowon took stock of Nigeria’s political 
situation. A refurbishing of Nigeria’s foreign policy with the explicit goal of making 
Nigeria into a great nation not only unified a war-torn Nigeria, but also improved 
Gowon’s own reputation among African heads-of-state. Akiba writes that the civil war 
“enhanced consciousness of Nigerian leaders about the fundamental importance of 
stability…[and the] quick re-absorption of secessionists into mainstream national life.”460 
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Gowon was particularly concerned with repairing relations with those countries such as 
Tanzania, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Zambia who supported Biafra through the OAU. One 
scholar wrote of Gowon’s preference for “adoration-value to the detriment of respect-
value,” meaning that he was more interested in acquiring praise through public voice than 
public action.461 
Some argue that Nigeria took an aggressive stance to southern Africa for the sole reason  
of punishing South Africa’s support for Biafra, but no concrete evidence suggests that 
South Africa had any interest in Nigeria’s civil war.462 Many Nigerians, into the early 
1970s, contended that South Africa actively tried to “subvert” Nigeria during and after 
the civil war. Arikpo, Nigeria’s commissioner for foreign affairs, stated that “South Africa 
was trying to establish a base in São Tomé” with the purpose of weakening (in an 
unspecified way) Nigeria’s influence over African leaders.463 The claim was far-fetched.  
Gowon’s foreign policy, although described as active, has never been portrayed as 
radical. While Nigeria cast itself as a leading nation and voice for the liberation of 
southern Africa, it also treaded lightly. By getting involved in the politics of southern 
Africa, Nigeria placed itself in confrontation with its largest trading partner and investor, 
the UK. Nigeria maintained a “special” relationship with the UK, partially fostered 
through its membership in the British Commonwealth. As a member, Nigeria enjoyed 
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many economic perks. For example, raw materials including oil from Nigeria were 
imported duty free into the UK. In 1970, Nigeria’s exports to the UK totaled 30 percent 
of its total exports and generated ₤125 million. Also, Nigeria received preferential 
treatment with regard to technical assistance and financial aid, which reached around ₤10 
million in 1971. In comparison to other African commonwealth members, Nigeria 
receives roughly 15 percent of British aid. Also, as a commonwealth member, Nigeria 
benefited from its participation in several associations (political, technical, and economic) 
from which Nigeria receives information, contacts, and advice.464 During the 1960s and 
1970s, Nigeria grappled, as did other African countries, with its membership in the 
organization.  
Throughout the civil war, the British government provided Nigeria with the 
essential military assistance to squash the secessionist movement. And, the British 
government and its firms played an important role in the rebuilding of Nigeria afterward. 
While grateful, Nigeria emerged from the war with a sense of strength, unity, and desire 
for greater independence from the UK.465 Many Nigerians, including Gowon, saw 
Nigeria’s “special” relationship with the UK as neocolonial. The ideology of economic 
independence, however, was overshadowed by Nigeria’s reliance on the UK. In short, 
Gowon recognized that Nigeria lacked the capital, know-how, and trade networks to be 
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truly independent. He realized that criticism of UK policy in southern Africa had limits, 
for which Nigeria’s own economic interests remained protected. Gowon treaded a fine 
line between a nationalist vision and a pragmatic one based on Nigeria’s economic 
situation. To Gowon’s growing opposition, he spoke from two sides of his mouth. He 
received criticism from African countries for his “inconsistent manners,” which included 
a weak speech at the OAU summit in Kampala, Uganda where he “discouraged African 
nationalists from their struggles.”466 Within Nigeria, Gowon worked closely with the UK 
and outside of Nigeria Gowon openly criticized the UK’s handling of southern Africa. 
When it became apparent that Gowon no longer intended to transfer Nigeria back 
to democratic rule, his forced removal by a group of officers in Nigeria’s military was not 
surprising. Nigeria’s new regime under the leadership of Muhammed (until February 
1976) and Obasanjo brought with it a third phase in Nigeria’s foreign policy 
development. While Muhammed’s rule was short due to his assassination, he set Nigeria 
on an extreme path of activism, promising direct military assistance to African resistance 
forces in southern Africa. Obasanjo built on his predecessors’ commitment to the 
liberation of southern Africa, but was described as “soft-pedaling,” much like Gowon, 
because of his connections to the US and UK.467 In general, the foreign policy applied 
during the 1970s represented a radical departure from that of the First Republic. What 
receives the most attention regarding the policies shaped by Gowon and his predecessors 
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is the role that Nigeria’s petroleum industry played either in generating funds or in the 
symbolic sense of political strength.  
 
Nigeria and the Liberation of Southern Africa 
With regard to the liberation of southern Africa, Nigeria approached it with some 
clear ideas and boundaries imbedded within its definition of liberation. Nigeria saw the 
liberation of African from, as it saw it, the grips of colonial rule –in the case of Southern 
Rhodesia and South Africa, from white-minority rule. Generally, the liberation movement 
called for the sanctioning of freedom and equality within African countries. More 
specifically, the right to leadership achieved through open, fair elections that reflected the 
African majority’s interests. Nigeria had its own interpretation. While Nigeria agreed 
with the idea of “African solutions to African problems,” it very much saw that the UK 
needed to finish the process of decolonization. Nigeria held the UK responsible for the 
settlement of Southern Rhodesia, and, in part, for dismantling apartheid in South Africa. 
Much of the vision Nigeria projected on southern Africa’s decolonization came from its 
own experience.  
Nigeria showed a particular sensitivity to the election process taking place in 
Southern Rhodesia in 1979. During Nigeria’s own first election, the UK was widely 
accused of manipulating the results to favor the northern political party, the Northern 
People’s Congress. When it looked as if a similar situation would occur in Southern 
Rhodesia in favor of Bishop Muzorewa, Nigeria made its sentiments known. Like many 
other OAU members, the liberation of southern Africa for Nigeria did not mean the 
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removal of white settlers from the South. Indeed, they were considered an equally 
important part of the political system. Also, Nigeria’s definition of liberation did not 
embody a vision of any particular economic policy, such as socialism.468 The liberation to 
which Nigeria subscribed called for a transfer of power, but without any concise opinion 
on the method other than holding democratic elections. Nigeria offered little advice on 
the structure of government. Overall, liberation as defined by Nigeria was limited in 
scope leaving the process open-ended.  
Nigeria saw itself in the liberation campaign as a mediator, placing itself between 
African and European states.469 At times, Nigeria also saw itself as a leader of African 
states and the primary agitator toward the West. Some Nigerians have overstated the role 
of Nigeria too far, as in the case of this passage:  
In 1979 Nigeria’s oil was again used to Africa’s advantage and this time 
against the Iron Lady, Mrs. Thatcher, whose policies towards Zimbabwe 
(in the eyes of African countries) tended towards the continuation of the 
white minority government in Zimbabwe. Nigeria struck a political and 
economic blow to the astonishment of the entire world…by announcing in 
Lusaka the immediate nationalization of British Petroleum assets in 
Nigeria…. Nigeria’s action was praised by African countries and by other 
Third World countries. To an extent, it can be said that Zimbabwe owes its 
independence to Nigeria.470 
 
What started as self-proclamation became a reality as Nigeria represented one of the few 
countries outside of southern Africa willing to confront the UK, UN, and the white-
minority regimes. In the early 1970s, Nigeria boasted of having a large, successful (based 
                                                 
468 Timothy Shaw, “The State of Nigeria: Oil Crises, Power Bases, and Foreign Policy,” Canadian Journal 
of African Studies 18, no. 2 (984), 397. 
469 Shaw, “The State of Nigeria,” 397. 
470 Onoh, The Nigerian Oil Economy, 123. Emphasis mine. 
 208
on the favorable outcome of the civil war) standing military, a swelling population in 
comparison to its neighbors, a rapidly growing economy due to the oil boom, and a 
domineering presence as one of the geographically largest countries in West Africa. The 
editor of Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign  Affairs writes:  
By all reckonings, Nigeria emerged at the end of the Civil War as a middle 
power with its claim to being a great black power hardly open to any 
further doubt.471  
 
Similarly, the editor writes that within the category of “developing countries,” Nigeria 
saw itself as semi-peripheral to the center (the West). In the 1970s, it likened itself to 
Brazil, as an industrializing country.472 If true, then Nigeria would have substantially set 
itself apart from nearly all of its African neighbors. Nigeria based its conclusion on its 
burgeoning oil industry that generated a great deal of revenue for the country. It failed to 
include the falling levels of agricultural production and exports. As a self-proclaimed 
semi-peripheral country, Nigeria saw itself in a position to act a mediator, with the sole 
purpose of drawing public attention to the issues.  
Although activism regarding southern Africa primarily included the government 
endeavor generating its own campaign, small-scale pressure groups and independent 
citizens also encouraged it. For example, Nigerians through the Nigerian Afro-Asian 
Solidarity Organization expressed their disappointment to the UK’s settlement 
negotiation with Southern Rhodesia. The organization submitted its criticism to the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stating 
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We are convinced that the visit [of Sir Alec Douglas-Home with Ian 
Smith] is one of those maneuvers of British Imperialism to draw the wool 
over the face of the entire world, particularly the black world….473  
 
The language of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization represents one of the most 
striking examples of strong and direct language against the UK. One member, Alhaji 
Aminu Kano, personally organized demonstrations throughout Nigeria against the UK’s 
alleged plan to sell arms to South Africa. One took place on 1 August 1970 in a stadium 
in Kano and attracted several hundred supporters.474 Some Nigerians also joined the Anti-
Apartheid Movement, intending to raise awareness within their communities in Nigeria 
and abroad. Many wrote letters to their local newspapers encouraging the federal military 
government to take action and, so to speak, strike while the iron was hot. Some Nigerians 
saw the possible election of Bishop Muzorewa as selected by the British prime minister, 
which went against the views of the African majority.475 One article recommended that 
the assets of all British companies “should be indigenised ‘in the real sense of it,’” which 
suggests coded language for meaning nationalization.476 Similar recommendation was 
made by an employee at the National Museum in Lagos who proposed several areas for 
government action, including the nationalizing of “British corporate investment.”477  
To the international community, Nigeria presented itself and its foreign policy as 
straight forward. As Andrew Young indicated, Nigeria appeared willing to take drastic 
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measures in order to ensure freedom for southern Africans. Nigeria became known in the 
international community for its grand gestures, often including threats to expel foreign 
nationals and companies. According to the popular narrative on the nationalization of BP, 
it did just as it promised. Nigeria hosted conferences, such as the World Conference for 
Action against Apartheid in 1977 and made several diplomatic visits, especially to the 
US, to spread awareness and gather support. It actively engaged itself in several 
organizations such as the OAU, UN, and FLS, in order to facilitate discussions and 
provide assistance to the liberation movements in southern Africa. In May 1979, Ondo 
State sent N76,000 as part of its share of the federal government’s N90,000 contribution 
to the South African Relief Fund ran by the UN.478 Several scholars comparing Nigeria’s 
words to its actions highlight inconsistencies and moments in which Nigeria appears 
guilty of playing both sides, so to speak.  
James Mayall, for example, concludes that Nigeria’s foreign policy was almost 
invisible to the outside and lacked cohesion.479 In July 1979, the Economist described 
Nigeria as having bark but no bite.480 One reason for this is that Nigeria’s economy 
heavily depended on the export of raw materials and, thus, the country’s wellbeing 
hinged on positive relations with its major trading partners such as the UK. As a result, 
any radical proclamation in the name of liberation was tempered by its dependence on its 
export-based economy. Another reason for this duplicitous behavior stemmed from its 
political situation. Since 1966, no military leader’s position in Nigeria was secure. This 
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meant that every leader in Nigeria weighed heavily the risks to his popularity before 
taking a radical step. 
Scholars largely agree that the grand vision for the liberation of southern Africa 
includes points of continuity, while the execution of them differed. All of Nigeria’s 
leaders expressed great concern over the future of southern Africa, stressed the 
importance of forging a sense of broad African unity, and showed some level of 
commitment to maintaining positive political and economic ties with the rest of the 
world. Nigeria’s foreign policy needed to remain flexible and actively monitored. 
However, we have only thus far viewed Nigeria’s foreign policy through the most 
prominent of three major perspectives that exist in the literature –that which highlights 
the discrepancy between Nigeria’s policy-making and policy-application with regard to 
its international relations. The second category emphasizes the impact of Nigeria’s 
foreign policy within the country, which we will return to shortly. A third category deals 
with the relationship between Nigeria’s natural resources and its foreign policy.  
Many scholars connect Nigeria’s oil wealth during the 1970s with its “assertive 
behavior” in Africa.481 Oil revenue played a significant role as the impetus for entering 
the international arena, but did not serve as the primary catalyst. Oyo Ogunbadejo, for 
example, writes that Nigeria’s oil wealth gave it the economic basis and confidence to 
“give more substance to its foreign policy.”482 Yet, Gowon’s interest in the OAU and 
                                                                                                                                                 
480 Q.M. Morris, “Nigeria,” 3 August 1979, BP 4823, 1; “Talking of Barking and Biting,” Daily Times 
[Lagos] (8 August 1979), 9. 
481 Akiba, Nigerian Foreign Policy towards Africa, 3. 
482 Oyo Ogunbadejo, “Nigerian Foreign Policy under Military Rule, 1966-1979,” International Journal 25, 
no. 4 (Autumn 1980), 765. 
 212
southern Africa took place several years prior to the oil boom. Attributing this change 
solely on oil ignores  political ambitions. In support of this idea, Akiba states:  
[t]he sudden increase in the wealth of a nation never leads in an 
unambiguous manner to resolving the myriad problems of 
underdevelopment and dependency… [because] …the capacity for state 
action is often constrained by the overall structural context within which 
foreign policy operates.483 
 
His point is that the oil wealth came from a particular foreign policy and that to change 
the foreign policy would possibly hinder the arrival of oil wealth. Regardless, Nigeria’s 
oil wealth gave it the confidence and clout to backup its claims, especially those 
regarding punitive measures against “rogue” companies and countries.  
 
The Call for Liberation 
Nigeria’s leaders rallied the country behind its campaign for the liberation of 
southern Africa through a combination of pubic speeches, use of the Nigerian media, 
publicized diplomatic visits, and published sources backing its initiatives. This section 
strives to answer three basic questions. First, what messages did Nigeria want to get 
across and how did it do it? Second, what buzzwords and popularly understood phrases 
and ideas were used? Third, who influenced who? Did Nigeria’s leaders act 
independently or did they incorporate ideas from local pressure groups? To answer these 
questions, we turn to the popular sources such as government announcements, 
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newspapers, and speeches given by Nigeria’s leaders. Secondary sources are also 
referenced as they represent the popular opinion in a written, semi-analytical format. 
The federal military government emphasized in its public addresses the 
importance of southern Africa as a national concern for Nigeria. Most Nigerians had no 
connection to southern Africa, let alone the knowledge to locate the region on a map. 
Many did believe the conspiracy that white-minority regimes in southern Africa had 
contributed to the prolongation of their civil war in hopes of seeing this great African 
giant fall. And, while not knowing all the details of southern Africa’s sorted history, many 
Nigerians emphatically agreed that all African nations should be liberated. The federal 
military government merely took already existing ideas and concretized them into a 
national ideology using the national media. The government underscored the importance 
of total liberation in Africa and accentuated a fear that South Africa, particularly, was out 
to violate Nigeria’s security.484 All of these issues came out strongest just prior to the 
nationalization of BP’s operations.  
The Nigerian press was instrumental in transmitting ideas of nationalism and the 
liberation of southern Africa. But, how free was the press? Does the press represent a 
mouthpiece or a public forum for discussion, through which to make recommendations to 
the government? Scholars studying the Nigerian press offer great insight into the complex 
relationship between the state and the press. Under both Gowon and Obasanjo, the press 
served as a promoter of national unity and culture as well as an educator of the people on 
social conduct and citizenship. The number of newspapers circulating in Nigeria during 
the 1970s at least doubled. The government’s creation of newspapers for new states 
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served as a way of opening a public space for dialogue. In part, this was the federal 
military government’s attempt at offering regions political representation. In 1978 the 
Nigerian Voice was created for Benue State to represent those living within the Niger 
Delta outside of Port Harcourt.485 The amount of freedom to speak honestly about 
economic and political development within Nigeria varied depending on the regime in 
power and its level of confidence. 
When Gowon first came into power in the late 1960s he declared his support of 
the newspapers; however, it was not long before he began arresting journalists without 
warrants.486 Muhammed and Obasanjo’s first order of business when they came to power 
was to liberate imprisoned journalists.487 They, too, however kept a close eye on the 
press. I. Bayo Oloyede writes that under Obasanjo, “the press was…less restrained than 
the public at large.”488 Both regimes maintained a staunch policy on “acts of treason,” 
preventing any journalist from openly criticizing the government. The Kaduna-based 
paper, New Nigerian, enjoyed less independence in its printed discussions than the 
Lagos-based Daily Times. Some scholars argue that, overall, the Nigerian press enjoyed 
more freedom under military rule than democratic rule.489 For the most part, the federal 
military government encouraged the newspapers to publish articles that fit the nationalist 
agenda of national unity, federalism, and the strength of Nigeria within African politics.  
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The same ideas reached the public through government funded or published 
projects geared toward well-educated Nigerians within and outside the country and those 
working within the swollen civil service. In some ways, these publications served as 
briefing notes for government officials. In July 1971 the federal military government 
supported the printing and circulation of Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs, which 
served as a forum to declare Nigeria as the liberator of Africa and remind its educated 
citizens of its success as such. The information provided in the bulletin reads as a detailed 
list of international involvement, with a nationalistic spin on past events. Speeches given 
within and outside of Nigeria were frequently transcribed within this journal or published 
independently. The benefits of publishing the speeches included wide circulation at home 
and abroad. Foreign companies operating within Nigeria used these speeches as a way  to 
understand Nigeria. BP collected the speeches and examined them for evidence of 
posturing and warnings about nationalization. Overall, these sources serve as excellent 
illustrations of the ideas embraced by the federal military government during the 1970s. 
Textual analyses reveals a great deal about what leaders chose to emphasize and 
deemphasize through indigenous and borrowed language. 
 A speech by President Shehu Shagari to the UN General Assembly after his 
inaguaration in 1980 offers a comprehensive example. Born and educated in northern 
Nigeria, Shagari had participated in Nigerian politics since the late 1950s. Between 1967 
and 1970 he held various positions with the government, including the Sokoto Native 
Authority. In the 1970s he worked as the Federal Commissioner for Economic 
Development, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction and as a member of the Constituent 
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Assembly. In the 1979, he won the presidential election through a compromise.490 Within 
the federal military government, Shagari participated and advocated the nationalist 
vision. Within his 1980 speech, the same grievances, manipulation of language, and 
solutions in this speech were offered by his predecessors in previous years. Indeed, the 
value of his speech is that almost all of the ideas espoused during the 1970s by Gowon, 
Muhammed, and Obasanjo are encapsulated within this one passage. To the UN General 
Assembly, Shagari declares: 
Africa bears the scars of a long history of spoliation and deprivation, ages 
of the slave trade and foreign aggression, of both political and economic 
injustices. The current crisis in the world economy is wreaking havoc in 
Africa…. For most of Africa negotiations are about survival itself. The 
very existence of some of our beings as citizens is being critically 
threatened by adverse economic forces and natural disasters…. It will take 
years before we in Africa can exercise our right to full unity and effective 
participation in the current international economic system. In spite of the 
enormous natural wealth and resources of Africa, our continent remains 
the least developed and our people the most deprived. These degrading 
possibilities make a mockery of our political independence. We are 
therefore resolved to make progress. We must therefore refuse to subsidize 
the economies of the rich by continuing to sell our raw materials and 
labour to them cheaply in return for their exorbitantly priced 
manufacturing goods…. In the wake of this Assembly’s important 
deliberations concerning the new international development strategy and 
the global negotiations, I call upon the Assembly to launch a decade of 
reparation and restitution for Africa as a master plan for the economic 
recovery of Africa…. I intend to dwell further on African concerns, 
because the destiny of Nigeria is inextricably linked with the fortunes of 
all countries of Africa and all peoples of African descent abroad….. As a 
plan we have continued and shall continue to strive vigorously for the 
inclusion of the rights and dignity of the black man everywhere, who for 
too long have suffered humiliation and discrimination….. Nigeria will no 
longer tolerate the provocations by South Africa or the illusory tactics of 
its allies in the Western bloc with regard to the determination and majority 
rule in Namibia…. Throughout all the 33 years that apartheid policies of 
the government of South Africa have been considered and condemned by 
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this great Assembly, it has become clear that the only peaceful avenue left 
for their elimination is the imposition of sanctions… In calling for 
sanctions, particularly an oil embargo to complement the existing embargo 
against South Africa, I want to emphasize that our Charter specifically 
prescribes sanctions to give effect to the decisions of the Security 
Council…. But sanctions alone will not destroy apartheid and racism in 
South Africa…. The termination of apartheid and racism in South Africa is 
the challenge of our decade and the attainment of that goal will constitute 
man’s last major victory over the evil forces of colonialism.491 
 
The most striking features of this excerpt of Shagari’s speech include the invocation of 
ideas that circulated within the African diaspora. He speaks directly to the UN, 
encouraging them to adopt a strict policy toward South Africa and a benevolent attitude 
toward the plight of African nations.  
 Shagari’s speech invokes ideas circulated within the African diaspora such as 
racism, reparations, and labor exploitation. Public discussions within the 1970s tinkered 
with ideas of racial inequality borrowed from the African diaspora. Attempts were made, 
especially in the second half of the 1970s, to reach out to African-American political 
figures and activists in the United States. The British government saw this racial 
consciousness as evidence of the African-American influence in Nigeria:  
Politically, Nigeria considers itself, and is considered by other black 
nations, as the natural leader of the black race. She is accordingly being 
wooed by the black community in the United States….492  
 
One way in which Nigeria’s leaders did this was by inserting themselves within 
discussions important to African-Americans. Public forums within Nigeria attempted to 
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facilitate this connection by conducting their own discussions on racism, racial inequality, 
and reparations.   
In Nigeria, however, race did not typically register in the same way it does in 
places such as the United States, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa. Unlike Senegal 
and parts of the African diaspora, Nigeria did not produce in first half of the 20th century 
scholars that discussed race. For Nigerians, frustration against economic problems, social 
divide, and political instability are not expressed in terms of race or skin color. For one 
reason, decolonization left few whites living and working in Nigeria. Europeans, 
especially, lived in private enclaves and engaged in limited interaction with local 
Nigerian communities. For another, black Africans took control of Nigeria’s government 
at independence. Nigeria saw the politics of southern Africa as, indeed, serious and in 
need of correction, but Nigeria’s political leaders tended to focus on the remaining 
vestiges of colonial rule in Africa. Typically, Nigerians did not accuse the British of 
endorsing racism in southern Africa; instead, they accused them of taking a laissez-faire 
attitude toward the white-minority colonial regimes. References to racism and racial 
inequality within speeches, for the most part, represented an effort to tap into the African 
diaspora. For example, on the fifteenth anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre in South 
Africa, the commissioner for external affairs, Okoi Arikpo stated:  
It is the duty of not only the Government but of all the people of Nigeria –
as indeed that of every black man the world over –to continued to support 
the diplomatic, economic, and cultural isolation of South Africa until the 
country abandons its racial discrimination; until that Government treats 
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the black man in South Africa as a full citizen of the country of his 
birth.493 
 
In his statement, Arikpo explicitly calls on Nigerians to support a government policy of 
sanctions against South Africa. His speech raises political consciousness and nationalist 
sentiments using strong language about race and discrimination. Likewise, a series of 
newspaper articles in Nigeria attempted to explore historical connections between Nigeria 
and the US, drawing parallels between degrees of subjugation and exploitation. For the 
most part, however, Nigerian public opinion saw the similarities as not about race, but 
about global capitalism in the form of imperialism that resulted in economic 
exploitation.494  
Shagari’s speech also referenced reparations, again drawing ideas borrowed from 
the African diaspora. The topic of reparations gained in popularity within the United 
States among African-Americans asking for not only an apology from the government, 
but also monetary payment for suffering, loss of family, and countless hours of forced 
backbreaking labor during over a century of slavery. While African-Americans lacked 
consensus on the issue of reparations, the idea circulated for many years, especially 
during the 1970s. The experience of slavery within the African diasapora was not 
something most Nigerians fully understood. For Africans, reparations were more about 
compensation for specific state-sponsored brutality during colonialism. In the case of 
Kenya, Africans have recently called on the British to pay reparations to survivors 
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regarding the violence and torture endured during the Mau Mau uprising. The British 
murdered, detained, and tortured upwards of 100,000 Africans. While Nigerians did not 
interpret reparations the same way or relate to slavery directly, they saw the connection 
between themselves and Africans within the diaspora on the issue of labor exploitation. 
Nigerians under colonial rule were quite familiar with forced labor, harsh working 
conditions, and political subjugation. 
In order to appeal to Nigerians, speeches like Shagari’s emphasized the colonial 
experience and called for the remaining vestiges of colonial rule in Africa to be 
eliminated. For example, in his speech to the OAU in 1971, Gowon deliberately tailors 
his points toward the end of colonial subjugation as opposed to racial inequality. He 
proclaims: “It is my strong conviction that the time has come when we should liberate at 
least one colonial territory within the next three years.”495 In publications circulating in 
Nigeria discussions about southern Africa tended to adhere to themes of European 
hegemony and anti-colonialism.  
For the most part, the Nigerian government used southern Africa as a rallying 
point. The situation in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa made the headlines of 
newspapers and became the focus of public discussions because the government made it 
that way. Using language that touched on racism and exploitation was highly effective in 
getting Nigerians to recognize the importance of the country’s commitment to the 
liberation of southern Africa. But, to internalize it and really make this campaign 
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effective and make foreign issues such as race and reparations hit home, they needed to 
make the messages reflect the trials of Nigeria’s history.  
 
Internalizing the Liberation Movement 
Nigeria was able to internalize the movement by hitching the liberation of 
southern Africa to Nigeria’s historical experience and strong anti-colonial sentiment. 
Odetola sums the relationship between nationalism and liberation perfectly: “Nationalism 
generates support from traders, businessmen, laborers, and a cry for liberation makes it a 
rallying point.”496 The federal military government tapped into the spirit of anti-
colonialism, drew connections between foreign oil companies and imperialism, and 
invoked a fear of war and political struggle. 
The first included rekindling the spirit of anti-colonialism and applying it to the 
contemporary neocolonial situation. The nationalist period ―from the end of World War 
II to independence― has been described as Nigeria’s “golden age” because it represented 
a time of greatest unity against the British as a common enemy. Arthur A. Nwanko 
writes: “It is probably true to say that Nigerian came closest to true nationalism during 
the struggle for independence, particularly in the 1940s.”497 Nationalists in Nigeria 
promulgated the concept of the Other. Placing the collective memory of colonialism –the 
discrimination, injustice, and exploitation– into the context of southern Africa provoked a 
strong response, stronger than any mention of racism or reparations. To Nigeria, southern 
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African countries remained exploited colonies (ie Portuguese colonies of Angola and 
Mozambique) and were deprived of proper decolonization (as in the case of South Africa 
and Southern Rhodesia).  
The second rallying point included calling for the disengagement from a 
neocolonial situation. In the 1960s, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana introduced the idea of 
African countries after independence positioned with the international economy as 
neocolonial states. He proclaimed that although these countries attained the legal 
distinction of independent, they still very much depended on their former European 
colonizers. Economically speaking, the nature of each African country’s relationship with 
its former colonizer remained virtually the same. The oil sector represented the most 
glaring area in which Nigeria was still a neocolonial state. It was the most lucrative and 
politically valuable portion of Nigeria’s economy. Not surprisingly, it became the focus of 
nationalist economic policy. Public discussions, in part spawned by the federal military 
government, connected control of its oil industry with notions of imperialism, 
neocolonialism, and the continuation of the British empire. For example, a news article 
described Shell-BP as “expanding its empire.”498 Neocolonial or not, people expressed 
concern over the possible return or expansion of empire.  
What concerned many people was that it might be done through political deceit 
and financial fraud. Within the oil industry this could be done through the falsification of 
oil production levels and profit reports. In 1979, Nigeria accused BP of violating its ban 
on trade and political relations with South Africa. Nigeria, as well as many other less 
developed, oil-rich countries, saw the major oil companies as pawns of their home 
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countries. In the case of the UK, British firms were viewed as extensions of the British 
empire  ―in a way that French or Italian companies were not. BP was not seen as a truly 
free agent, bowing to the demands of the UK even if this included violating sanctions. BP 
had also operated extensively in Nigeria during colonial rule as was viewed as an agent 
of the British empire. BP, out of all the major oil companies in Nigeria, needed to be 
updated to reflect the new, independent Nigeria. To rally people behind ridding the 
country of neocolonial attachments, the government revived anti-colonial sentiments. 
Concern over being, or becoming, a neocolonial state, however, was problematic. During 
the 1970s, Nigeria tended to see any form of economic dependency on the UK as 
neocolonial. The nationalization of BP, and all its other endeavors at economic 
participation, were efforts to counter this relationship. In 1964 33 percent of all goods 
imported into Nigeria came from the UK, but by 1978 that number dropped to 25 
percent.499 Nigeria’s goal included not only reducing its reliance on the UK for trade, but 
also increasing its relations with companies based outside of the UK. Many construction 
contracts, for example, went to firms from Asia and trade arrangements to African 
countries and the US. Exports to the US, for example, expanded from 7 percent in 1964 
to 40 percent in 1978.500 Dependency in itself is not a bad thing; what is bad is to lack 
autonomous development of any kind.501 
The third rallying point drew from experiences shared by Nigerians of war and 
political struggle. Ernest Renan, in the late 1800s, commented on the centripetal force of 
                                                                                                                                                 
498 “Of Oil and Economic Independence,” Daily Express [Lagos] (7 April 1970). 
499 Spiliotes, “Nigerian Foreign Policy and Southern Africa,” 42. 
500 Ibid. 
501 Peter O. Olayiwola, Petroleum and Structural Change (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1987), 155-7. 
 224
historical memory, especially through adversity. He writes that “griefs are of more value 
than triumphs, for they impose duties and require a common effort.”502 The post-civil war 
atmosphere in Nigeria allowed for a receptive audience to civic nationalism, especially 
with the failure of secession. Also, the federal military government also capitalized on the 
notion of unity through war, by inducting its citizens into a new kind of war, which was 
the liberation struggle in southern Africa. Nigeria armed its citizens with information, war 
cries, and a sense of purpose. For many Nigerians, this was an effective strategy because 
it invoked feelings of empathy and camaraderie.  
As mentioned above, the federal military government emphasized the situation of 
southern Africa as a threat to national security. To not take an interest in those affairs 
placed Nigeria at great risk. Indeed, Nigeria’s language fits into Renan’s idea that the 
“nation…is a culmination of a long past of endeavors, sacrifice, and devotion.”503 As 
implied previously, Nigerians felt a mixture of betrayal and resentment toward the UK, 
which Nigeria projected on southern Africa. Liah Greenfield in her work on nationalism 
speaks of unity through a sense of inferiority and envy, which she labels ressentiment. In 
the case of Nigeria, we see this as a clash of a fractured sense of oppressed nationalism 
by Nigeria against the UK’s dominant nationalism, which simultaneously serves as a 
model to replicate and an enemy to be feared.504 This struggle played out in southern 
Africa, with Nigeria alternating from a direct confrontation with the UK to an indirect 
one through southern African nationalist movements. 
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The federal military government used a variety of methods and ideologies to 
create a sense of national unity through the common cause of southern Africa. 
Additionally, pressure groups within Nigeria complimented this vision through their 
activities. The press was instrumental in disseminating information about southern Africa 
and Nigeria’s destiny as the “giant of West Africa” to lead in the African liberation 
struggle. Nigeria’s leaders during the 1970s attempted to connect with the African 
diaspora creating a global united front through discussions of race, labor exploitation, and 
reparations. It also invoked anti-colonial sentiment appealing to the African population at 
home in conjunction with alerting people to the problem of being a neocolonial state. The 
idea of the UK no longer “pulling the wool over our eyes” resonated strongly with many 
Nigerians.  
 
Raising National Consciousness 
No doubt, Nigeria’s role in the liberation of southern Africa was real with some 
degree of genuine commitment. But, despite the popular narrative, the nationalization of 
BP emerged out of domestic economic policy represented just one of many take overs 
conducted in the 1970s. However, this does not mean foreign policy had no role to play. 
The oil bust in 1978 upset that trend and revealed the failure of that project to materialize 
for the average Nigerian. In the last years of the decade, Obasanjo shifted brought 
southern Africa into primary focus in order to carry out a few final and assertive 
economic policies. This section addresses why southern Africa became a successful focal 
point. For Nigeria, southern Africa facilitated a distraction away from domestic problems 
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and lack of democracy. Scholars have documented the relationship between domestic 
instability and foreign conflict. It allowed for a military regime to capitalize on its 
strength in engaging in a “battle” over colonialism to justify its existence. It also allowed 
Obasanjo to leave office during a moment of glory. Most importantly, the tactic produced 
the intended results. This southern Africa twist applied to the last years of this remarkable 
decade have altered the way in which Nigeria is understood, particularly within the 
secondary literature. 
By and large, the military leadership in Nigeria adhered to some of the basic 
characteristics attributed to those all over the world. Symbolism, idealistic language, and 
tactics devised on militaristic terms were common features. Odetola writes that military 
leaders frequently present themselves as “the embodiment of nationalism, national unity, 
modernization.”505 However, these leaders do not adhere to the principles of democracy 
and individual freedom, resulting in the banning of political parties, trade unions, and any 
threatening youth organizations. Their messages are deliberately disseminated on a large-
scale with ambiguous meanings attached to terms of liberation, racism, and freedom.506  
In discussing the foreign policies of developing nations, political scientists have 
observed a relationship between domestic instability and foreign conflict. Peripheral 
countries such as Nigeria experiencing domestic problems, find strength for the ruling 
regime within the international arena. Richard Vengroff states that the reasons for this 
include a desire to prevent foreign conflict from “destabilizing its own country” and also 
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“may represent an effort to divert attention from domestic conflict.”507 The latter has the 
effect of unity through the identification of an outside enemy. In the case of Nigeria, it 
was racist, white-minority regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.508 These ideas 
can be exaggerated into near melodramas, where the aggression of an enemy is perceived 
as base on “evilness” and separated from political context. Southern Africa created an 
avenue for fostering country-wide nationalism and a sense of unity that had been 
debilitated during the civil war. 
One common agenda among military leaders is to unseat ethnic nationalism in 
favor of civic nationalism, which often fails in the face of economic decline.509 For the 
most part, military governments work within the framework that their presence is a 
temporary adjustment to correct errors of the previous regime and set a country back on 
course. Gowon, for example, promised a transfer of power, which never occurred. Within 
African countries, military leaders often find themselves struggling to justify their 
continual rule and find solutions within their area of military expertise.510 For example, 
Libya under Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi was under perpetual economic and political 
“revolution.” Nigeria, too, underwent an economic transformation carried out under a 
series of development plans and indigenization decrees. Military leaders are soldiers 
trained for battle and war and they carry this sense of purpose with them. They lead 
civilians, as if troops, into battle against various fronts within and outside of the country. 
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In times of war, people tend to rally around their leadership and local tensions tend to 
subside. In the case of Nigeria, Gowon and Obasanjo maintained the notion of fighting 
against colonialism and for the liberation of southern Africa. Muhammed even threatened 
to send troops into southern Africa. This is one reason for which the focus on southern 
Africa became central to the military regimes in Nigeria.  
The problems of southern Africa also served as an excellent distraction away from 
the lack of democracy, increase of corruption, and failed development plans. On this 
subject Nwanko explains that the “… inadequacy of economic-political system is 
cleverly circumvented, and public attention is diverted to personal performances” of the 
military leaders.511 For Gowon and Obasanjo the greatest personal performance cited 
within the secondary literature has been their unwavering commitment to the liberation of 
southern Africa. At the same time, they treaded a fine line in making demands for 
southern Africa that went beyond the level of liberation experienced within their own 
countries.  
Going back to Shagari’s speech, we can identify two areas in which the Nigerian 
federal military government chose to be silent. First, Shagari’s speech reveals a common 
practice among Nigeria’s military leaders of not speaking about or promoting democracy. 
This is because it was not something Nigerians had. Second, the speech did not overtly 
address the plight of Africans all over world and their need to be liberated. Instead, the 
speeches spoke specifically about economic oppression and Nigeria’s fragile position 
within the global, Western-dominated economy. To speak of political oppression in any 
other form would again highlight the irony of Nigeria’s situation (as well as the majority 
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of African countries at the time). Southern Africa served as a distraction for those 
watching Nigeria’s military leaders. Toward southern Africa, Gowon and Obasanjo 
displayed a sense of compassion and grounded idealism on the importance of freedom 
and democracy. A logical, but severely flawed, conclusion is that these notions were 
merely extensions of those put forward in Nigeria. Many living in Nigeria at the time, 
however, would disagree. Southern Africa helped shape the reputation of Gowon and, 
more importantly, Obasanjo. 
Coming out of his stretch as military leader, Obasanjo acquired the legacy of 
being the first military leader to transition Nigeria back to democratic rule and as a 
successful champion of freedom for southern Africa. Much of this reputation formed 
during the election period from October 1978 to September 1979.512 No doubt, this 
legacy helped put him into the position of president in 1999. The nationalization of BP, as 
his last act in office, played an important role in securing Obasanjo’s reputation. He was 
seen as a true leader in Nigeria and in Africa within a commit to democracy in progress, 
which Gowon never was able to secure because of his failure to allow elections to take 
place.  
Using southern Africa as a central focus served the designs of the two successive 
military regimes well. Nigeria’s involvement in the struggle for southern Africa also put 
the UK on guard and provided a significant amount of leverage for Nigeria. Also, Nigeria 
received recognition and praise from its African neighbors. If much of Nigeria’s presence 
within the arena of African politics was self-crafted, did they receive the desired 
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international recognition and influence? At all the major political junctures –Anglo-
Rhodesian negotiations and reports of sanction violations –officials in London turned to 
their counterparts in Lagos to determine the Nigerian reaction. Nigeria periodically set up 
a series of committees to review the possible retaliatory measures to take against the UK, 
which had a tremendous impact on UK firms and government offices. What is not clear at 
this time is whether other African leaders knew about the takeover of BP before it 
happened. 513 Until the late 1970s, the UK and British oil firms saw nationalization as 
unlikely.514 This did not, of course, mean that Nigeria did not keep them in suspense. 
Also, Nigeria boasted of the public praise circulating in the Zambian media as well as 
among Zimbabwe nationalists. A representative of the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe made 
a special trip to Lagos with the purpose of congratulating Nigeria. In a speech, the chief 
representative stated,  
Western countries have come to get used to being threatened by one 
African country after another, but for the first time, Nigeria has taken 
action….515 
 
The nationalization received a great deal of praise from African countries, especially 
from those in southern Africa. Overall, Nigeria generated a great deal of international 
attention, diverting attention from its economic problems and toward the charismatic 
leaders such as Gowon. 
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In addition to the outcomes orchestrated during the 1970s are two that emerged 
afterward within the secondary literature. First, Nigeria’s involvement with southern 
Africa has created a schizophrenic view of Nigeria’s experience and its leadership in the 
1970s. Anthony Kirk-Greene and Douglas Rimmer describe the 1970s under military rule 
as an era of “incompetence, inaction, of authoritarian if not reactionary values” but at the 
same time emphasize Nigeria’s leaders as being “accredited with major achievements in 
foreign policy, local government reform, and economic control.”516 Within the secondary 
literature on Nigeria exists two opposing trends –works that praise and works that 
criticize Nigeria’s leadership and policies. The latter certainly makes up the majority, 
posing questions regarding Nigeria’s political and economic downfall. But, within the 
expansive body of literature on Nigeria there is a compelling pocket of works that narrow 
their focus on the years of promise and wealth through foreign policy. Most were written 
during the 1970s, with a few in the 1990s. These works celebrate Nigeria’s role in the 
OAU, its status as a major oil producer, and its ambitious foreign policies. For several 
scholars, particularly Nigerian ones, these aspects of the 1970s were quite positive. They 
emphasize Nigeria’s role as the “liberator” and “mediator” for southern Africa and base 
their analysis on the assumption that all observers accepted Nigeria’s self-proclaimed 
title. These authors take delight in highlighting those moments of great assertive, no-
nonsense policies. As a result, evaluations of Gowon and Obasanjo’s regimes rae 
inconsistent. Are they to be remembered fondly or dismissed as inept leaders? Works on 
Nigeria’s foreign policy say the former, while those addressing economic policy say the 
latter.  
                                                 
516 Kirk-Greene and Rimmer, Nigeria since 1970, 154. 
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Second, the southern Africa tactic has perpetuated false notions of African 
leadership, vision, and overall agency. It has contributed to the idea that Africans operate 
on short-sided politics. In fact, the reason the nationalization of BP is wholly accepted as 
hinging on southern Africa is because this kind of behavior is expected of Nigeria. The 
nationalization was not rash and there is evidence that the NNPC had this design in mind 
for several years prior. Obasanjo and the NNPC simply waited until the optimal political 
moment to take advantage of a political situation. Playing complex politics, with smoke 
and mirrors is typical for the Obasanjo regime. One can argue that Obasanjo played on 
the global stereotype of an emotional, irresponsible Africa to progress with the 
nationalization for political gain. As a result, the nationalization has been used falsely as 
evidence for hasty African politics. 
In this chapter, I have indicated several reasons as to why Nigeria’s federal 
military government linked the nationalization of BP to its activism regarding southern 
Africa. It provided a rallying point for the country as well as smoke-screen to hide 
domestic problems. As intended, this strategy contributed heralded many praises from the 
African community and the Nigerian academic community. A significant body of 
literature on Nigeria’s foreign policy during the 1970s attests to this celebration. For 
Obasanjo, this legacy contributed to his election as a civilian ruler in 1999. The liberation 
campaign reached Nigerians by government-monitored forms of media, government 
publications, and recorded speeches. All of these forms circulated not only within 
Nigeria, but also among Nigerians living abroad. In speeches, Nigeria’s military leaders 
applied globally recognized concepts such as racism and slavery to invoke a strong 
response. But, within Nigeria, these terms were remembered and interpreted differently 
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than within the African diaspora. Also, several key issues so prevalent in discussions of 
liberation such as democracy and freedom of press were notably excluded in the 
speeches. Overall, Nigeria embraced the liberation cause within the confines of its own 
situation. The liberation of southern Africa, no doubt, served the purpose of unifying the 
country, albeit, temporarily. It complimented the agenda of economic nationalism, 
especially in the last two years of the decade, when oil prices dropped sharply and plans 
for taking over transnational oil companies had yet to be completed. 
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Conclusion 
This project explores Nigeria’s nationalization in 1979 of the London-based oil 
company, British Petroleum. It approaches the topic on two levels, with the first looking 
simply at why Nigeria nationalized BP and the second addressing the impact Nigeria’s 
nationalist oil policy has had on Nigeria. More specifically, this project explores the 
federal military government’s program of economic nationalism as well as how 
nationalism shaped economic policy. I argue that the focus of Nigeria’s nationalization of 
BP rested almost completely within the parameters of economic nationalism. 
Furthermore, the nationalization was not an isolated, reactionary action involving 
southern Africa as suggested in the popular narrative, but, instead, an integral part of the 
trend of takeovers aimed at foreign companies. Many other oil companies within Nigeria 
underwent similar transformations from a foreign, private enterprise to a partial or total 
private, indigenous one. Obasanjo made use of southern Africa strategically in an effort to 
boost support for himself and the state within and outside Nigeria. The nationalization of 
BP, within this context, won great praise from members of the OAU. The way in which 
Nigeria nationalized BP and presented itself globally makes for an unusual case within 
cross-continental discussions of nationalization projects among oil-rich developing 
countries. 
 This chapter completes the analysis of the nationalization of BP by looking briefly 
at the impact it had on Nigeria’s economy and society. Much of these successes and 
failures are discussed in previous chapters, making this discussion simply a synthesis of 
those ideas. This chapter brings together the two levels of analysis to address the impact 
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the nationalization of BP specifically had on Nigeria in addition to the projects of 
increasing participation as a whole. It is within this chapter that the dual qualities of the 
perspective of economic nationalism can be best appreciated. The presence of economic 
nationalism as a state-sponsored endeavor is hard to miss and overshadows the second, 
equally important, aspect in which nationalism influences economic policy. To recognize 
the latter brings into question who controlled the state –the supreme military commander 
or groups and individuals clamoring for economic power. This tension helps to explain 
why the vision of economic nationalism, as the primary identifier of Nigeria’s fractured 
society, had failed. 
 
Impact of Nationalization 
The nationalization of BP was heralded as a bold move by Nigeria that few others 
dared take. Nigerians displayed great optimism about the impact the nationalization 
would have on the UK. The local press extrapolated that the loss of 300,000 bbl/d would 
cripple the UK’s economy and plummet BP into financial trouble.517 BP lost roughly 9 
percent of its supplies for customers outside of the company. The company estimated a 
loss of £60 million that year.518 While the crippling and the plummeting failed to 
materialize, the nationalization had a tremendous impact on Nigeria’s national 
consciousness. In the same way that the federal military government took great care to 
not describe the fate of BP as “nationalization,” Nigeria also went to such lengths in not 
making any promises about new jobs or improved revenue allocation. Any claims about 
                                                 
517 “Take Over of Oil Firm Justified,” Nigerian Tide [Port Harcourt] (30 August 1979), 3. 
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crippling the UK and reducing Nigeria’s unemployment rate did not come from the 
government. The nationalization of BP meant that the state received a substantial portion 
of the new SPDC’s oil revenues. Beyond that, however, the nationalization of BP meant 
very little. Shell remained the company’s manager and supplier of expatriate highly 
skilled employees. Although the Nigerian government did not make any claims, it had to 
know the implied meaning behind nationalizing an oil company. Based on previous 
nationalizations globally and locally, Nigerians associated them with increased 
participation among citizens. It is no wonder, then, that people living within the Niger 
Delta surrounded by Shell-BP’s operations were among those most disappointed. 
 Within a few years of large-scale oil production, people in the Niger Delta began 
to suffer from the affects of pollution and land acquisition. In exchange for their sacrifice 
they received little. During the 1970s, tension escalated between the local communities 
and the oil companies, with the federal government ignoring the situation in hopes that 
the mythical “trickled down” theory would take affect. The complaints aired to the 
federal government started to emerge within the local press around 1970. After an entire 
decade of filing complaints and surviving gas flaring and oil spills with little 
improvement, people living in the Niger Delta realized that their government respected 
the wishes of the oil companies over theirs. And, the nationalization of BP as taking a 
part of Nigeria’s largest and most problematic oil company brought little to no 
improvements. This highly praised nationalization, in the case of Nigeria, meant nothing. 
Presumably, the people in the Niger Delta felt let down and realized that their struggle 
was against two forces, not one, and with virtually no allies. The nationalization of BP 
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figuratively and literally placed the obstinate national government in direct confrontation 
with local agitators in the Niger Delta.  
 As emphasized in previous chapters, the nationalization of BP did not 
dramatically change Nigeria’s relationship with the UK or BP. Indeed, BP lost only select 
aspects of its operations in Nigeria. The tendency within the secondary literature is to 
simplify the nationalization, making it appear that BP was banished from all aspects of 
Nigeria’s oil industry. Nigeria’s greatest success in the nationalization included the take-
over of BP’s marketing operations. Within a short amount of time, Nigeria increased the 
direct participation of Nigerian businessmen who took over the petrol stations and board 
of directors. African Petroleum essentially took over a successful business model, 
allowing for the expansion of petrol stations into sparsely populated regions. Despite this 
take-over, BP today holds the distinction of acting as a major technical advisor to its 
predecessor African Petroleum. Some scholars have concluded that Nigeria would never 
take a decisive economic move such as nationalization without ensuring its own survival. 
The federal government, despite its rhetoric, had little interest in making a true enemy out 
of the UK.  
 Most importantly, the nationalization of BP went into Nigeria’s turbulent history 
as a positive, memorably event. Making the nationalization of BP about southern Africa 
proved highly successful in not only distracting Nigerians from their own economic 
problems, but also became a major rallying point within the country. It gave Nigerians an 
opportunity to feel part of a global struggle and a way to feel proud of their government’s 
commitment to the cause. In many ways, Nigeria’s role in the liberation of southern 
Africa placed Nigeria within the scope of the international community. During the 1970s, 
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Nigeria became not only a oil-producing powerhouse, but also one within diplomatic 
circles. Public forums buzzed with discussions about the injustices within southern Africa 
and the ways in which their own experiences related. The largest source of evidence for 
this, of course, is how the majority of African scholars discuss Nigeria’s involvement in 
southern Africa and the nationalization of BP. Without southern Africa, the military 
leadership of Gowon and Obasanjo would be seen in an almost entirely negative light. In 
actuality, Gowon and Obasanjo are praised for their strength to stand up against the UK 
and their commitment to the liberation of southern Africa. The nationalization of BP, if 
nothing else, illuminates the deeply strategic style of politics so characteristic of 
Obasanjo today.  
 In general, the nationalizations of oil companies within the downstream and 
upstream sectors ―including BP― that took place during the 1970s had a tremendous 
impact on Nigerian society. For example, the wave of nationalization and indigenization 
did, in fact, give the federal government more control over its trade. As a result, Nigeria 
was able to diversify its trading partners and invite foreign investors from all over the 
world. Table 11 shows that between 1960 and 1975, Nigeria decreased its reliance on 
British consumers and increased its trade with the US and West Africa by 9.85 percent 
and 0.5, respectively. 
 
Destination  1960  1970  1975 
United Kingdom 47.6  28.3  18.9 
United States  9.4  11.5  18.25 
West Africa  0.6  0.8  0.11  
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Table 11: Nigeria’s Main Trading Partners519 
 
Rentier State 
Like so many other “spigot economies,” to borrow Frederick Cooper’s phrasing, 
Nigeria fell into the trap of becoming a rentier state. Oil has, as Gelb et al. describes, as 
some “peculiar features,” which include it being a large-scale industry with high wages 
within countries that have predominately small-scale industries and low wages. Oil 
carries with it a “degree of uncertainty.”520 Unfortunately, oil rents are extremely 
unreliable as a path of economic development. The term rentier highlights the 
accumulation of wealth from a market price of a good that has low production costs 
associated with it.521 In theory, high revenue from oil should ensure development within a 
country, but this is rarely the case. For one reason, it can make states lazy and less 
aggressive about establishing a broad economic base outside of oil. The rent collected 
represents, as Sven Wunder explains, “supra-normal profits that exceed the normal return 
on factors of production.”522 For another, it has the tendency to increase the inflation rate 
in the country. Within the literature, this is described as the “Dutch Disease.” Within 
politically unstable countries, oil wealth becomes a magnet for corrupt activities and 
massive spending in projects yielding little long-term gain. It tends to have devastating 
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522 Sven Wunder, Oil Wealth and the Fate of the Forest (New Brunswick, NJ: Routledge, 2003), 28. 
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effect on prices for basic commodities, wages, and national productivity. Prices of 
commodities increase while wages did not, creating massive inflation. This made the 
daily lives of people in Nigeria difficult as they can no longer afford basic food items 
such as salt (see Table 12). Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso, a founding member of OPEC, 
described oil as “the devil’s excrement” for this very reason.523  
 
Commodity  Unit  From  To (in N) 
Palm Oil 1 tin  18  19 
Onions  1 bag  15  28 
Beans  1 tin  12  15 
Stockfish 1 piece  5  7 
Sugar  1 carton 35  40 
Salt  1 bag  12  13.50 
(1960=100) 
Table 12: Consumer Price List for Gongola State (July 1979)524 
 
For Nigeria, being a rentier state was only a fraction of the problem. The federal 
military government failed to take steps to correct the downward spiral. The level of poor 
development planning, corruption, and comprador nationalism only exacerbated the 
situation. Nigeria engaged in a series of large-scale development plans in which taking 
over foreign economic activities became a major focus. These plans also included a great 
deal of government expenditure in the areas of state-wide infrastructure such as roads, 
electricity, and telecommunications in addition to health and education. Funding for these 
massive projects came from oil windfalls, particularly during the oil boom years from 
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1973-1978. However, Nigeria failed to properly invest and save for the long-term and 
found itself in serious financial debt. To satisfy demands made by military supporters and 
the general public, Nigeria spent well beyond its financial ability during the 1970s. 
Chibuzo N. Nwoke writes that the failure of economic nationalism can be attributed to 
the lack of turning it into a clear ideology and applying it systematically.525 As a result, 
the exact same military regimes that mandated this nationalist vision were also those 
preventing it from reaching fruition. 
The golden years of massive government spending came to a grinding halt, with 
development projects discontinued and neglected. Poor financial planning coupled with a 
failed federal allocation system resulted in Nigeria’s agricultural exports moving from 
around 40 percent in 1960 to around 5 percent by the mid-1990s. Table 13 gives a 
comparison of crude oil with other commodities produced and exported in Nigeria. 
Additionally, health care facilities and course materials for formal education programs 
began to collapse. By 1980 Nigeria had become an economic and social disaster.  
 
(‘000 tons) 
Commodity  1968   1970  1973  1975  1978 
Grountnuts  638  287  197.7  --  0.6 
Crude Oil  6,890  50,883  94,302.2 81,696.0        82,580.1 
Raw Cotton  14  28  8.3  --  13.1 
Cocoa Beans  206  193  213.8  191.6  167.5 
Table 13: Exports of Major Commodities526 
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The scarcity of economic resources within the country became a breeding group 
for corruption in the country. The structure of the federal military government all the way 
down to local government officials facilitated the proliferation of it. In this regard, 
economic nationalism actually stifled economic freedom and political liberation. Instead, 
the majority of the take-over, partial or complete, that occurred went to those who kept 
the federal military government in power. Corruption bled the country and failed to create 
a stable middle class. Gains made from this practice rarely reached the average Nigerian 
in any appreciable amount.  
As part of both the system of corruption and economic nationalism, there is the 
added political force of the compradors. Terisa Turner describes this group of individuals, 
not by ethnicity, but by their mutual quest for total access to foreign firms, local markets, 
and raw materials.527 As foreign companies competed for shares in Nigeria’s economy, 
the federal military government stimulated the involvement of state officials and local 
businessmen. The result is a triangular relationship in which the state, compradors, and 
foreign firms are negotiating and undermining one another. Within the oil industry, 
technocrats promoting state-sponsored capitalism are undermined by corrupt officials 
trying to undercut them and negotiated directly with the foreign oil companies. Activities 
of this nature included the granting licenses for construction projects without open 
contract bidding, collecting kickbacks, and launching projects that never materialize. As a 
comprador state, as well as an authoritarian one, power and wealth remained in the hands 
of a few individuals. An integral part of this comprador system is the nationalization of 
foreign companies, which increases revenue circulating among the government. 
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Studying Nigeria as a comprador state complicates the role and effectiveness of 
economic nationalism. For the most part, economic nationalism is identified as having an 
ethical, socialist, and egalitarian quality to it. What comprador nationalism emphasizes is 
that within the framework of economic nationalism, we can see strong tendencies toward 
capitalism, individualism, and corruption. Comprador nationalism reflects the interest of 
businessmen within Nigeria and their influence on the federal military government. In 
reference to the nationalization, an official from Shell underscores the government 
received from the civil service. To the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, he writes: 
There was in any civil service, but especially where, as in Nigeria, it was 
an elite, a feeling that they should be the people who determined the 
future. In Nigeria this resulted in a desire to obtain control over their oil 
resources. The civil service were therefore prepared to use emotion 
generated by an issue like Rhodesia to justify an improper move to seize 
control of the oil industry in their country.528 
 
The above quote suggests that not only the influence of comprador nationalism on 
economic policies, but also, once again, offers evidence that those close to the situation in 
Nigeria recognized the deliberate linkage created between the nationalization and 
southern Africa. Scholars addressing the cultural composition of such pressure groups 
highlight the Yoruba, with a strong presence in Nigeria’s unofficial commerce capital of 
Lagos, and the Muslim landowners and intellectuals from the North. The program of 
economic nationalism during the 1970s, however, reconfigured the appearance of 
affiliations into pressure groups derived from state institutions. 
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 244
 The federal military government put efforts into people attaching their identity not 
with their ethnic group or religion, but in their state. Gowon and Obasanjo put faith in 
their development plans and indigenization decrees to shake up old power structures and 
replace them with new ones. The creation of new states, in which Nigeria went from 
having four regions in 1963 to nineteen states in 1976, was the key. Additionally, the 
federal military government tinkered with the ratios of revenue allocation to meet the 
needs of every state. The federal military government saw some success in that many 
people adhered to the notion of “our oil,” indicating at least some identification with a 
national commodity, it was replaced with intense state-level rivalry and the forging of 
regional polarization. 
By the end of the 1970s, it became apparent that contesting forms of nationalism 
threatened the project of economic nationalism. The focus of most of the secondary 
literature on Nigeria during the 1970s implies that ethnic and religious nationalisms took 
a back seat to this state-sponsored program. But, is this an accurate conclusion? A close 
look at public demands indicates that two developments occurred. On the one hand, 
people did seek state channels during the 1970s to voice concerns and complaints. 
Individuals put a great deal of hope in the oil boom to improve their situation. On the 
other, ethnic claims became disguised as state demands. Complaints about environmental 
degradation caused by oil facilities were not expressed in terms of ethnicity, but in terms 
of state affiliation. A north-south divide also occurred in the mid-1970s. By the 1980s, it 
turned into hostility between Muslims in the North and non-Muslims in the South. All 
over the country, people turned to social institutions to help with financial problems and 
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political disputes. Ethnic nationalism and religious nationalism, while always existing 
during the 1970s, increased in visibility after 1978. 
 States during the 1970s received the majority of their funding through the revenue 
allocation scheme, which made them highly dependent on the federal military 
government. Individual states found themselves competing for scarce resources when the 
oil boom ended. The NEP decrees, development plans, and nationalizations were 
supposed to release some of the pressure of this situation. When funding and business 
opportunities for individuals dwindled, problems of ethnic and religious tension started to 
surface.  
Ultimately, the program of economic nationalism initiated by the federal military 
government during the 1970s succeeded in turning away foreign firms and empowering 
local businessmen. It failed to promote long-term economic development and sustainable 
growth. The basic living conditions of most Nigerians did not change as improvements to 
infrastructure did not keep pace with population growth or distribution within the 
country. How did Nigeria end up this way? How can we prevent this kind of economic 
backslide in the future? With this kind of major economic transformation in the span of 
one decade, it is no wonder that the Nigeria during the 1970s is a major topic of research.  
 
Areas for Further Research 
There are many areas in which further investigation is warranted. Most secondary 
works on oil in Nigeria focus on the upstream sector, in which the nationalization of BP 
and the formation of the NNPC figure prominently. These events certainly affected the 
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national consciousness of Nigerians, particularly among those living within the oil-
producing Niger Delta. However, Nigeria also passed decrees related to the downstream 
sector, which, arguably, affected larger segments of the population than the downstream 
sector. In the early 1970s, Nigeria began the policy of subsidizing the price of petroleum 
products to make them more accessible to Nigerians. It also took over the marketing 
operations of nearly every major foreign oil company in the country and created national 
marketing companies to meet growing demand in remote regions of the country. These 
decrees had a tremendous and long-lasting impact on Nigerians’ national consciousness 
and perspective on the role of oil in their lives. Chronic fuel shortages that were never 
relieved coupled with cross-border smuggling made the nationalistic plan of “oil for 
everyone” into a cruel joke. While the nationalist transformations in the upstream sector 
affected many Nigerians, those changes in the downstream sector affected the majority of 
the population directly or indirectly. This is just one area that has yet to be studied and 
would make a substantial contribution to the field of oil in Nigeria.  
A second area in need of further research also emerged while researching and 
writing about the nationalization of BP. This area for further study includes looking 
explicitly at the linkage between the nationalization projects of the 1970s and the crisis in 
the Niger Delta that reach global attention in the early 1990s. Primary documentation 
thus far collected from Nigeria and the UK provide ample evidence of the tension 
between villagers and the oil companies within the Niger Delta starting in the early 
1970s. This kind of project exposes the historical context behind the contemporary crisis 
in the Niger Delta. It has the potential of revealing the problems created in the 1970s due 
to rapid nationalization and the rising tension between the local communities, oil 
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companies, and the oil revenue thirsty national government. A close look at the historical 
underpinnings of this crisis may help policy makers and scholars to better understand the 
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